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SUMMARY and OBJECTIVES 
The subject of this study is long-term, contract-based relationships, demonstrated 
through a variety of cases in the music industry. An alternative legal approach, the 
hypothetical doctrine of unconscionably constructed contracts, is propounded, 
compared with existing law and tested against prominent and recent cases. 
Observational knowledge gained over fifteen years of experience and contact with 
writers, performers, managers, agents and lawyers, led to the study. Thus, that industry 
was specifically considered, although there may be other industries where the concept 
could be applied. 
Because the relationships discussed are vulnerable to breakdown causing costly 
litigation, current rules and doctrines may fall short of providing adequate advice and 
governance to a needy business class. 
Whatever the outcome, judicial ruling and cost to the various parties, cases with similar 
root cause and argument recur time and again, decade after decade. Neither side, 
creative nor corporate appears to learn enough from experience. Their inability to 
understand guidance and governance offered by the law is examined, as are other 
possible reasons for their apparent recalcitrance. 
Relevant areas of contract law are found to be undue influence, restraint of trade and 
inequality of bargaining power. Underlying judicial concern over public policy and 
unconscionable behaviour is recognised as important. 
Combined with the study of contract law theory and practices, is an examination of the 
nature of the parties, creative and corporate. Economic, personal and commercial 
factors which influence their behavioural patterns have been analysed. Economics 
analysis methodology combined with behavioural and personality analysis has led to an 
understanding of those aspects of long-term contractual conduct which are often the 
cause of relational breakdown. 
The music industry is seen to be receptive to improvements offered by thoughtfully 
structured law. The parties anticipate intervention and attempt to utilise rules of law in 
building and severing their obligation to each other. Therefore, it is believed here that 
the hypothetical doctrine offered would give tighter definition, resulting in better 
practice in the preparation of contracts and reduce the frequency of costly litigation. 
1 
TABLE of CONTENTS 
Introduction ....................................................................................... 5 
PART ONE 
GENERAL RESEARCH and DISCUSSION 
MUSIC INDUSTRY CONTRACTS and CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
1: 2 The Music Industry Contract, Comments on Its Development and Content ............ 17 
1: 3 Music Industry Contractual Relationships, Comments on Sources of, and 
Approaches to Problems .......................................................................................... 24 
THE BASIS of the HYPOTHESIS 
2: The Hypothetical Doctrine of Unconscionably Constructed Contracts .................... 35 
2: 1 General ................................................................................................................... 35 
2: 2 The Parties ............................................................................................................. 35 
2: 3 General Scope ........................................................................................................ 35 
2: 4 Suggested Conduct and The Terms of an Agreement .............................................. 37 
2: 5 Advisors 
................................................................................................................. 38 
2: 6 What Follows and Why ............................................... .................................... 40 
THE CONCEPT of UNCONSCIONABILITY has a HISTORY 
3: The Emergence, in English Contract Law, of the Principle of Unconscionability; 
Judicial Recognition of Relational Subtleties ........................................................... 43 
3: 1 The Development of Judicial Attitudes ................................................................... 44 
3: 2 The Historical Progress of Unconscionability as a Legal Concept ........................... 45 
3: 3 From the Concept of `Not equal to Protecting himself There is Evidence of 
Judicial Attempts to Create a Stand Alone Doctrine ................................................ 47 
3: 4 The Conceptualisation of Inequality of Bargaining Power -A Notion of Public 
Policy ...................................................................................................................... 48 
3: 5 The Continued Development of the Pseudo-Rule, or Principle, of Inequality of 
Bargaining Power 
................................................................................................... 50 
2 
THE EFFECT of INEQUALITY of BARGAINING POWER 
4: The Difficulty in Defining the Status of the Parties When This is Used as a 
Measure to Justify Intervention at Law, And the Effect of the Principle of 
Inequality of Bargaining Power ............................................................................... 53 
4: 1 Could Principal Parties Find Themselves Unacceptably Categorised into Classes 
of High Degree Incompetence? .............................................................................. f 
54 
4: 2 Should The Source and Value of Independent Advice Have Measurable 
Accountability Toward Apportioning Blame and Responsibility? ............................ 55 
DEVELOPMENTS Via UNDUE INFLUENCE 
5: Undue Influence How it Has Applied in The Music Industry .................................. 61 
5: 1 The Fleetwood Mac Case ....................................................................................... 62 
5: 2 Gilbert O'Sullivan 
................................................................................................... 64 
5: 3 Evaluating Undue Influence as a Governance Factor to the Industry - The 
Inclusion of the Principle of Inequality of Bargaining Power and the Cross-over 
With the Common Law Doctrine of Restraint of Trade ........................................... 67 
5: 4 The Stone Roses Case 
............................................................................................ 70 
DEVELOPMENTS via RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
6: The Initiation of The Application of the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade, Leading 
up to A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay [ 1974] ............................ 73 
6: 1 A Closer Look at A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay .................... 79 
6: 1: 1 Lord Reid 
............................................................................................................... 79 
6: 1: 2 Lord Diplock .......................................................................................................... 82 
6: 2 The Standard Form: Clauses From The Schroeder Contract .................................... 83 
6: 3 The Paradox of Duration ........................................................................................ 85 
COMMENT 
7: Abusing a Doctrine Will Cause Further Lack of Clarity in the Law ........................ 88 
COMMENT 
8: Why Has this Area of Contract Remained in the Domain of Common Law: Why 
Not Statutory Intervention? 
..................................................................................... 91 
3 
ACADEMIC APPROACHES 
9: The Concept of Co-operation ................................................................................. 
96 
9: 1 Co-operation Intra-Contract or Mere Economic Self Interest and Utility 
Maximisation: The point of View of Roger Brownsword ....................................... 96 
9: 2 The View of Hugh Collins ...................................................................................... 98 
9: 3 The view of Morten Hviid .................................................................................... 100 
RESEARCH into THOSE WHO MAKE UP the [POP] MUSIC INDUSTRY 
10: The Nature and Characteristics of Those Who Constitute the Music Industry ....... 104 
10: 1 The Businessmen 
................................................................................................. 105 
10: 2 Development in the Industry - Will it Change the Characters Who Forge the 
Relationships? ....................................................................................................... 109 
11: The Artists ............................................................................................................ 114 
11: 1 A Propensity toward Lifestyle Shifts is an Artist's Character Trait Which Can be 
Damaging to Long-term Relationships .................................................................. 115 
11: 2 Destructiveness 
..................................................................................................... 117 
12: A Paradigm of The Artist - Built From Survey Responses and Interviews 
Combined With Information From Relevant Case Reports 
.................................... 120 
12: 1 Questionnaire Analysis Results 
............................................................................. 121 
COMMENT 
13: The Potential Impact if Law Continues to Evade the Industry Mind Set ................ 127 
4 
PART TWO 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING AGAINST the GEORGE MICHAEL CASE 
14: The Principle and Operation of the Hypothetical Doctrine of Unconscionably 
Constructed Contracts 
.......................................................................................... 130 
14: 1 George Michael, Personal Characteristics and Career Building ............................. 130 
14: 2 Events Leading To Panayiotou v Sony [1994] ...................................................... 132 
14: 3 The Onlooker's View of the Case From Sony's Perspective ................................. 1.34 
14: 4 Panayioutou and Others v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd ........................... 137 
14: 5 Testing the Hypothetical Doctrine ........................................................................ 139 
14: 6 Summary of Findings in Respect of Whether there was an Unconscionably 
Constructed Contract: 
........................................................................................... 154 
ARGUMENTS RELIED UPON 
15: Arguments Which Support the Proposed Approach 
............................................... 159 
15: 1 Inequality of Bargaining Power ............................................................................ 159 
15: 2 Good Faith 
............................................................................................................ 164 
15: 3 Public Policy 
........................................................................................................ 165 
15: 4 Economics Considerations 
.................................................................................... 166 
15: 5 Academic Suggestions 
.......................................................................................... 168 
15: 6 Behavioural Traits 
................................................................................................ 170 
16: What Has Been Rejected in Formulating the Hypothesis ....................................... 173 
THE MOST RECENT EVENT 
17: Nicholl and Another v Ryder (1998) .................................................................... 179 
5 
Introduction: The Hypothesis 
The hypothesis here is that English Common Law contract law would be improved by 
the substantive development of a new operational principle. For the purposes of this 
discourse the, suggested principle has been called the Doctrine of Unconscionably 
Constructed Contracts. To support the argument, the music industry has been identified 
as representative of a class of contracting parties that may benefit from the application 
of such a principle. In legal terms there appear to be three prevalent doctrines at play 
through music industry disputes which are relevant to the discussion to be had here. 
These doctrines are restraint of trade, undue influence and the question of whether or 
not any defensive plea of proprietary estoppel (or waiver or laches; it seems unclear as 
to the appropriate term) is properly available. 
To test the argument that a new approach at law would be advantageous, case history 
drawn directly from the music industry as well as surrounding influential cases will be 
analysed. Alongside this case law, specialist and general commentary from academic 
text and relevant reports such as trade journals and newspapers will be discussed. This 
discussion will raise evidence for the suggestion that the music industry grasps only 
disparate elements of the above mentioned, currently operable doctrines and principles 
of contract law. This is shown in the manner in which these have been raised arguendo 
through litigation and, over time, have become mis-utilised by those in the music 
industry in pre-trial circumstances. Academic and general responses to these litigious 
events add a dimension of influential analysis which is constructive toward offering a 
structure for alternative or additional new law. The most recent culmination of this area 
of inquiry is provided via the judgement of Thorpe L. J. in Ryder v Nicholl and Anoiher, 2 
given in the Court of Appeal on 15th December 1999. That case has provided a timely 
insight to current judicial responses to those questions and debates in which this 
discourse is footed. Furthermore, a substantial degree of the closing argument here has 
been built around that case in its capacity as provider of up to date comparators and tests 
for the hypothetical doctrine. 
In addition to argument footed in traditional legal studies it has been found to be 
important in this discussion to examine the behavioural characteristics of contracting 
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parties from the music industry. It is believed that a specific understanding of the 
mindset of the industry is a necessary corollary to any serious attempt at suggesting how 
and why communication with it can be improved. The motivation behind the 
hypothesis here is that contract law is, or should be, a tool of behavioural governance 
and it is understood that this is a conceptual tool which can operate only through 
controlled and efficient communication. 
Having accepted that contractual disputes and contract law are very much a topic of 
human behaviour, a significant proportion of the test for the hypothetical doctrine of 
Unconscionably Constructed Contracts is focused on the discovered characteristics and 
nature of parties in the music industry, To furnish this discussion a variation of the 
Briggs-Myers Type Indicators test has been used to build a survey questionnaire. The 
test was circulated to 25 up and coming, creative artists4 (musicians, soloists and 
lyricists), of those 16 completed the questions. In addition personal experience gathered 
during some ten years working in that industry has been combined with interviews and 
discussions with 
professionals drawn from UK based recording and publishing company offices and 
conducted during the period taken for this research. Further character studies have been 
drawn from biographical material, music industry books and commentaries, all of which 
have been recommended from within the industry. 
The core debate, which runs through the majority of academic discussions surrounding 
both the validity of a stand alone doctrine of unconscionability and the nature of music 
industry cases at law, frequently highlights considerations of the balance of economics 
influences in these areas. Thus it has been found necessary to observe here the 
influence of gains maximisation, whether that be idealistic or pecuniary. This 
observation must be levelled at those parties entering in to contractual relationships as 
well as those already in dispute. All of the relationships subject to this discussion are, 
of necessity, long-term relationships. This fact is considered to be pertinent to the 
context of relevant economics based issues and the placing of those issues within this 
discourse. 
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Observation suggests that while relevant parties, commentators and law makers 
(advisors, advocates and judiciary) remain to some degree conscious of economics 
influences on contractual behaviour in this field, less clarity of awareness is evident 
over the power or potential power of [common law] contract law itself as an industry- 
wide governance factor. Therefore, some emphasis has been afforded to the 
possibilities for lawmakers to utilise a new approach such as the hypothetical doctrine 
of unconscionably constructed contracts, as a tool with which improved behaviour 
patterns might be engineered. The scope for improvement ranges from pre-formation 
negotiation through to planning and maintaining the long-term, contractually based 
relationships. This incorporates expectations management from the moment of first 
meeting or speaking and, of course, expectations management at those times of 
relational breakdown irrespective of whether that breakdown leads, or is likely to lead to 
litigation. Furthermore, such an approach at law to the relationship should encourage a 
greater understanding between the judiciary and the contracting community. It is 
anticipated that this approach would render clarity to the judicial delivery of guidance 
and remedy. This in turn would enable confident shifts in contractual based relationship 
behaviour. 
In order that the concept of the hypothetical doctrine be tested as rigorously as possible, 
factors from throughout the following discussion and research have been pulled together 
to draw up a suggested draft for that doctrine. This consists of general advisory notes 
targeted at defining the scope and intention of the doctrine. At the conclusion of this 
discourse, framed by the scope and definitions given at 2 below, and guided by the 
relevant case law, academic discussion and empirical research which follows, applicable 
tests and questions are offered. These, it is felt, could be raised in practice towards the 
purpose of settling such disputes as the doctrine intends to address. Refinement beyond 
the broad discussion on estoppel/waiver, like specific quantum meruit where restitzitio 
ab initio is not possible and other case-specific technicalities are not considered part of 
this discussion. It is felt that these decisions remain within the domain of courtroom 
response to facts and circumstances. 
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1: General Comments About Standard Form Contracts and Consideration of 
Their Place in Music Industry Contractual Relationships 
An overview of Standard Form Contracts raises a number of questions. In essence they 
exist as a tool of convenience but they are often considered oppressive either by 
intention or unintentionally by virtue of their construction. It can be stated at an early 
point that the belief here is that music industry standard form contracts are not malicious 
documents intended to mask onerous terms and/or deceitful clauses. They are merely 
standardised tools, designed and developed out of a need for expedience and economy. 
That is not to say that there have not been those who have set out to tip the balance of 
benefit in the favour of their employer, or, in some cases their own business interests, be 
they invested in recording or publishing houses. Overall, however, it is not those 
instances which have attracted the attention of this study. In contemporary practice there 
is some form of review of the contract in most cases and some opportunity for an artist 
or writer to allow his advisor (generally a solicitor) to suggest amendments. 5 Having 
said that, the basic standardised form will be generated by the 
record/management/publishing company and negotiations will be thus limited. Also, 
following A Schroeder Music Publishing Ltd. v Macaule it can be taken that the 
judiciary consider music industry contracts as `standard form' and apply the law 
accordingly. Over and above the origin of the documentation, what has been brought to 
focus here is the relationship, contractual relationship that is, for which the paper 
contract in this industry has apparently become the copingstone. Thus, this discourse 
will attempt to move beyond a narrow analysis of published contractual terms and 
conditions in order to inspect the interaction between parties to the contract and between 
those parties and contract law. It is felt here that the nature of this approach to 
analysing this class of contract has been structured not so much by design as by the 
forces of the nature of the subjects under study. Even though the discussion must 
necessarily visit debate and views offered through academic and court room opinion, it 
seems that the nature and characteristics of both creative and corporate parties to music 
industry business relationships, prevent either themselves or the onlooker from 
restricting their attention to a singular focus on 'rules of law'. 
9 
For example, in building or engineering industries' it would appear that standard form 
contracts forge a literal link between parties who enter into long term business 
relationships and who intend to advise, supply or carry out some physical activity for 
each other in the interests of maintaining their ongoing livelihood. In these industries, 
the concept of acceptable waiver (over delivery conditions or similar contractual terms) 
to give effect to the spot intentions of the parties in their long-term relationships is not 
uncommon. However, this has not developed as acceptable standard practice to bring 
flexibility in music industry cases. ß The standard form contract in the music industry 
has a substantially different role than mere evidence of a flexible working agreement. 
Its position within the relationships under discussion here might lead one to believe that 
`the contract', in some popularly mythicised guise, sits in its prepared state on the 
record company or publisher's shelf, waiting to be handed down to the eager artist like a 
dose of efficacious, sugared tonic. It can be conjectured that when a builder gets a 
contract to build, he is delighted to have his immediate future mapped out and can set 
about planning the business of carrying out the building work, ordering the necessary 
labour and organising the ensuing income. When a creative artists gets a contract with a 
recording or publishing company, observation suggests that his mind stops short of the 
future and dwells on the triumph in the instant victory of attaining what is in his hand. 
Future creativity, future productivity and business management are not key concerns of 
the creative party at this juncture. He appears to assume that the future will take care of 
itself as a direct result of this paper document to which he is now a party. This 
statement may be something of a broad generalisation, but evidence here supports that it 
is only when the relationship reaches some aspect of personal or behavioural frustration 
that the formation of the contractual document will be addressed. This tends to be acted 
out in a vitriolic manner, the artists generally expressing a vehement wish for severance 
rather than flexibility. This comment, it is felt, is supported by all or any of the music 
industry cases cited below, 9 
In exploring why music industry contractual relationships demand studies and solutions 
which go beyond the confines of mere contract law, as it now stands, it has become 
evident that there is a substantial weakness in this business based activity. This is that 
the parties pay little attention to the gaining of a general understanding of the depths, 
10 
drives and philosophies of contract law itself. This comment is made inspite of the fact 
that in the history of the music industry, its leading corporations have often been headed 
up and populated by qualified or part-qualified lawyers. By comparison it appears that 
while the building industry example suggests avoidance of strict application of the rules 
of contract law, there is surely an inherent understanding of common law ethos and 
contract law in general in the choices of variation and waiver. By comparison, and as 
will be discussed at length later, both the George Michael'0 party and the Shaun Ryder" 
party gravely underestimated the strength of their argument footed in restraint of trade 
given that in both cases it was found that variation and waiver worked against them and 
were the very principles which put victory at the feet of the other side. 
Through their strong, often volatile personalities, music industry `figure heads' tend to 
dominate therefore personify the corporations which they represent. 12 They do not, 
however, make a practice of deep philosophical study in the same way as, say, the 
judiciary might. The tendency is rather more toward business law, copyright or 
commercial law, (generally these areas tend to be based in legislation rather more than 
cultivated from judge-made or Common-law13). Their forte will be to demonstrate 
sharp litigious wit and an understanding of the type of legalese employed in drafting 
businesses and business contracts. Amongst this class who are so often dancing a 
commercial Texan waltz (one step forward, two steps backwards) in their contractually 
bound relationship building, surprisingly little effort is made toward taking control of 
what effects might be imposed by common law contract. Neither party takes control of 
the spectrum of behavioural effects contract law intends to introduce, let alone control 
of the delivery of their own genuine intentions, in order to bring to bear success in their 
ongoing business. At the outset of such a relationship, there is no evidence that either 
party shows direct concern that the industry-standard contract clauses which they 
employ regularly fail to represent industry standard expectations on one part or the 
other. Clarity in the formation of the relationship is not achieved by the issuing of 
industry standardised contracts, although that is, in many respects the standard form 
purpose. 
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Artists and composers, it would seem, are as notorious in the 1990s for their apparent 
business naivety as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. At least it could have been 
argued, some forty years ago that there was comparatively little industry custom or 
experience, in the rock and pop field, upon which to base their expectations. As will be 
discussed throughout this text, this class of individuals has, however, developed the 
habit of progressing the relationship for some time and then attempting to bolt from 
their contractual obligations. Generally this tends to coincide with bursts of significant 
self-awareness, triggered by spurts of career enhancing developmental shifts. 
'; This, in 
turn, triggers a drive to force radical change within the microenvironment in which the 
individual functions. For both sound as well as selfish motives, allegations of restraint 
of trade's will be levelled against the standard form contract. The purpose behind such 
an allegation will be to either (a) force the other party to the relationship to concede to 
unplanned alterations in the ongoing business progress; or (b) to attempt to force the 
other party to release the individual from that contract. It seems that the standard form 
contract, which at once crystallises the creative party's desires and ambitions, will later 
be perceived as nothing more that a fettering agent. 
Corporate industry parties on the other hand, have honed and refined portions of their 
contracts in reaction to changes in trade practices, or as a veritable knee-jerk response to 
high profile cases. However, it is felt here that these changes have been minimal, 
tending to focus on financial reward rather than long-term relationship nurturing. 
Proposals which embrace the real costs and losses bound in bad relationship 
management are only to be found in specialist academic comment and, as with in-depth 
judicial commentary, the majority of this falls on stony ground when it comes to 
seeding behavioural reform. The irony of this is that it is a successful, long-term 
relationship that both parties must intend and desire from the outset. This is what the 
standardised contractual documents are set out to achieve, because this is the structure 
on which the whole economic philosophy of this industry is founded. A continuous 
string of one off exchanges would not enable the huge profits or high profile market 
positioning which the long-term relationships in this industry allow to accrue. 
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In analysing standard form contracting as a behavioural tenet, it is possible to say that 
there are two schools of approach. There are those who believe that these standardised, 
company authored contracts represent lengthy and deliberate attempts to entrap an artist, 
lyricist or composer (the creative party) into a relationship which is heavily biased, 
apropos of benefits to be gained from the ensuing commercial activity, in favour of that 
company. This achievement of gains would be the result of the accumulation of many 
lengthy and complex clauses that would baffle the expectations of the naive. But, these 
clauses have been tested and revised over a period of some one hundred years (initially 
through music hall and variety entertainment contracts). So if it were true that creative 
parties continue to arrive at the contract in such a naive and ill equipped state that they 
have never influenced the terms of their agreements then this discourse will set out to 
ascertain why. This question must surely extend to ask why contract law has not, 
through ratio and deliberation, provided the naive with the tools required to strengthen 
his propositions for a successful future. 
If there is a failure in the reach of the law here, there are those16 who would suggest that 
it is as a direct result of a purposive philosophy of laissez faire. This view legitimately 
harps back to the origins of some modern-day principles at law and the surrounding 
political policies of the 18u' and 19'h centuries. It can be argued that this perspective on 
the nature of music industry standard from contracts, along with views on the industry's 
propensity for alleging restraint or restriction of trade, is the most common approach. 
This approach, and the discussive points so raised, is supported by evidence which 
tracks the evolution of the legal principle of inequality of bargaining power in this field. 
This subject will be analysed in detail through the following pages. 
On the other hand there are those who suspect that the same standardised documents are 
merely overly complex and potentially noxious as a result of bad husbandry. This 
suspicious approach to observed legal complexity could be partially explained by the 
realisation that, over time, linguistic legalese has become unintelligible to the layman. 
This is not because the layman cannot read, or cannot read adequately, as may have 
been the case for the general populous in centuries gone by, but because the twentieth 
century layman literally speaks and reads an equally complex but quite different modem 
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language. The fact is that to replace antiquated (albeit thoroughly interpreted) legal 
phraseology with modern terminology is proven, necessarily, to require equally lengthy 
and detailed passages. In many industries the current drive toward `plain English' in the 
development of all documentation might prove disturbing to practitioners and students 
of law alike. Instances will inevitably arise where this fashion for word-economy will 
cause draftsmen to neglect the precision with which legally binding matters must be 
conveyed if they are to have any enforceable effect. If such attention to detail were to 
be neglected for the sake of economy or linguistic simplicity then the `contract' may 
carry unintended gaps or may be subjected to unanticipated misinterpretation. Thus it is 
believed here that wordy music industry contracts should retain their bulk and that there 
is some value in the reticence with which standardised contracts become subject to 
change. In the same context, however, one method for building changes in to 
standardised contracts has been observed during this research with some alarm. " 
During interviews carried out for this discourse the habit of drawing paragraphs to build 
contracts from printed or electronic database sources has been witnessed. This practice 
results in the patching together of paragraphs and phrases for the sake of expedience, 
and seems prevalent in entertainment based businesses when building contracts for 
services between parties neither of whom (in the main) understand the actual or specific 
meanings of their texts. It has been observed here that this type of standard form 
writing leaves the central corporate party and each of the individual creative parties with 
unique and often contradictory beliefs over the meaning of certain clauses within their 
document. Therefore, it could be argued, in simple contract law terms that there is no 
contract between these parties because there is no real agreement, no consensus ad 
idem. It certainly makes contractual dispute, in the event of disagreement during the 
relationship very complex and costly when a) clauses may, in fact, be meaningless; 
and/or b) whether the clause(s) are meaningless or not, each party has a different 
interpretation of what they believe the clause set out to mean. This observation only 
applies to what might be described as the fringes of the entertainment industry where 
the companies involved are low budget or inexperienced, substantial and long practising 
parties are, naturally, better advised and better equipped. But the philosophy in some 
quarters that contracts, especially standard form contracts, are documents which the 
majority will not understand anyway seems to fuel the continuing failure to try to 
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understand as well as negating expectations that any non-specialist could understand 
what is written. What this shows is that this approach to the study and analysis of 
standardised contracts is not contradictory to the lessaize faire approach given above, 
but should be considered as equally valuable and additional to the study as undertaken 
here. 
By broadening the perspective of this analysis, and in contrast to the pessimistic views 
portrayed above, it is possible to argue that a standardised paper contract which has 
been revised through the last forty to fifty years by a company such as CBS, RCA or 
Warner Brothers makes perfect economic sense for both parties at the outset of what is 
intended by both to become a long and satisfying relationship. What will be assumed 
from here onward is that it is the relationship in total, not merely the tangible evidence 
of the birth of the relationship which must be analysed if genuine industry problems are 
to be identified and addressed. With this principle in mind, common sense would 
suggest that that years of experience and consequent revision should have encouraged 
documented clauses which engender relational co-operation. However, it is believed 
here that this common sense ideal may be isolated as the juncture at which there is 
prevalent failure in good quality contract making in this industry. Observation, as 
discussed post, suggests that such an ideal symbiosis of the commercial and the personal 
factions has not been attained, either within the paper contract (whether standardised or 
not) or within the relationship which it serves to bind. There is a paradox in that the 
commercial entity, say a record company, will have its focus fixed on maintaining a 
market place success continuum which precludes the agreement from allowing 
indulgence in experimental output from successful, high turnover artists. At the same 
time, an individual record company executive 18 is likely, by virtue of his mode of 
livelihood, to have a deep personal understanding of the forces which change an artist's 
drives and feelings toward what is important in terms of experimenting with musical 
style, lifestyle, political style and so on. For the majority of the time the executive and 
the artist will carry the relationship unimpeded by the formalities of the company or its 
standardised contract. But this is virtually a three party contract, Company, Executive 
and creative Artist each having a distinct and personalised input. When any two of the 
parties come into dispute about performance of contractual obligations or indeed 
15 
performance of relational duties then the relationship itself will tend to swing from one 
of personalised support, friendship and advice to one of self-only benefit maximisation, 
market place positioning and, frankly, profit potential. In these instances, 19 even if the 
artist is the party who is behaving badly in contractual terms, his adversary represents 
an unusually dichotomous opponent. This in itself encourages argument, even at law, to 
take on deeply personal opinions which are unusual in commerce based law 
considerations. Standardised contracts cannot be said to be responsible for the three 
way relationship so described, but at present none of the standard issue in use address 
the inherent problems of such relationships to any satisfactory extent, and neither, it is 
felt here, does the law itself. 
So, to clarify the hypothesis on which this work is based, and to identify the beliefs 
underlying the commentary surrounding research findings for this discourse it must be 
said that long-term relational contracts, on which the music industry is founded, go 
beyond transactions intended to achieve mere capital gain. Albeit that the legal context 
of this breadth of contractual scope remains un-preplanned and unintentional on the part 
of the draftsmen or their employers. 
It is speculated here that if the subject matter was merely simple transaction or series of 
transactions exchanging talent for money (via selfish and/or unnecessarily complicated 
written terms) then there would be considerably fewer contractual problems arising, and 
certainty almost none of those to be discussed post. 
Furthermore, whereas studies such as that of David Yates20 suggest that the operation of 
standard form contracts causes the individuality of the parties to become irrelevant, it is 
contended here that such sensitive long-term contract based relationships as will be 
found in the music and entertainment industries actually incorporate individuality. 
Therefore these contracts, and contract law should have developed sufficient scope to 
address what is incorporated, in total, inclusive of personal expectations as well as what 
ever other matter constitutes individuality. It is surely not possible, given the 
expectations and intentions of music industry contracts, for the individuality of either 
the industry executive or of the creative party to become irrelevant. Yates' comment 
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seems particular only to the consideration of consumer contracting, as do the majority of 
comments and discussions centred on standard form contract problems. In response: 
firstly, there is rarely the formation of any long term relationship of such dependence 
between consumer and retailer and/or consumer and manufacturer as there is in 
contracts binding entertainment industry relationships; Secondly that discussion in 
general focuses heavily on the tendency to include exclusion clauses within consumer 
based standard forms. Commentaries like Yates' might, therefore, be set aside from the 
discourse in hand. However, attention must later be paid to the effects of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1977, and the operation of section 3(2) in relation to the long term, 
contract based, business relationships. This portion of the discussion will also explore 
whether, if UCTA is applicable, later European legislation is capable of intervention in 
future cases of the nature under study here. Returning to the point initiated here, 
individuality (character) is key to the package for which the bargain is struck in music 
industry contracts. 
It is felt here that the paper contract represents approximately one third of the substance 
of the legally binding relationship. The other two parts being the long-term personal 
relationship between the creative party and the industry representative with whom he 
most regularly deals, and the long-term commercial expectations of the two. It might be 
protested that the paper documentation cannot be intrinsic to the contract because it is 
merely the carrier of the contract in written form, but what is to be revealed is that the 
concept of the contract in this area has evolved so that the thing itself and the getting of 
that thing have become materially significant. The parties do not initiate their 
relationship by stating what commercial activities they promise to carry out, but by 
saying here is material evidence of a `contract' with RCA/CBS/Sony/Accuf Rose [etc. ], 
we agree to allow you the creative artist, to have, hold, own and sign this contract; then: 
we agree that you the creative artist have a relationship with us; then, because we have 
gifted you with our [paper]contract and entered into an agreement to carry on a 
relationship with you there will be commercial activity to which we can all appoint 
expectations. Here is the evidence that you, the creative artist, are now a fully signed up 
participant in `show-business'. 
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This document enables that creative artist to describe "my record company. . ." or "my 
publisher ... " or "my manager. . . ". The rock and pop mega-star are 
icons of the 20th 
and now the 21a century and these contracts and the relationships surrounding them 
exist in an ethos of licenses to become legendary, at least within a given market if not 
on an international scale in all cases. That is the expectation which the creative party 
brings to the deal. These emotive and unwritten additions to the contract are a 
substantial part of what this work sets out to measure and evaluate. The same may be 
true in a few other industries such as the literary and artistic publishing industry 
perhaps, but in the main it is not the subject of discussion or conjecture in works about 
contract law. This is perceived here as a shortfall in works elaborating on contract law 
for academic enlargement of the subject. Socially this may underpin a gross oversight in 
the development of the operation of this area of law and legal regard for relationships in 
the name of public policy. 
1: 2 The Music Industry Contract, Comments on Its Development and Content 
In creating an overview of the development of music industry contracts it is interesting, 
at this stage, to reflect on a piece of anecdotal evidence of early use of standardised 
contracting. The subject is not specifically musical, but can be seen to represent one of 
the early exercises in creating and marketing popular records. 
The story is part of the life story of Pantomime comedian Sandy Powell: 21 
During a visit to his agent, Walter Bentley, in 1929, Sandy Powell overheard that a 
recording arrangement had been finalised between some American singers and Vocalion 
Gramophone Company, London. Powell complained that the agent didn't make such 
arrangements for English acts. The next day, Bentley told Powell that he had arranged 
for him to go and record at Vocalion with Recording Chief, Bill Hanson. As stated 
above this was not a recording of music, Powell chose to record a popular stage sketch 
called The Lost Policeman. The company's selection board accepted the recording and 
it was decided that the record, an eight inch, 78 rpm with a duration of ten minutes, 
would be released on the Broadcast label at a price of One Shilling. Powell was offered 
a choice of contract, he could either take a one-off payment of £60 on release and have 
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no further rights in the record, or he could take a payment of £30 as the recording 
session fee and retain the rights to royalties for each copy sold. He chose the latter. The 
Lost Policeman sold over half a million units and during the next few years a total of 
seventy-nine recordings, released on Rex, Broadcast, Imperial, and Victory labels, sold 
some seven million units. Royalties from these records earned upward of £12,000 per 
year. 
That Sandy Powell story serves to make a distinction between lengthy, and often 
restrictive Artist Contracts such as those which were developing in Hollywood during 
that era, 22 and the almost informal attitude toward the agreement between a recording 
company and an artist during this time of music industry development. Unfortunately 
the informal and uninformed attitude of many would-be performers and writers in the 
early part of this century did lead to many instances of mischievous advantage being 
taken by sharp recording companies. For example The Manhattan Brothers, 23 have 
stated that they were taken in to recording studios and recorded but then told that 
"Blacks were not entitled to royalties". Undoubtedly, during this development period 
there are many cases of genuine misrepresentation, undue influence or just plain 
unequal bargains entered in to by those naive would-be singers. It was not uncommon 
to sign single sheet agreements to record songs for $5 or $10.24 Artists', lyricists' and 
composers' representation, along with industry executives themselves, can be presumed 
to have become more sophisticated through experience and education during the past 
fifty years. Alongside this, the development of high-speed communications, long 
distance travel and recording and broadcasting technology have all been instrumental in 
the enforced refinement and complex additions to the industry and its standardised 
contracts. The simple exchange of work for a flat fee plus royalties is still the essence of 
music industry contracts but now there has to be protection against reproduction and 
passing off. Consideration must be had for the performance of a composer's material 
other than the original performance, overseas sales must be accounted for, and so-on. 
Beyond this, it might now be accurate to state that the industry-produced contract is the 
materialisation of the creative individual's dreams. It sates his ego and puts into his 
hands tangible proof of his new relationship with industry kudos. As a potential 
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governance factor for this type of industry, contract law must continually find methods 
for broadening the scope of its reach. 
In order to understand the more transient relational issues of long term contractual 
relationships it is, of course, necessary to understand the less flexible and standardised 
terms against which those relationships rest. Starting first of all with the bare facts and 
quantifiable measures of the contracts under, question: An artist or writer/composer can 
expect to find written into a publishing contract for example: Definition of territories 
where the publisher has rights to market and profit from the composition; clauses which 
define the writer/composer's rights to say 10% of the cover price for all sheet music 
sales; 50% of all record royalties from U. K, which the record company will pay to the 
publisher, being some 6.25% of the retail, price less V. A. T.; on joining PRS (the 
Performing Rights Society) some 50% of all performance fee royalties (otherwise paid 
to and claimable from the publisher if the writer is not a member of PRS), this includes 
obligatory fees payable by radio companies, TV broadcasters, and venues for live 
performances. The writer/composer should also get some 50% of any other income, 
which the publisher gets from his work, and there will need to be clauses and definitions 
covering this. Additionally there may be 25% of overseas and/or sub-publishing, 
overseas record royalties; then there will need to be definitions for duration of the 
contract, options to renew and determination arrangements. As can be imagined, an 
aspiration toward a dream life-style and the achievement of success in, creative,. artistic 
terms is hard to reconcile with the type of wording and calculation, which such a 
document must carry when expressing percentages and percentages of percentages per 
se. 
Similarly a record company contract must cover territories within which the company 
may market the product, royalties to publishers for compositions, artists' royalties, 
producers' royalties, retailers' margins, recoupment of the cost of pressing and 
marketing to the record company the record company's own percentage, V. A. T., 
copyright license fees, label and cover costs, duration, options to renew and 
determination arrangements. New additions introduced to these contracts, in respect for 
the rapid changes in playback technology over the last twenty years include wide 
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clauses intended to cover potential release of material through some new medium such 
as the Internet, and mediums which have not yet been invented. These contracts will 
also contain notes about the style of music and characteristics of artistic presentation 
expected. This is because the company will have expertise in specialist markets and 
must be enabled to capitalise on this by being supplied with suitable product. There will 
be notes about the frequency or volume of production of new material so that the 
company can make commercial timetables, plans and arrangements. There may also be 
notes about what degree of tour support and involvement, merchandising support (T- 
shirts and logo/identity bearing product) and other non-direct activity involvement the 
company wishes to undertake. 
A manager's contract will seek to set out what percentages of what percentages the 
manager expects to retain from the artist or writer's various sources of income, the 
extent to which the manager will invest in gaining the artist's position in the industry 
and what he will undertake in order to look after the artist's interests within the various 
activities which must be acted out in order to achieve exposure, credibility and success. 
Add to the above the growing complexity of conditions which have become obligatory 
and integral to the text of a music industry contract like the need for longevity in the 
relationship if commercial success is to be achieved. In Sandy Powell's day high 
profile marketing for such recordings did not really exist and certainly did not represent 
the hundreds of thousands of pounds which a company will nowadays invest (some 
would say gamble) on creating and maintaining the market desire for an artist. Returns 
against such high investment necessitate the obligation of longevity in these contractual 
relationships. Theoretically both parties have opportunities to negotiate the contract to 
their satisfaction (musician is not a synonym for incapacitous idiot) which returns the 
discussion, here, to the early conclusion that the standardisation element of music 
industry contracts is, in the main, a tool of economy and expedience. 
On the matter of these contracts in general, (notwithstanding extra-contractual relational 
issues) the corporate party will set out to gain a long-term commitment of exclusivity. 
As part of its fiduciary duty it is best advised to ensure that: a) the artists' or writers' 
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lawyer, or some other qualified third party, explains the connotations of this exclusivity, 
especially where the artist or writer is young or inexperienced; and b) that there is no 
currently live contract or terms of any contract which binds an interest in the work of 
this artist or writer to some prior relationship. In this industry post-contractual triggers 
operate similarly to covenants of restraint of trade (reasonable or otherwise) in 
employment contracts. There is evidence, following litigious disputes such as those to 
be discussed in the following chapters, that artists and writers have come to believe that 
a combination of options to renew and post-contract clauses are utilised inequitably by 
music industry companies. That is to say that artists and writers who wish to bolt or 
rapidly escape their obligations from the contractual relationship, which generally 
occurs for personal or personality based reasons, will brandish accusations of restraint 
of trade 25 The most recent development in this area, however, is the judgement in 
Nicholls and Another v Ryder 26 where it was given that an artiste would be estopped 
from alleging the contract invalid (by reason of being in unreasonable restraint or trade). 
The artist or writer would be considered to have waived this legal right if he had, for 
any substantial length of time, carried on performing his obligations under that contract 
and/or had caused the other party to alter their position in reliance on that contract, with 
or without detriment to that party. This may be a controversial decision by Thorpe LJ 
and will be discussed as appropriate, in some detail through this discourse. 
A point that may be distinguished here is that the contracts under discussion here are 
never contracts of service or employment, they are contracts for [personal] services. 
Although artists and writers are bound to their record and publishing companies for 
periods spanning years the company does not, in the eyes of the law, have total control 
over how, when or where the creative party goes about creating his wares. The 
company can stipulate acceptable quality and, to some degree, 27 style for the creative 
party's output as well as delivery requirements. It can also reject material or keep it on 
hold once it has been delivered. Indeed, the artist or writer might use facilities provided 
by the company, but these are provided on a hire basis and are paid for out of royalties 
and earnings by the artist or writer, this would indicate shared risk in the costs and 
efforts of the venture. No responsibility is held for working hours or conditions. This 
means that artists and writers fall outside the protection offered by employment law. 
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For example, an individual artist is a self-employed service provider, or a group might 
be a partnership or business in its own right, termination of the contract could never lead 
to a case for urfair dismissal. Fees are not regulated or protected as a legislated right by 
minimum wage stipulations, although the Musicians Union has set minimum standard 
hourly fees but enforcement depends on whether the artist has membership of the union 
and on some degree of co-operation between the artists and the union. Liquidation or 
bankruptcy on the part of one of the parties could never lead to any redundancy rights 
on the part of the other. Similarly there are no enforceable statutory obligations within 
this type of relationship as to health and safety at work, minimum number of working 
hours per week, paid holidays, entitlements during sickness and so on. All of these 
aspects fall within the responsibility of each service provider and he must ensure that he 
has adequate insurances or that the places he visits to provide the promised services 
have public liability or indemnity policies which protect all involved to at least the 
minimum acceptable level. Furthermore, between shows or performances an artist will 
have difficulty in claiming unemployment benefits because these periods are part of his 
business pattern and are not periods of unemployment per se unless he has left his music 
industry career, and that would be self inflicted. 
The reason why these relationships are formulated in this way is because each party 
may seek to contract with several others for the purposes of operating the artists' and 
writers' careers. For example if each artist set himself up as a business and `employed' 
a manager, a producer, recording experts, technical experts and marketing experts and 
so-on, then each manager/producer/recorder would be bound to one creative source. 
Marketing would become impossible and profits would be too thinly spread to benefit 
any one to the degree that they do in reality. That is not to say that a different business 
set up cannot work for a few `mega stars' who generate such great income that it makes 
sense for management and even publishing and recording to be in the ownership or 
employ of the artist. 
On the other hand, exactly why major record companies do not `employ' artists, putting 
into place specialist marketing and technical crew remains unclear. Presumably this is, 
initially, a matter of tradition. The crux seems to be an element of mis-trust between the 
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parties over the matter of the fair distribution of income. Productivity incentives and 
sale related bonus schemes augur against the creative nature of the individual and will 
not produce an environment in which he is content and productive. 
Having added some substance to the understanding of the subject matter here, there are 
two points to be reiterated in order that they be kept in mind: 
1) that the term `standard form', as it is to be understood in context, with reference to 
music industry contracts, implies standard terms and conditions settled by each 
record/publishing/management/agency or producer's company which has had the form 
drawn up. These contractual documents are not standard across the industry, although 
they will naturally be similar. Furthermore each contains flexible negotiable clauses on 
the matter of percentages, royalties and advances. These degrees of remuneration seem 
to both parties to be the focal point of negotiating leverage once it has been decided that 
the artist or writer is capable of creating works that suit the company's marketing 
strategies. 
2) The second point is that it is ownership in the paper item itself and the application of 
the signature to the contract which is, in the minds of the artists, lyricist or composer, 
the manifestation of success. The `thing' which they aspire to gain seems initially to be 
the signed paper form. The ensuing relationship is taken for granted in that it is 
expected to flow, by both parties it seems, as if by magic from the signature to an idyllic 
future of creative satisfaction. However, the relationship, the intensity of mutual respect 
and the areas which will beg compromise, sensitive and personal issues of character 
development and personality shifts28 are not, of course, addressed by the document at 
all. Nor, indeed, are these issues able to be addressed within the current field of 
contract law. In legal terms good faith, mutual trust and confidence, even fiduciary 
duties are restricted to considerations of the technical and quantifiable aspects of the 
contractual relationship. Expectations, in the eyes of the law, can be measured in terms 
of how many recordings or appearances or publications one party is expected to perform 
within a given contractual period. Judicial analysis can only take account of contractual 
restrictions on the utilisation of skills for the purpose of earning a living. 29 Judicial 
measures of undue influence have, in the past, 30 rarely stopped to calculate the self- 
24 
deception of the eager artist or the ill informed intervention of enthusiastic parents, 
wives or friends in their bid to attain that signed contract. 
1: 3 Music Industry Contractual Relationships, Comments on Sources of, and 
Approaches to Problems 
Each artist, lyricist or composer comes to each contract in his capacity as an industrial 
unit, trading the successive manufacture of unique items (songs or performances) 
against a percentage of the income that each specialist company can generate through 
expert handling and exploitation. Conversely, once one of these companies obtains an 
interest in the created work it transposes this one-off piece of art, via the process of 
multiple copying, into a commodity of potentially limitless market duration. The 
relationship between the creator of the work and the work itself occurs at two levels 
then. Initially it is for the act of fresh creation that the artist or writer is expecting to be 
rewarded. At this stage he faces (sometimes daily) the ego bruising experience of 
rejection or criticism and the possibility that this unit of creativity will be rejected or put 
on hold. Once the unit has been accepted and reproduction commences then live 
performances will carry on like a supply of hand baked cakes, each time one is 
purchased and consumed another, equally as good, must be baked and offered up to the 
market. A new baker will make a new interpretation of the recipe just the same as 
another singer, or even the same singer when he appears at different venues, will make a 
new interpretation of a song. Hopefully, although each will be different it will be just as 
good so that the market desire is maintained. Similarly, hard copies of the material may 
amount to one release running into thousands or even hundreds of thousands of sales, 
sometimes millions world-wide. However, a successful song will run to many releases 
by many artists and will have the option to return to the market as a re-release or as an 
item on a compilation album. All of these points of sale along with radio and TV play 
and nowadays internet exposure will represent a percentage royalty to the original writer 
and the artists involved. It is the responsibility of record, publishing and management 
companies to ensure that the royalties represent fair remuneration to the creative 
individuals. Because of the nature of the contractual relationship in this industry the 
corporate parties are ultimately only ever advisors to the creative parties. Good, expert 
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advice will lead to a good career, but there are some areas, as will be seen, where advice 
is sparse and there is room for improvement. Because the industry is well developed 
and has already formulated characteristic habits of operation it is in need of guidance 
and governance in extending the scope of its intra-advisory behaviour. Some of this 
guidance should become mandatory to business behaviour if the future is to bring 
improvement. 
Having realised their purpose in acquiring the expertise of industry executives, artists 
lyricists and composers frequently, deliberately avoid involvement in marketing based 
decision-making and favour channelling their energies purely into creative work. This 
encourages the corporate party to become the steering element of the business and 
marketing development practices in hand. As will be seen in later discussion, this factor 
of the relationship can be misconstrued if a dispute arises and is brought before the 
court. The fact of the industry's common use of standard form contracts, in conjunction 
with the incorporation of terms of fidelity has engendered within judicial approaches a 
tendency to perceive a relationship based on inequality of bargaining power. This 
perception can easily give rise to the conclusion that the contract unduly restricts a 
creative individual's options for marketing his output. 1 Given this perceived relational 
imbalance along with the standard form embodiment of the Agreement, if the 
relationship does come to dispute before the court then any term which is biased in 
favour of the corporate party may potentially be construed as usurious, onerous and 
generally passed on to the creative party by means of undue influence. The court 
perceives the solution to this to be the appointment of independent advisors at the outset 
of the relationship, guiding the creative party toward his best interests. Of course it 
would be quite wrong to suggest that independent advice is a waste of time, but it is 
believed that advisors who are solicitors or businessmen will focus on the finer points of 
terms of remuneration, percentage points, royalties and so-on, these being elements of 
the contract which they feel empowered to manipulate and influence on behalf of their 
client. Offering behavioural advice and relationship guidance of a more personal nature 
might be perceived as a rewardless departure. Furthermore, the artist or writer should 
beware that once an independent advisor is in place the judiciary will consider it quite 
proper to impute that advisor's potential for greater knowledge and understanding of the 
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finer points and long-term implications of the contractual terms to his `principal', the 
artist. 32 
Singer/songwriter George Michael likened his relationship with his record company, 
(CBS/Sony)33 to a marriage. This analogy is considered most appropriate here, for it is 
often the case that at the formation stage of these contracts that the artist or writer is 
consumed with excitement and a passion for the other party, which is tantamount to lust. 
There are exceptions, notably here the Ryder v Nicholls34 case where the artist showed 
no interest in paperwork whatsoever and it was the manager, Mr. Nicholls who may 
have been impatient toward gaining his signature. However, once the initial excitement 
and drive to interact has subsided and a steady, long-term commitment of fidelity is 
unfolding other issues come in to focus. These are issues of trust, achieving 
expectations and mutual or shared compassion. In at least two high profile instances, 
for example, artists and record company executives have severed or sought to sever 
their relationship on the grounds that the executive(s) have failed to support (in the 
artists opinion) the artist's endeavours to contribute to charitable causes through the 
sales of specified material. Walter Yetnikoff of CBS records lost Bruce Springsteen to 
Warner Records when he refused to give company support for an album recorded for 
charity 35 Later, George Michael complained during his dispute with Sony36 that the 
Company had had failed to properly market albums released to raise funds for charity. 
These types of personal dispute and disappointment of expectations can amount to 
irreconcilable breakdown in relationships. Gilbert O'Sullivan's dispute with MAM37 
may appear to have been triggered by a lack of attention, following his manager's 
decision to devote most of his time to his zoo in California while the artist was left to 
get on with his (now well established routine) job of creativity and performance. 
Conversely, the initiation of the dispute between artist Sean Ryder and his management 
company, Nicholls and Dimes (Mr. and Mrs. Nicholls) was that the Nicholls' income 
was reduced significantly after their primary employer, the recording company to which 
they had assigned Ryder, no longer employed them. They shortly discovered a flaw in 
their own contract with Mr. Ryder which meant that they were charging tour 
commissions on Ryder's net income rather than on his gross income -a costly 
difference. Sean Ryder's advisor sought to rely on the exact terms of the agreement and 
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when negotiations broke down over this issue he sought to terminate the agreement on 
the grounds that it had been induced by undue influence and was in restraint of trade. 
The artist himself played little or no active part in the run up to this dispute, his attitude 
was that "paperwork freaked him out" and that it "did his nut in". 
Following this kind of disillusionment and disappointment in a relationship, some 
parties will never enter into another relationship of this kind again. For example, in 
private conversation Lonnie Donnegan (an artist who is held in high esteem by others 
and who has influenced many through his musical creativity and style) has expressed a 
high degree of mistrust for music industry executives to whom he generically refers as 
`suits'. These relational breakdowns become bitter testimony to the cost in hurt feelings 
and loss of confidence which can amount to an incapacity to continue to generate 
revenue-earning product. 
For some artists or writers initial grounds for dispute are triggered by a chance meeting 
with another party who appears to be promising a better future than the one which they 
currently face. This may provoke the desire at least to have the existing contract 
declared void, or even to purposely breach the current contract (by any means 
available). If this seems to have little to do with contract law or business in general then 
it must be remembered that this industry is in the business of setting up and selling 
peoples' feelings and dreams. While contract law could not and should not be 
considered to operate in any way comparable to any form of divorce court, 38 it should 
surely be able to be a better advisory body for these kinds of relationships that it is at 
present. These, after all, are not spot-contracts capable of being kept fair by methods of 
legislation like consumer law but are contracts of which the very intention is to forge a 
long-term, successful relationship. 
On the matter of advice, legal and financial advice are a must for the inexperienced both 
in the creative and the corporate fields. The caveat being that the advisor, at present, is 
not wholly accountable for the outcome of acting on his advice. Even if, as in Sean 
Ryder's case, he largely performs business activities on his principal's behalf, it is the 
artist and the corporate parties who remain principals to the Agreement and who are 
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bound and obliged by its terms. If not altogether achieved, at least the importance of a 
fair bargain is well recognised in this industry nowadays. Business greed, where it 
exists is capable of evolving into megalomaniac tendencies, and vice versa, in this 
highly manipulative and cash rich industry. In the end this type of characteristic, if 
unchecked may well lead to fraudulent behaviour. The technicalities of obtaining 
pecuniary advantage by fraud, or the laws designed to redress such damage are not the 
object of this discussion. However it can be recognised here that some kind of 
behavioural husbandry (to be suggested throughout later text, as an approach toward 
improvement in contract law) could very well curtail this problem. 
It must be pointed out early on here that the majority of this discussion portrays artists 
and writers as individuals. The discussion turns on the relationship between those 
individuals and other, more corporate, parties with whom they contract in this industry. 
Where the artist or writer is, in fact, constituted by a band or group it is assumed here 
that their responsibility to the contractual relationship is allocated on a joint and several 
basis. For the sake of clarity, in general discussion they will be referred to as if they 
were an individual. If instances are found where individual band membership is 
relevant to the following discussion then that will be clarified in situ. Similarly it is 
recognised that any corporate body, record company, publisher, management company 
or agency company will be made up of many individuals. 
However the artist's relationships tend to revolve around one or two personal contacts 
from within such an organisation and these relationships are core to the discussion in 
hand. These relationships are bound by the personal characteristics of individuals as 
much, if not more than by corporate missions and objectives. For example when an 
individual leaves a corporation, such as when Walter Yetnikoff left Sony, the remaining 
party will be left to shift his concentration on to relationship building with the new 
replacement. This might be a smooth transition bringing improvement to the 
relationship as a whole as well as improving productivity. On the other hand, as with 
George Michael, 39 the departure might mark the beginning of a breakdown, or even an 
excuse to manifest a latent desire for breakdown in the contractual affair. 
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As stated above, from a legal point of view it is wise to ensure that at the time of 
departure all long-term obligations are either severed or carried forward openly and in 
good faith. 
As artist and writer generally desire long and stable careers, the key to success will be a 
contract which accommodates that longevity and all the events, personal and business, 
likely to occur. To prevent entrapment on either side, this is generally (at least partially) 
achieved by the incorporation of options to renew within a contract which is otherwise 
constructed to effect a fixed-term of duration or a specified quantity of releasable 
product to be provided by the artist or writer within a given time-scale. There will be a 
proviso that material or production is to a certain standard and of a certain genre to 
match the company's marketing capabilities. A key to the formation of the relationship 
at the outset is that the company judges the artist or writer to be able to continue to 
produce this specified type of material for the required duration. Assuming that all goes 
well the option clauses will be triggered to enable the smooth continuation of the 
working relationship, but will also provide points in time when re-negotiation of 
royalties and other variables will be (or should be) possible. 
The complaint of many artists and writers is that these opportunities for re-negotiation 
are mishandled or do not result in furthering achievement of expectations so far as their 
working relationship is concerned. This is evident in all of the music industry cases 
discussed later and is particularly expressed in the Panayiotoii v Sony4° case. It is at this 
stage, as evidence presented in the following chapters shows, that the artist or writer, or 
the legal advisor, tends to turn to allegations of restraint of trade or undue influence in 
order to justify intervention at law and to manipulate release by having the contract 
undone in court, although this action is not always successful. 
In the past the draftsmen of music industry standard form contracts have consistently 
put two assumptions side by side. One, that the corporate party may wish to make a 
commercial decision to sever the relationship either at time of negotiating options to 
renew or by giving intra term notice. Two, that the creative party will not wish to sever 
the relationship which he has, after all, so long craved. They have therefore made the 
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habitual faux pas of omitting from the contract any option giving the artist or writer 
terms of notice by which he can determine the relationship. This adds fuel to allegations 
of restraint of trade and should, simply, be corrected. 
From a commercial point of view it is surely possible to draft terms of notice which 
would enable the party to finish the relationship in controlled circumstances, reducing 
the damage to both parties and probably reducing the tendency to develop the desire to 
sever just for the hell of it (because it is made impossible there is a suggestion of the 
`want what can't have' mentality). Naturally the law will be expected to find undue 
severity in long-term contracts which do not permit one of the parties to determine the 
relationship, should reasonable grounds arise. Frequently, as the cases discussed later 
will show that is exactly how the law does find these agreements. Indeed, in some 
cases, it may be that this very point is enough to question whether there is an agreement 
at all. The lengthy memorandum that is the all-powerful `contract' is intended to be 
protective to the corporation that produces it. But, can it be said that it is good law to 
impose such a strict liability here, so that the artist or writer's signature represents 
acceptance of all the terms and that all the terms are, because of that signature, deemed 
reasonable. That will be the corporation's point of view. However late discovery or 
delayed understanding of the implications of a contract-based relationship seems 
inherent in the development of the creative party as he matures in his role. There is 
some doubt felt here as to the overall justness of the most recent precedent, 41 that an 
artist will be estopped from calling in to question the legal validity of a contract which 
he has attempted to uphold, say via longevity of performance and compliance with 
specifiable terms. Such estoppel could be evoked on the grounds that the other party 
have adjusted their position in reliance on that contract, a condition which could 
presumably be satisfied by evidence of advance promotional activities or other 
common-place record or publishing company pre-release activities. The matter of 
creating a balance between protecting long-term commercial activity as well as offering 
the personal choice to stay in the relationship will be addressed post. 
During interviews and discussions held for the purpose of building this discourse much 
emphasis is placed by non-lawyers on the complexity of the paper contract and the 
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ability of the non-expert artist or writer to fully comprehend it. But, while the concept 
of plain English, for example, might be supportable to some degree, it is felt here that it 
is quite wrong to encourage creative parties to levy this argument as it must become 
circular and will amount to nonsense. Although, prima facie, a contract is an agreement 
between two parties, music industry business depends on a myriad of parties each 
supporting the others. As stated above42 a publishing contract must allocate the 
percentages of percentage based royalties to the publisher; percentages of those 
percentages to sub-publishers; percentage returns to the composer(s) from the publisher 
and from any sub-publishers; tax deductions and other calculations covering currency 
values in different (world) territories; some operated by the publisher and some by sub- 
publishers; application of copyright implied terms; 43 declarations of originality of the 
works to be produced; how, when and by whom copyright rights might be transferred; 
what (if anything) will not be protected; how any existing contractual obligations must 
be transferred in due course such as post contractual ties in works published initially by 
other publishers; how territories will be defined and how they might be varied in the 
future; who the parties and sub-parties to the contract are or can be; options for renewal 
and termination or notice arrangements and who will be responsible for the collection 
and distribution of performance royalties on the material once it is released. Add to this 
periods for payment of due fees; royalties and incomes; periods for accountability when 
the publisher must inform the composer(s) of all transactions on their behalf and any 
embellishments such as agreements towards promotional activities and, even in the 
plainest of English this is a lengthy and complex document. What is more, as the 
industry progresses in to the twenty first century and internet marketing increases 
(which exposes material to the whole world but which offers no territorial boundaries or 
scope for protecting territorial `sales') these contracts are likely to become more rather 
than less complex in terms of apportioning rights to the artist or writer and any 
companies involved. The technicalities inherent in these clauses represent the 
manifestation, on paper, of the expertise and skill of the corporate party. They cannot, 
of course, even outline personality traits or individualistic characteristics on the part of 
the company or the composer(s). Therefore, there should be developed some built-in 
provision for action or method for measuring these traits, which can be incorporated 
into the contractual relationship and which can cause co-operation on the part of both 
32 
parties as the relationship progresses. In incorporating such qualitative extras the 
parties should be able to rest assured that the initial commercial intentions will not be 
reduced, but rather that this can be a method for enhancement of such aims. 
All of the above must equally apply to record company, management and sometimes 
agency agreements in this industry. These can be equally as complex and could be 
equally enhanced by the inclusion of the provisions here. The discussion which follows 
centres around cases spanning several decades of music industry activity and views the 
application at law of the principle of unconscionability (in various guises). It is felt that 
this will show repeated proof of the need for the law-based drive for the enhancements 
suggested. 
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2: The Hypothetical Doctrine of Unconscionably Constructed Contracts 
A Suggested Structure for the Building of Good and Qualitative Long-term Contractual 
Relationships The Purpose of the Doctrine of Unconscionably Constructed Contracts: 
2: 1 General 
2: 1: 1)To influence behaviour and provide an aid to expectation management between 
those entering into long-term contractual relationships in the music industry 
2: 1: 2)To provide substantive tests to establish whether a contractual dispute has as its 
root cause unconscionable construction of the contract 
2: 1: 3)To provide guidance toward the remedy of such a dispute as might be identified at 
2), but not to dictate quantum or other individual, measurable remedies 
2: 2 The Parties 
2: 2: 1) To enable those whose lifestyle, livelihood or business depends on long-term 
contractual relationship to come together in good faith and build a relationship which 
will be able to progress through personal as well as business-based circumstantial 
changes. 
2: 2: 2) While allowing the parties to maintain a high degree of co-operation and 
flexibility in their dealings it is essential that the integrity of their relationship under the 
law and the bonding effect of the principle of binding contract is not undermined, so 
that the parties shall at all times carry obligations to each other which are represented by 
the contract itself. 
2: 2: 3) Both parties should have, as a right, trustworthy independent advice. 
(Stipulations regarding the advisor are given at 2: 5 below) 
2: 3 General Scope 
2: 3: 1 To address the conduct of parties during the formation of a long-term, contract 
based, business relationship 
2: 3: 2 To address the maintenance of long-term, contract based, business relationships 
2: 3: 3 To address the conduct of parties to long-term, contract based, business 
relationships in the event of disputes of the nature described at 5)(d) 
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2: 3: 4 Disputes to be addressed here shall be those which indicate a failure of one or both 
parties to maintain realisation of expectations which are not necessarily financial gains, 
but which might influence financial gain where the stages of breakdown leading to the 
dispute affect productivity or marketing activities but while breakdown itself is alleged 
to have been caused: 
i) by onerous restrictions brought about by the express terms of the contract 
where those restrictions have become evident to the complainant whilst 
continuing to attempt to perform relational obligations 
ii) by failure to maintain reasonable good faith within the performance of the 
dealings conducted between the parties 
iii) by failure to maintain a duty of reasonable trust within the performance of 
the dealings conducted between the parties 
iv) by a breakdown in understanding of obligations within the performance of 
the dealings between the parties 
v) by a breakdown of ability to 
a) maintain plans for future performance expectations within the 
relationship 
b) agree ongoing plans for future performance expectations within the 
relationship 
vi) by failure on the part of the parties co-operatively to be able to identify an 
agreement due to misinterpretation by both parties of the expectations 
expressed or intended to have been expressed at the outset of the 
relationship, where the relationship has continued to progress so that the 
contractual element of the relationship imposes some binding obligation 
vii) where flexibility of commercial attitudes and beliefs on the part of either 
party, over a reasonable period of time, causes the portion of the 
relationship which is beyond expression within the written contract to 
breakdown, but which does not strictly prevent performance of the 
obligations as captured within the contract except that continuous 
performance of such obligations would become sufficiently unacceptable 
to the reasonable sensibilities of one or both parties because of the shift in 
the potential-market perception and marketing intentions of the 
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complainant when compared to the potential-market perception and 
marketing intentions of the other 
viii) any other failure or breakdown in the relationship which is capable of 
being generically classified as being reasonably similar to categories I) to 
vii) above. 
2: 4 Suggested Conduct and The Terms of an Agreement 
2: 4: 1 Under the head of the contractual principle of Agreement; the Offer, the long term 
intentions of the Offeror, the expectations of the Offeror and any areas of exchange, 
trading or other dealings where the Offeror is not prepared to be flexible or co-operative 
toward change must be clearly described during negotiation and clearly represented at 
the time of Agreement 
2: 4: 2 Determination clauses must be clear and inclusive of terms by which the Offeror 
is prepared to release the Offeree from further or future obligations in the event of the 
Offeree desiring to change or alter any part of his performance under the relationship in 
a manner or in circumstances which the Offeror has clearly identified within the Offer 
as being unacceptable areas for change in the performance of the relationship and/or 
which can be caught under the definitions of cause for breakdown under 3: 4 i) to iiiv) 
above 
2: 4: 3 The Offeror shall have a duty to take into account in preparing the Offer; the age 
of the Offeree, the degree of experience of the Offeree in entering into such agreements; 
the current pattern and evidence of any pattern and style of performance, specific to the 
nature of the relationship, which the Offeree has exhibited in the past and which the 
Offeree is obliged to expose during the formation of this Agreement 
2: 4: 4 The Offeror has a duty to ensure that the Offeree has received and clearly 
understood the contract as a whole, inclusive of the terms of co-operation and flexibility 
and the terms of determination 
2: 4: 5 The Offeree is obliged to incorporate into the contract the long term intentions of 
the Offeree, the expectations of the Offeree and any areas of exchange, trading or other 
dealings where the Offeree is not prepared to be flexible or co-operative toward change 
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2: 4: 6 The Offeree is obliged to ensure that he has read and understood conditions 
regarding future variations, co-operation and flexibility clauses, taking independent 
advice where necessary 
2: 4: 7 The Offeree is obliged to expose, during the period of negotiation, evidence of any 
current pattern or any past pattern of style of performance, specific to the nature of the 
relationship which might affect the long-term performance of the relationship 
2: 4: 8 The Offeree is entitled to ensure the incorporation of any reasonable terms or 
reasonable variation of terms of determination which might protect his future course of 
dealing with the Offeror or with any other party in the same or similar industry 
2: 4: 9 Both parties should incorporate into the contract a commitment to communication; 
due to the long-term nature of the life of the contractual relationship the parties should 
agree to regular settlement meetings, possibly to coincide with other annual account 
settlements. It should be agreed that the terms of the contract and the nature of the 
relationship should be reviewed. This arrangement should not have the effect of 
enabling either party to bring about premature determination of the Agreement, but 
should serve to bring the parties together and remind them of their obligations to each 
other. If such a meeting should expose frustration of expectations or other breakdown 
within the relationship such as falls within the definitions at 2 i) to iiiv) above and 
which cannot be resolved by reasonable co-operation then the parties can agree to 
proceed to wind down the relationship in a structured manner in accordance with the 
determination clauses in hand 
2: 4: 10 Where the initial Agreement is reached within four months of any commercial, 
marketing or other production deadline (e. g. Christmas sales) then the parties should be 
obliged to arrange the first settlement meeting within six months post deadline 
2: 4: 11 The initial Agreement, under such circumstances, should incorporate an 
additional reasonable term that enables variation to the long term effects, statements of 
expectations and express determination conditions, such as are reasonable to both 
parties and are agreed by both parties. 
2: 5 Advisors 
2: 5: 1 Where independent advice is in the hands of a business manager, an agent or any 
other party who stands to gain benefits which can be identified as deriving directly from 
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the successes of the long-term relationship then that party might also be recognised as 
gaining third party rights and obligations arising from and towards the validity of the 
contract as a whole. 44 To be in accordance with the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 19995 1 ss(3) a third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a 
member of a class or as answering to a particular description if he is to be able to 
enforce his rights to benefits from the contract under this Act. It is possible, for 
example, that an advisor who is paid by commission which is directly linked to the 
income of an artist or writer, may be invested with rights, not only in the timely 
payment of the artist but also in the proper performance and conduct of the relationship 
so as to maintain an income which can be stipulated as reasonable given all the 
circumstances. The extent of that possibility can only be speculated as there is not yet 
judicial interpretation of the Act to give guidance as to how far reaching it can become. 
However, the Law Commission Report No. 242, makes it quite clear at Section B, 
Preliminary Issues Part III, 3.33(iii), that the remoteness of damages rule will still 
prevail, also that the third party will be responsible for mitigating his losses and that no 
award for specific performance will be made in relation to personal services. There is 
much for an advisor to gain from the longevity of his own appointment. That must 
depend upon his advice leading his client to a contract in good faith and upon his 
encouragement of honest and timely dealing between the principle parties during the life 
of the contract. It seems, therefore unjust if the advisor is not additionally invested with 
some degree of responsibility. In the Music Industry such parties tend to be in a role 
which intervenes in the act of negotiation and the continuance of contractual 
performance. Alongside this, specialists naturally form their own beliefs about 
individuals, companies and markets which are passed on as influences to the client's 
beliefs about his relationships. However, in the House of Commons Debate, on the 
Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Bill, 45 which was expressly intended for inclusion in 
the Hansard Report for future judicial guidance, The Parliamentary Secretary, Lord 
Chancellor's Department. Mr. Keith Vaz, made it clear that 
... the Bill does not change that part of the rule under which a burden cannot be 
imposed on a third party without his prior consent. 
It is felt here that a burden of duty must be imposed upon Music Industry Advisors and 
that if they do become recognised as third parties in accordance with the new Act then 
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this should be included in judicial consideration. Realisation of such burden should not 
be a surprise to an individual whose suggestions and activities have such a high degree 
of influence. 46 
2: 5: 2 If there is felt to be no necessity to incorporate the Advisor under the Contract 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the principle Agreement should incorporate a quasi- 
contract which imposes on the Advisor an obligation to ensure that (a) he is acting in the 
best interests of the principle party whom he represents and (b) that he will not issue any 
advice or cause to be incorporated any term or condition which has as its purpose the 
effect of damaging or reducing the expectations of either principal beyond what is 
reasonable 
2: 5: 3 The Advisor should be obliged to reveal, on demand, at the time of negotiation, to 
either party, any qualification, experience or other grounds on which he holds himself 
out as being fit and proper to impose such advice as may vary or otherwise affect the 
Agreement between the principles. Failure to question the capacity of the Advisor 
during the time of negotiation would render him immune from post Agreement 
complaints or grievances arising from action taken due to his advice unless such 
complaints or grievances give rise to the discovery of fraud, misrepresentation or other 
illegalities in the formation and performance of the Advisor's duties or the 
representation of his capacity as fit and proper to perform such duties. 
2: 6 What Follows and Why 
Having set out the principle suggestions for the procedure for building a conscionably 
constructed contract (i. e. good and well considered long-term contractual relationship 
formation), this discourse will now turn to an examination of the developments at law 
and the developments in relevant music industry cases which gave rise to the suggestion 
of the need for the doctrine of Unconscionably Constructed Contracts. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the nature and characteristics of the individuals who make up 
the classes involved in music industry contract cases. Finally, there will be an 
examination of the methodology which it is felt could be adopted in court for examining 
the validity and enforceability of long-term contracts and long-term contractual 
relationships. This will attempt to show the valid operation of selected tests and 
principles. What are considered essential elements for such a doctrine have been 
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selected from both academic proposals and established legal and judicial practices. 
However, with a modicum of exceptions it has been found that some of the principles to 
be utilised here have required re-interpretation, re-defining or re-analysis. This is not 
altogether surprising, as these principles in their existing form or context (as established 
in the overview of relevant developments) have not been subject to mutual examination 
for any similar purpose. In its existing form each principle has been severally 
interpreted, analysed and debated but, it seems, each has not satisfactorily address or 
resolved the specific issues which this discourse attempts to address. It is also to be 
desired that the outcome of the following re-working and interpretations should be 
sufficiently exoteric to answer the very purpose which initiated the work. That is, to 
discover and understand the purpose and integrity behind the following principles, 
without over hypothesising each point and then to reduce the conclusions to a pattern 
and language which can be readily absorbed by the intended recipient parties as well as 
interested onlookers. Thus it is anticipated that this fresh review will go beyond 
highlighting observation and opinion to actually give rise to a potentially workable 
solution. Whether this will ever be adopted in practice or tested beyond this paper 
remains to be seen. The contiguous nature of the principles as well as their relevance to 
the music industry will be expounded, where appropriate, throughout. 
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END NOTES 
44 For a more full discussion on this matter see Appendix 8 
45 Second Reading, 29 June 1999, at pars S. 
46 See for example the role and high level interaction carried out by the advisors to George Michael and 
Shaun Ryder as examined from pp 130 below. 
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3: The Emergence, in English Contract Law, of the Principle of 
Unconscionability; Judicial Recognition of Relational Subtleties 
The suggestion of a stand-alone doctrine of unconscionability is not new. Exploratory 
research in this area quickly reveals challenges such as Enman's: " .. why has the 
equitable doctrine been narrowed in England and expanded elsewhere? " 47 In 
addressing this challenge and examining the value of pursuing the -generation of such a 
principle the conclusion reached is that while the concept, in one guise or another, has 
been alluded to, defined, discussed and even held- up as a prop for the rationale of 
decisions in court, there are undetermined factors in operation which abate independent 
development of the equitable doctrine of unconscionability per se. It is felt here that 
while on the one hand the development of common law contract rules and their place 
within sectors of the business community may be the simply be the natural principle of 
evolution at play, on the other hand, like organic evolution, the selection process for 
cross matching (in this case of principles rather than genes) must not be a suppressive 
event acted out as a result of the instinctive response of one judge at a time, given one 
case at a time. 
While it is natural and proper that actual changes in common law involve lengthy 
deliberation, consideration and therefore time, it is believed that it was never intended to 
be sluggish or inaudible. However, in an increasingly fast moving information driven 
culture, it certainly gives that perception. Given the speed of commercial and 
technological progress in the latter part of the twentieth century, a more suitable course 
for further development would surely be found through open, collective reasoning 
between the judiciary, more positive manipulation of the process for the selection of 
principles and rules due for modernisation, in addition to which the desired legal effect 
would be better extricated by the proper use of modern communications techniques. 
It seems odd that rigorously trained specialists in the-English legal system spend days, 
months or even years, researching progress in certain areas of law and then giving a 
mere summarised delivery of their learned beliefs to the limited audience in court. In 
terms of informing `the man on the Clapham Omnibus' this process depends on reports 
read only (in the main) by other specialists, or on the interpretations of dedicated 
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journals. Neither government nor any currently operating business clings to such an 
antiquated plan. The market for new law-based behavioural policies is huge as well as 
fragmented, so that it needs fast generated, well constructed, new business law. In a 
business environment where marketeers no longer talk of five-year plans, but change 
policies sometimes quarterly, this new law needs to be more rapidly formulated, easily 
understood and easily escalated into mainstream business plans. Because it is true to 
say that there is no distinguishable doctrine of unconscionability, or no doctrine of good 
faith, per se, in operation in English common law due to the slow, traditionalised 
progression of parent principles through the cases which are discussed below, it is felt 
that this is an opportunity to highlight development needs in this area and utilise these to 
attempt to instigate progressive change. Inevitably, there will be those academics and 
practitioners who feel that "unconscionable" should be retained simply as an adjective, 
useful only in the part it plays in the language of deliberation. 
3: 1 The Development of Judicial Attitudes 
While the methodology for the development of common law principles might, if one 
agrees with the point of view held here, be jejune to the modern business world, tracing 
the evolution of the principle and spirit of unconscionability does reveal an historic 
judicial tendency to respond to contemporary issues of sociologic, economic or political 
trends. 48 For example, and most pertinent to the development under discussion here, the 
dominant cultural shifts caused by the Industrial Revolution49 which inevitably 
reorganised the economic stresses of land ownership, and thus shifted expectations 
towards inheritance and wealth, also inevitably engendered fresh moral, political and 
economics based attitudes. This change period unquestionably had the effect, while 
bringing befuddled expectant heirs before the courts, of shaping the judicial dogma and 
responses. 
This area of study also reveals that the judiciary has a history of sensitivity to the 
relational subtleties that play a crucial role in the formation and carrying on of 
contractual relationships. Research is able to turn up many instances where the judiciary 
have both observed relational subtleties and, in response, called not just on Equity, but 
on the specific concept of disallowable, unconscionable behaviour. To arrive at the 
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desired moral, just or public-policy based juncture, the judiciary frequently embark on 
excursive discourse on matters in general as well as the matter in hand. As a result each 
example of judicial exhortation, while it does carry the power of persuasion, does not 
set in stone any boundary for the operation of a principle of unconscionability. Broadly 
speaking this may be to the merit of the machinations of Equity, but following any one 
instance this form of delivery can only offer sweeping, moralistic guidance. This 
cannot impact on the general behaviour of a class of people because it represents 
untargeted observational comments, whilst the ratio decidendii and any remedy are kept 
unique to the case in hand. 
3: 2 The Historical Progress of Unconscionability as a Legal Concept 
Because case by case analysis of precedent is the method for progress for English 
common-law principles, it is also the only method for determining what has been shed 
or avoided along the way, and why. Whilst the what part of that question remains the 
simple gathering of facts, the why element continuously evades satisfactory answer. 
For example, in Vernon v Bethel Lord Henley L. C. observed that: 
... necessitous men are not truly speaking, free men, 
but, to answer a present 
exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them. 
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This clearly indicates an understanding of human interaction and a realisation that unfair 
play was at hand. Lord Henley L. C. has voiced an understanding of socio-economic 
pressure upon individuals and by use of the words crafty and impose has expressed 
disapproval of certain devious tendencies on the part of certain parties engaged in 
capitalistic endeavours. Why not, then, state just as clearly that this is unconscionable 
behaviour and as such is illegal? 
Other cases, which illustrate the same judicial sensitivity alongside typical socio- 
economic pressures of the era, include Gwy me v Heaton in which Lord Thurlow L. C. 
said: 
The heir of a family dealing for an expectancy in that family shall be 
distinguished from ordinary cases, and an unconscionable bargain made with 
him shall not only be looked on as oppressive in the particular instance, and 
therefore avoided, but as pernicious in principle, and therefore repressed. 51 
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The court here is clearly operating to uphold public policy. During the 17th - 18th 
centuries this area of law sought to bring more and more emphasis on the protection of 
family heritage. A principle with which the judiciary, perhaps naturally, empathise. The 
ready recognition of the plight of expectant heirs and the weaknesses of young men in 
society was reflected in that empathy. This must raise a question about how much 
emotional harmony the judiciary need to have with those in contest before them, it may 
be that varying degrees of empathy are responsible for varying degrees of application of 
public policy or Equitable remedy. So again an unconscionably constructed contract 
has been disapproved and the feeling is evoked here that it is the nature of personal bias 
which leads a judge to invoke public policy to support his rationale. It is also felt here 
that it is some degree of consciousness of that bias (as any justification framed in public 
policy can only be a contemporary socio-political thought) which precludes him from 
formalising that rationale into a rule. 
Another strong example of the spirit of judicial understanding can be seen in Evans v 
Llewellyn, S2 where Lord Kenyon M. R. explained: 
The cases of infants dealing with guardians, of sons with fathers, all proceed on 
the same general principle, and establish this, that if the party is in a situation, 
in which he is not a free agent, and is not equal to protecting himself, this court 
will protect him. 53 
While time and the nature of business inter-actions have progressed, this spirit of 
sensitive observation has continued. Unconscionability has continued to be 
disapproved. This is demonstrated by the recognition of "surprise" in Walters v Morgan 
5' and also that "... the conduct of the party applying for relief is always an important 
element". " However, although these cases prove that the judiciary have recognised an 
underlying principle of human weakness, and have addressed it through the operation of 
law of an equitable nature, they have continued to fail to give the procedure specific title 
or regulatory attributes. 
They have, however, discussed this very failure to the extent that: 
56... it is sufficient for the application of the principle, if the parties meet under 
circumstances [as, in the present transaction, ] to give the stronger party 
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dominion over the weaker, and such power and influence are generally 
possessed, in every transaction of this kind, by those who trade upon the follies 
and vices of unprotected youth, inexperience and moral imbecility. 
3: 3 From the Concept of 'Not equal to Protecting himself'57 There is Evidence of 
Judicial Attempts to Create a Stand Alone Doctrine. But There is Further 
Evidence that the Principle of Public Policy Engenders Broad Scope Approaches 
Rather than the Birthing of Distinctive Rules 
Not only do the series of cases presented here prove a judicial understanding of the 
human nature of the problems in hand, but they also give evidence that the judiciary 
have, even if subliminally, made attempts to frame a distinguishable set of rules within a 
defined principle. Progress may have been hampered by the very nature of Common 
Law itself. As has already been expressed, each attempt has been made in isolation and 
can only be progressed if subject to affirmation and encapsulation within the sequence 
of cross-case debate. As a result it was possible for Lord Sullivan M. R. to throw the 
principle wide open by stating that: 
.. if two persons, no matter whether a confidential relationship exists between 
them or not, stand in such a relation to each other that one can take undue 
advantage of the other whether by reason of distress, recklessness, or wildness 
or want of care, and where the facts show that one party has taken undue 
advantage of the other by reason of the circumstances I have mentioned, a 
transaction resting upon such unconscionable dealing will not be allowed to 
stand, and that where parties were not on equal terms, the party who gets the 
benefit cannot hold it without proving that everything has been right and fair 
and reasonable on his part. 58 
What Lord Sullivan M. R. has said here does encompass the principle. He defines 
behavioural traits which are otherwise often discussed in isolation. He defines the 
broadest scope of undue influences' and uses the term unconscionable to support his 
argument. 
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Central to the core of the hypothesis here is that such broadness of scope continued to 
render uncertainty to the future structure of any potential rules for behavioural 
governance which contract law, it is felt, must set out to provide. 
In essence, public policy, it seems, is the fortification of the idea that a man should be 
free to enter into any [legal] contractual obligation he chooses. This on the proviso that 
he enters that contractual obligation of his own free will and intention. Indeed this 
policy is so deeply rooted in the mind of the public that the majority can be found to 
believe that any agreement, once entered, is irreversibly binding. There is often 
difficulty in persuading the man on the Clapham omnibus of the legal protection and 
restrictions which prevail in his favour. None-the-less, the public demands that the law 
intervene when a contractual dispute becomes burdensome and the consequences seem 
unfair, that is how these cases get to court. What must be guarded against is that which 
Pollock QC identified rather poetically in the George Michael case60 quoting from the 
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam: 
Ah love thou acrd I with fate conspire 
To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire 
We would not shatter it to bits - and then 
Re-mould it nearer to the hearts desire 
.. a Plain! j may (depending on the circumstances) be doing little more than 
inviting the court to improve the terms of his bargain.. 
Vis-ä-vis this colourful exposition the conclusion which is reached here is that the term 
public policy is the label for a fantasy tool. Surely, as the law exists at public demand, 
to counsel, and intervene whenever a man exercises his right to contract because no 
contract is perfect, the law itself is public policy. With that in place, to pretend that any 
contract can be drawn up to perfection is, probably, as Parker J. puts it61 "to ignore the 
wider aspects of commerce". 
3: 4 The Conceptualisation of Inequality of Bargaining Power -A Notion of 
Public Policy 
In the influential case of Fry v Lane 62 Kay J. supported the conjoint opinion of Lords 
Harwicke and Selborne that there is an element of `fraud' not in the strict criminal 
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definition but in the nature of "unconscientious use of power arising out of [these] 
circumstances and conditions". The judiciary do make careful distinctions over the 
nature of the parties before them such as that offered by Lord MacNaghten in Samuel v 
Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Corp. Ltd that: 
The directors of a trading company in search of financial assistance ... are 
certainly in a very different position from that of an impecunious landowner in 
the toils of a crafty moneylender. 63 
Of the parties to that case he also noted (significantly here) "each of whom was quite 
sensible to what they were doing"64 and that there was a "perfectly fair bargain" in 
place. The principle at issue was that there was an onerous condition attached to the 
mortgage under question: i. e. the contract was one of unconscionable construction, 
demonstrating potential to cause hardship under certain conditions during the course of 
a long-term relationship. However, rather than the development of a doctrine of 
unconscionability, the judiciary have followed a course which lead Lords MacNaghten 
and Sullivan M. R. to be suggesting, alias dictus, `inequality of bargaining power'. Lord 
MacNaghten in this case also recognised the super-added obligation of solus agreements 
(the import of which shall become clear later). 
When dealing with matters footed in public policy, then, it seems that the judiciary 
proceed with extreme caution and remind themselves that "'unconscionable' must not 
be taken as a panacea for adjusting any contract between competent persons when it 
shows a rough edge to one side or 1he, other ". 65 . 
But public policy makes-demands on 
the conscience" so that, in the wake of Lord Radcliffe's advisory comment Meggary J. 
still could not withhold from ensuring that he did not narrow the scope of the principle: 
What has to be considered is, first, whether the plaintiff is poor and ignorant; 
second, whether the sale was at considerable undervaltue; and third, whether the 
vendor has taken independent advice. I am not, of course, suggesting that these 
are the only circumstances that will suffice; thus there may be circumstances of 
oppression or abuse of confidence which will invoke the aid of equity.. 67 
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In response to the difficulty of applying such an undefined doctrine with such unlimited 
scope, as this particular path of progress in law has continued, practicable questions 
became a needs-must such as that proposed by Lambert J. A. : 
In my opinion, questions as to whether the use of power was unconscionable, an 
advantage was unfair, a consideration was grossly inadequate, or bargaining 
power was grievously impaired... are really aspects of a single question. That 
single question is whether the transaction, seen as a whole is sufficiently 
divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it should be 
rescinded. To my mind, the framing of the question in that way prevents the 
issue from being obscured by an isolated consideration of a number of separate 
questions. 68 
This proposal at least suggests an approach, while by comparison, cases such as 
Multiservice Book Binding Ltd v Marden 69 offer characterisation but do not fully 
specify how to distinguish that an event of the prescribed character has been described 
to the court. 
3: 5 The Continued Development of the Pseudo-Rule, or Principle, of Inequality of 
Bargaining Power 
The judiciary has determined one dominant formula significant to the study here. 
Following Lords Sullivan and MacNaghten70 legal fault can be apportioned where there 
is an unconscionable bias of gains coupled with inequality of bargaining power. 
However, this principle is never relied on in isolation. Adding to the loss of clarity for 
those wishing to interpret or encapsulate the law, is the fact that although Common Law 
and Equity rarely, if ever, share common specific content, the arena in which inequality 
of bargaining power will be engaged may be a case for Common Law restraint of trade 
or Equitable undue influence. 71 
With a strong desire to raise inequality of bargaining power to the status of a tried-and- 
tested doctrine at law, Lord Denning M. R72 offered it as alternative grounds for his 
decision. In doing so, he attempted to bring together those cases where he believed such 
inequality to have been a decisive factor: 
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Hitherto those exceptional cases have been treated each as a separate category 
in itself. But I think the time has come when we should seek to find the principal 
to unite them. I put on one side contracts or transactions which are voidable for 
fraud or misrepresentation or mistake. All those are governed by settled 
principles. I go only to those where there has been inequality of bargaining 
power such as to merit the intervention of the court. 73 
But as Treitel74 has pointed out, in common with its parent principle unconscionability, 
inequality of bargaining power has no `clear limits' except Lord Denning's statement 
that: "No bargain will be upset which is the result of the ordinary interplay of forces". 
In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long 75 the Privy Council could not find the contract voidable for 
duress, or invalid on grounds of procurement by `unfair use of dominant bargaining 
position". Lord Scarman said on the matter that: "To treat this as a grounds of 
invalidity distinct from duress would be unhelpful because it would render the law 
uncertain". He repeated this opinion in National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan. 76 In 
response, it is felt here that there must be occasions when judges such as Lambert J. A. 
or Lord Denning have sat back in private and sighed ... 'well I thought I had offered 
certainty, clarity and indeed explicitness', 77 but on the part of the many conservatism 
and caution have prevailed. 
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4: The Difficulty in Defining the Status of the Parties When This is Used as a 
Measure to Justify Intervention at Law, And the Effect of the Principle of 
Inequality of Bargaining Power 
One of the problems in gaining acceptance for the notion of a stand-alone doctrine of 
unconscionability may be the difficulty felt over defining the status of the parties. It 
may be argued that this is the reason why the principle of inequality of bargaining 
power has made such clear progress toward stand-alone development in this area, as 
will be discussed here. 
Where the nature of the relationship appears clear in the minds of the judiciary, then the 
court has no difficulty. Intervention is justifiable on behalf of the poor and ignorant, 78 
those who may be insane or who are obviously in the weaker bargaining position, and of 
course, those simply responding to an unlawful degree of pressure. 79 The nature of 
some relationships is such that the court can see a need for third party advice, and can 
suggest that the benefitor should have made sure that this was offered before he secured 
the benefit. Thus there is recognition of the necessity for limitations on certain types of 
party in order to substantiate the protection of individuals disadvantaged in the 
circumstances surrounding the agreement such as in Tate v Williamsons0 where Lord 
Chelmsford said: 
The jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity over the dealings of persons 
standing in certain fiduciary relations has always been regarded as one of the 
most salutary description ... The courts 
have always been careful not to fetter 
this jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its exercise. 
But surely once one party's dominance in a relationship has been sufficiently recognised 
to bring into play questions of inequality of bargaining power, the nature of the attitude 
of contract law will automatically imply a fiduciary duty? This prevalent attitude which 
keeps the scope of justified intervention broad or limitless is all very well, but it does 
nothing to inform the parties on either side toward what is reasonable or how they 
should best conduct their relationships. 
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4: 1 Could Principal Parties Find Themselves Unacceptably Categorised into 
Classes of High Degree Incompetence? 
In terms of analysing those who are susceptible to undue influence, an interesting point 
to observed at this stage is the way in which the judiciary avoid creating legal 
incompetents. Strictly speaking the singer Sean Ryder8' was incapacitous when he 
signed his management agreement whilst heavily under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol. 82 Surely this known, constant state of incapacity negates suggestion of 
ratification of the contract? 83 Because of the empowerment of the advisor who acted as 
monitor, spokesman and quasi-manager, the court in this case did not have to consider 
this question. However, as other cases have attached great significance on the concept 
of inequality of bargaining power between artist and corporate party it is necessary to 
briefly view just how incapacitous an individual can be while the law looks the other 
way. For an extreme example, the American, Friedman84 makes a clear illustration of 
this in his analysis of the case Kreuger v Buel. gs He starts with the description of the 
plaintiff and her circumstances: 
The plaint fa woman of 55 years of age, had the appearance of and acted like 
a person of about 75 years, was infirm and childish, broken in health, weak 
minded and easily susceptible to influence. . practically a helpless cripple and 
mental wreck .. she 
fell into the hands of persons who were able and willing to 
take advantage of her .. The case is one where ... an enfeebled old 
lady of weak 
mentality had fallen into the hands of Philistines and has been overreached by 
designing and unscrupulous persons ... 
". 
This strong description leaves the reader in no doubt of the inequality in this 
relationship and it is an extreme illustration. Friedman goes on to discuss the judicial 
approach in the light of the doctrine of capacity, and points out: 
.. the court 
(perhaps deliberately) never once spoke the magic word 
"incompetent" as a basis for granting relief for the plaint f from an oppressive 
transaction. Incompetence is not so precise a concept, but it has sharp and 
serious consequences (loss of power for example) ... law in the 19`" century 
tended to reject creating a large class of legally incompetent persons. The idea 
of treating every person, to the extent possible, as an autonomous unit of 
economic action militated against the creation of new classes of the 
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incompetent, and encouraged the use of malleable concepts .. which could be 
applied as needed to situations rather than classes of people ". 
The purpose in this portion of this discussion is to make an observation. There is a 
danger that an industry which continuously alleges undue influence and/or inequality of 
bargaining power on behalf of one class of party also continuously suggest that one 
class of party is, to some degree, less competent than the other (though not always to the 
degree of Mrs Kreuger). 86 In each music industry case cited here it has been noticed that 
the judiciary have a tendency to portray artists as `young", "naive", "inexperienced in 
business matters" and so-on. Add to this the fact that Sean Ryder is not altogether rare 
in the music industry as being susceptible to mind altering drugs or drink on an ongoing 
basis. In addition, whatever his condition, he is quite common in the artistic classes, in 
his adversity to conducting business matters on his own behalf. (That is not intending to 
say that many artists do not conduct their business affairs admirably for themselves. ) 
However, while it is agreed that the court should continue to avoid reinforcing 
suggestions of weakness in certain classes of party, and should continue to utilise 
policies which are applied as needed to situations rather than classes of people, as 
demonstrated by the assumptions and behaviour of the advisor in the Ryder case, 87 a 
business or trade community cannot be expected to conduct itself within a specific 
framework of good contractual behaviour while at the same time attempting to second 
guess the possible interpretation of that behaviour by any one judge. 88 
4: 2 Should The Source and Value of Independent Advice Have Measurable 
Accountability Toward Apportioning Blame and Responsibility? 
Suppose, for example, that the Lloyd's BankS9 representative had said to Mr Bundy, 
`You must take independent advice'. Mr Bundy would have had to pay an advisor at 
costly professional rates and would probably have been told that he must bankrupt his 
son and keep his house. If that had happened, the bank, the son and Mr Bundy each 
stood to lose a great deal anyway. Mr Bundy and his son would have faced the deeply 
unpleasant social stigma and long-term repercussions of bankruptcy which were perhaps 
more onerous then than now. In the minds of the bank's representatives, (or, indeed, Mr 
Bundy) there is nothing to suggest that this scenario would necessarily constitute 
reasonable behaviour. 90 Not only must the court consider clearly categorising that 
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which it finds to be unlawful behaviour (as suggested obiter by Lord Denning M. R. 91) 
but it must progress and structure its categorisation of relationships and provide realistic 
guidance as to how they should be formulated and carried on. This is what inequality of 
bargaining power has attempted to do, but handing down the message that a corporation 
has greater negotiating power than an individual, or a trained salesman than an 
unsophisticated housewife [which is how it must read to the layman] is an ineffective 
statement of the obvious. The parties cannot alter what they are, they can only alter 
what they do. The rules which might surround a doctrine of Unconscionably 
Constructed Contract could offer greater clarity and structure for future guidance. 
This study turns to the music industry for analysis and demonstration, simply because 
that industry is ideally formulated by huge corporations, independent smaller business 
parties and a myriad of individuals, each dependent on the others for his survival and 
success. The conduct of business in the music industry is dependent upon long-term 
relational contracts, and the problems to be analysed here are those that go to the heart 
of formulating and conducting those contractual relations. On the matter of independent 
advice, it must be held in mind that music industry lawyers and solicitors can only 
address matters which their clients ask them to address. The same is presumably true of 
any independent advisor. This may create something of a paradoxical dilemma as those 
regularly charged with the duty of giving such advice would naturally become 
specialists in their field as a result of which, other research confirms, such advisors 
habitually develop shortcuts or will come to rely on contingency placed damage 
limitation plans, as demonstrated in the Ryder case, to overcome some of the problems 
known to develop frequently during long-term, standard form based relationships. 92 
Furthermore, these types of advisor, particularly to the music industry, are continuously 
fettered by deadlines and their client's drive to get the deal done so that comprehensive 
advice and the encouragement of negotiation are often not possible. Alternatively the 
advisor may find himself charged with the care of an artistic individual who, like Sean 
Ryder, 93 bluntly refuses, for what ever reason, to become involved with the details of 
business matters. In that case the advisor is only able to act in what he believes to be his 
client's best interests. In the case of Ryder it may be that the advisor was misled by the 
outcome of earlier cases and through assumptions about the operation of contract law. 
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He inadvertently waived his client's rights against the contract by insisting on deploying 
one particular term of it. The singer, Ryder, seems to have had little or no input to the 
operation of his own contract with his managers beyond that of continuing to turn up 
and sing where and when he was told. The advisor acted not only as solicitor but also 
as: 
monitor and spokesman ... 
fulfilled a quasi managerial role, kept his views 
about the enforceability of the management agreement to himself because he 
adjudged it to be in the defendant's best interests that the plaintiffs should 
continue to manage him... 94 
Yet clearly it was the singer rather than the advisor who was held to account. The event 
of the Shaun Ryder95 case may quash that school of thought which suggests that 
progress over time has developed a strain of vicarious undue influence. 96 This would 
have had the potential to take the scope of the doctrines of restraint of trade or undue 
influence beyond the contract and might have made the advisory party more directly 
accountable however well intended his actions. 
Where there is an allegation of undue influence, without clarity through future case-law 
it is uncertain whether the undue influencer need not be a party to the contract, provided 
that the contract itself can be shown to be onerous and one sided in court. The cause of 
this expectation is that, in Barclays Bank v O'Brien/CIBC Mortgages plc v Aitt, 97 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson has sought to reinstate the position of Public Policy in this area of 
legal reasoning as well as the principle of relationships of confidence. These are terms 
that Lord Scarman presumably felt to be over emotive as he labelled them as words and 
phrases leading to misinterpretation of facts. 98 In a move away from Lord Scarman's 
directive that the victim of undue influence should prove that he had been victimised, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that the fiduciary has a duty to establish affirmatively that 
the transaction was a fair one. The reason for this turn in placing the onus of proof 
seems to be the inclusion of third party bystanders in the act of influence. This goes 
toward clarifying the scope of the duty of the fiduciary, he must ensure that his charge 
enters the contract freely, and is encouraged to take good independent advice, free from 
pressure or interference. Otherwise it is questionable whether there can be said to be an 
Agreement between the principals to the contract, therefore no contract per se. This 
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whole concept could make contracting in the music industry difficult as the potential to 
identify closely aligned, well meaning (or otherwise) third party influencers is high. 
Invariably, in the bank cases surrounding Barclays Bank v O'Brien/CIBC Mortgages plc 
v Pitt, 99 where this concept was initiated, the person who has fallen under influence to 
enter into an imprudent transaction has been a wife, and the key influencer has been her 
husband. It is a simple analogy to liken Sean Ryder's relationship with his monitor, 
spokesman, advisor, lawyer with that relationship of husband over wife. In these 
banking cases, the representative of the bank is left, according to Browne-Wilkinson, 
with the onus of proving that he had not failed in taking reasonable steps to ensure that 
the wife had adequate understanding of the nature and effect of the transaction and that 
the transaction was a true and informed one. Gibbs CJ. reiterated the point in 
Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio'oo 
... of course, the bank and the respondents 
did not meet on equal terns but that 
circumstance alone does not call for the intervention of equity ... A transaction 
will be unconscientious within the meaning of the relevant equitable principles 
only if the party seeking to enforce the transaction has taken unfair advantage of 
his own superior bargaining position, or of the position of disadvantage in 
which the other party was placed. 
For whatever reason the Managers in the Ryder case side-stepped the advisor altogether 
and obtained Sean's signature to their own version of a contractual agreement, ignoring 
the advisors express amendments, and they were able to do this because the singer 
spend a great majority of his time under the mind dimming influence of certain drugs. 
Initially this is a clear case of undue influence on the part of the managers toward the 
singer. However, and as stated above, the advisor waived the singer's rights to avoid 
the contract due to undue influence and what is not clear is why the advisor himself did 
not become a third-party undue influencer in the eyes of the law as in the Browne- 
Wilkinson bank cases. Of course this could have lead to unjust law as it is easy to 
speculate that the managers of Sean Ryder would have had little or no charge over the 
power he allowed his lawyer. They would have had no mechanism to challenge 
whether the advice given to Sean, or rather the decisions and actions of the solicitor 
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carried out on Sean's behalf, were in the best interests of the contract as a whole or 
simply biased decision making done due to Sean's business abstinence. If the law were 
to develop the course of third-party undue influencer beyond the bank cases where it has 
brought justice, this could be interpreted to mean that not only an artists employed 
advisor, but also his wife (husband), mother, father, or other close relation or 
companion could be in the position of catalyst, triggering the circumstances under 
which the music industry executive carries the full responsibility of ensuring that the 
artist has not allowed himself to become blinkered. It must be recognised that, at the 
outset of many young artists' careers, it is often the wife (husband), mother, father, 
other relation or companion who enthusiastically plays the role of pseudo-manager or 
advisor, vigorously encouraging progress towards that all important `contract' and 
attempts to protect their artist thereafter. Thus it is open for the artist to maintain his 
focus on `art' and become shy of `business'. That is the nature of the classes involved. 
The question must then be asked: are there instances where music industry contract 
cases should be dissuaded from calling on the equitable doctrine of undue influence in 
contractual disputes? It is felt here that the potential course of events described above is 
enough to support the conclusion that undue influence, like restraint of trade101 is an 
area of law which is in danger of being distorted rather than properly developed and that 
these classes of case should spark a fresh development more attuned to their (and 
society's) needs. 
Furthermore, Panayiouiou V Sony1°2 demonstrates, perhaps even more clearly than the 
previously discussed case, that advisors in the music industry may not be classed as 
independent at all. The plaintiff, George Michael's lawyer, Tony Russell and his 
Manager, Rob Kahane, frequently spoke for and acted on George's behalf in 
negotiations and meetings. Often withholding critical information from George and 
others who were involved in the course of his business. 103 It is felt here that these 
individuals became more intimate to the contractual relationship of which George 
Michael and Sony Music were principals. In accordance with item 2: 5: 1 and 2: 5: 2 at 
page it is felt here that the intrinsic nature of these third parties should be recognised at 
law incorporating their play into the long-term contractual relationship, both supporting 
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their right to gain and upholding the degree to which they own liability in that 
relationship. 
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5: Undue Influence How it Has Applied in The Music Industry 
The principle of inequality of bargaining power and the doctrine of undue influence are 
invoked by incidents where there has been an abuse of power or position, generally 
where one party has invested considerable confidence or trust in the other. Unlike the 
inequality, undue influence has developed a set of definable rules of application. The 
question to be addressed here is does the relationship between undue influence and 
inequality of bargaining power in court stretch the scope of that doctrine beyond what is 
reasonable? While there are rules about the operation of undue influence, there do not 
appear to be any strict rules which dictate when inequality of bargaining power has or 
has not been demonstrated. The suggestion to be made here is that if the parties have to 
wait for the wisdom of the judge in each case, then, to avoid meeting him at all, they 
cannot take preventative or remedial action in the conduct of their relationship. While a 
large proportion of the discussion so far has been drawn from the general ambit of 
contract law and development, here a focus on the characteristics of the music industry 
supports the validity of addressing this question. This will be demonstrated by the cases 
and discussion which now follow. What is to be drawn from these cases in this context 
is that it is not in question whether it is wrongful for one party to `steal' away a benefit 
which rightfully belongs to the other, these cases have chosen to go beyond that matter 
to examine the core of the relationship itself. However, a pattern of good behaviour is 
not clearly handed down as a prescription for the parties' (and others') future, but faults 
in the conduct or formation of these relationships are identified in court, i. e. bad 
behaviour. Instead of defining and seeking a way to lay out a clear path for behavioural 
reform, the court seems to appoint blame and responsibility for behavioural conduct and 
then reverts to apportioning damages for chiefly quantifiable losses. 
It is felt here that the net result of this is that onlookers and potential future litigants are 
able to point to the parties post case and believe that there has been a unique instance of 
bad behaviour from which they themselves are disassociated and from which they learn 
nothing about themselves. Because the majority of industry knowledge of these cases is 
gained through the media it is also probable that much of what the judiciary intended to 
be advisory will be lost. 
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5: 1 The Fleetwood Mac Case 
Through the case Clifford Davis Management v WEA Records Ltd. 104 [The Fleetwood 
Mac Case], Lord Denning M. R. made some points that support what is suggested here. 
Furthermore, discovery through personal interviewlos confirms that while individuals in 
the music industry are aware of this and other similar cases, the finer points of legal 
advice and development are lost to them. There is a general assumption that artists are 
naive, that members of Fleetwood Mac were particularly naive and not predisposed to 
sharp business sense and that `management' personnel are often unconscionable in their 
dealings. The term unconscionable is not actually the term that is commonly applied by 
businessmen in this industry, with the exception of specialist lawyers who, naturally, 
use the term guardedly. 
The background to the case is: the writers McVie and Welch had, in 1971 and 1972 
respectively, signed publishing agreements with Clifford Davis Management Ltd., the 
management company of their working band Fleetwood Mae. These publishing 
agreements had an initial life of five years extendible to ten. Neither writer had entered 
into full negotiations or taken independent advice. The management agreement 
between Fleetwood Mac and Clifford Davis was terminated in 1974. When the two 
writers created songs for the later album "Heroes are Hard to Find", released by WEA 
in the US, Clifford Davis Management relied on the 1971/72 contracts to claim interests 
in the UK release assigned to CBS. As a result Clifford Davis Management obtained an 
interlocutory injunction against WEA and CBS preventing release in the UK while the 
validity of the claim was put to question. The case was remedied under the equitable 
doctrine of undue influence, by which it was claimed that Clifford Davis Management 
had taken undue advantage of the naivete and lack of advice taken by McVie and Welch 
and had driven an unfair bargain, reducing their profits and tying them to the 
management relationship through their work as writers rather than as performing artists 
(in which guise the relationship had already ceased). 
At appeal Lord Denning M. R. took the opportunity to scrutinise the rationale behind A 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay, 106 furthering the understanding, he 
felt, of inequality of bargaining power. He found that: 
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(a) the length of the period of the agreements, potentially ten years, was unfair, 
and that the benefits to the composers was minimal. 
(b) that the composer was bound to assign the world-wide copyright in each 
composition to the publisher, but the publisher had no obligation to do 
anything with them 
(c) the publisher had the right for six months to reject any new composition 
without payment 
(d) the publisher had the right to assign the agreement to anyone, the composer 
had no say in it. The composer had no similar right. 
The principles set out in the case A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay107 
were applied: 
(a) contractual restrictions which appear to be unnecessary or to be reasonably 
capable of enforcement in an oppressive manner, must be justified before 
they can be enforced. 
(b) if one party uses his superior bargaining power to exact terms that are 
unfairly onerous, or to drive an unconscionable bargain, the courts will 
relieve the other party of his legal duty to fulfil it. 
He then went on to discuss his own recent endeavour to state the terms of inequality of 
bargaining power in Lloyds Batik v Bundy108 and to strengthen the approval gained via 
Lord Diplock at Instone vA Schroeder Co. Ltd. 109 Lord Denning said: 
Now the question arises: is the court bound to er force this assignment of 
copyright at the suit of the publisher alias manager? The agreement is of the 
same class as the agreement considered by the Court of Appeal in Instone vA 
Schroeder Co. Ltd. and by the House of Lords only last week. "o An agreement 
such as this is not an agreement which is 'in restraint of trade' strictly so 
called. It does not preclude a man from exercising his trade at all. But is an 
agreement which is `restrictive of trade'. . 
111 
So did active members of the music industry view the progress of the cases A Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay112 and Clifford Davis Management v IV EA 
Records Ltd 13 [The Fleetwood Mac Case] and then amend their ways to avoid future 
conflict in this area? The answer is a resounding "no"! When faced with this class of 
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conflict is the course to remedy clear cut and well understood by the contracting parties? 
No! 
5: 2 Gilbert O'Sullivan 
1970, eleven years after the Fleetwood Mac Case came Gilbert O'Sullivan v 
Management Agency and Music Lid 114 Here was a complex affiliation of business 
confidence and personal trust founded on the artist's relationship with his manager. 
This dispute was between two plaintiffs: singer/writer Gilbert O'Sullivan plus his own 
company Gilbert O'Sullivan Ltd. (set up to receive his UK generated incomes) and six 
defendants: Management Agency Music Ltd; MAM (Music Publishing) Ltd.; Gordon 
W. Mills; Ebostrial Ltd.; MAM (Records) Ltd. and CBS Inc. O'Sullivan had 
approached manager Gordon Mills while his early career was failing and trusted Mills 
to sign him up to the appropriate companies for publishing, recording and distribution 
purposes as well as personal management. During the time he was signed to these 
companies and under Mill's care his career became successful, in eight years he realised 
gross retails sales of more than £14.5 million. 
The cause of breakdown in this relationship, and one of the key triggers to O'Sullivan's 
dissatisfaction was that he held mistaken belief that he had signed into the same class of 
joint publishing partnership as his contemporaries Tom Jones, Englebert Humperdink 
and the like. He had already made this mistake in his prior agreement with April 
Publishing and was sophisticated enough to be clear about his commercial desires. At 
both first instance and at Appeal the courts'15 felt that poor characteristics of the 
relationship were portrayed by O'Sullivan's contention that he never achieved the 
promised publishing-partnership status. MAM's credibility was brought to question in 
view of the fact that a publishing-partnership had been discussed between O'Sullivan 
and MAM and it had been indicated that the desired 50/50 set up would be arranged at 
some undetermined time in the future, a promise never to be kept if O'Sullivan's 
version of events is accepted. Eventually the artist/writer refused to sign pertinent 
documents, notably having taken independent advice on the matter. It must be noted 
here that artists of such stature can and do command a very lucrative 50/50 
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remuneration deal from publishing material by taking a directorship in the company 
which is set up within the publishing agreement itself. 
In court the fact that the manager, Gordon Mills, was a substantial shareholder in the 
first five defendant companies, as well as advisor and manager to O'Sullivan through 
Management Agency and Music Ltd., was felt, of itself, to be enough to raise a 
presumption of undue influence against him. But industry custom is ignored in this, as 
it is not entirely unusual for a publisher to have a hand in management or vice-versa. It 
is wholly possible that the outcome of the artist's career would have been the same if 
the publisher, the recorder and the manager had been three people. The point being that 
the relationship is one that is fiduciary in nature, but three fiduciaries must be just as 
responsible as one, unless the suggestion is that they counter each other in terms of 
independent advice? 116 Also, compare this case with the court's view of the 
`independent' advisor in Ryder v Nicholl and Another. 117 How far removed does an 
advisor have to be to be classed as `independent', conversely, how close to the 
bargaining process can an `independent' advisor become involved? 
As it was, the success of the complex series of agreements in play largely turned on the 
incorporation of overseas (tax exempt) banking. This would have caused substantial 
mystery to those not one hundred percent experienced in such matters, however many 
heads were involved: 
.. Enormous sums of money came pouring in to MAM from all over the world, 
although where it all came from and what percentage it represented of whose 
earnings remained a mystery. 118 
There can be no question that the relationship between Gilbert O'Sullivan and Gordon 
Mills was one based on trust and confidence on both parts. At the outset Mills moved 
O'Sullivan from his bed-sit in Bayswater to a small and attractive bungalow in the 
grounds of Mill's Surrey mansion. He was provided with £10 per week cash and in 
addition all outgoing expenses were paid by one of the MAM companies. This was not 
an unusual arrangement, in point of fact, it was noted in court that the £10 weekly sum 
equalled O'Sullivan's prior weekly earnings as a postal clerk. In addition it must be 
66 
realised that he was not restricted from drawing cheques against his royalties although it 
is understood that he did not withdraw a great deal. 119 He was left in this `Utopia' to 
write hit after hit, as and when he pleased, until, in 1972, he moved into his own 
£95,000 home. O'Sullivan seems really to have become disillusioned with the 
relationship (along with Englebert Humperdink who simply switched management) 
when Mills became preoccupied with his private zoo in Los Angeles. Lawyers were 
then employed and spent three years preparing O'Sullivan's case. The lawyers did 
discover that although some £500,000 pre tax income had been paid to the artist, some 
£14,500,000 remained outstanding. Steps had been taken by MAM to provide 
legitimate tax avoidance on behalf of the artist but as the quote above suggests it is 
difficult with this type of accounting to separate and apportion these kinds of amounts 
while they are being put to work. It is quite possible to speculate that the outstanding 
amounts were held away from the artist in order for them to accrue greater mass to his 
eventual benefit, and nothing more sinister. 
The Court of Appeal120 felt that the trial judge in the ensuing case had levelled 
unjustified criticism toward Gordon Mills. The Court ensured that the defendants were 
allowed remuneration for skills and labour (recognising the nature of the joint venture). 
Inequality of bargaining power was not brought into play in this case and Fox L. J 
expressly dismissed restraint of trade: 
I should refer to the argument advanced by the plaintiffs that, quite apart from 
any undue influence, the agreements were wholly void as being in restraint of 
trade. The fact that the agreements were in restraint of trade does not, in my 
view, render them void. They are unenforceable ... Thus in Schroeder Music 
Publishing v Macaulay the agreement was held to be in restraint of trade Lord 
Reid said `It must therefore follow that the agreement so far as unperformed is 
unenforceable ". That was also the view of the Court of Appeal ... Accordingly, 
I do not think this argument advances the plain tiffs' case. '21 
In discussion, while preparing this discourse, both learned colleagues and those 
involved in preparation for the O'Sullivan v MAM case have suggested that O'Sullivan 
was lucky in the outcome and that a different perspective on the course of events could 
have brought about a different outcome in court. 
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5: 3 Evaluating Undue Influence as a Governance Factor to the Industry - The 
Inclusion of the Principle of Inequality of Bargaining Power and the Cross-over 
With the Common Law Doctrine of Restraint of Trade 
The O'Sullivan case is contemporary with National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan. 122 
So it can be said that the view of the House of Lords, at that time, was as expressed by 
Lord Scarman. 123 In short it was that when the relationship between the parties was one 
which was fiduciary in nature and therefore led the court to the presumption of undue 
influence, then it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove manifest disadvantage or 
victimisation, in order to render that presumption actionable. Lord Scarman called for 
the destruction of any idea that that a banker, in National Westminster Batik plc v 
Morgan, when explaining the nature of a proposed transaction, automatically lays 
himself open to a charge of undue influence. 12" He felt that he had support from Sir 
Eric Sachs in the view that: 
... the relationships which may 
develop a dominating influence of one over 
another are infinitely various... There is no substitute in this branch of law for 
a 'meticulous examination of the facts . 125 
This matches the expectation of the music industry manager/publisher/record company 
executive. Gordon Mills cannot have guessed that in manipulating for Gilbert 
O'Sullivan to develop into a wealthy and famous entity (as had Tom Jones for example) 
that he was victimising him. According to Lord Scarman evidence of victimisation was 
necessary and that is what the resolve to the case suggests to the business onlooker, and 
that is why it serves no purpose in advising other music industry fiduciaries. At that 
time there prevailed an assumption that any artist would be naive in respect of business 
matters, a view which the judiciary appear to share: 
It is, I think, clear that O'Sullivan, who was at all material times a young man 
.. 
'26 with no business experience,. 
It was, broadly speaking, an easy sell for the artist to persuade the court of 
victimisation. 
None of this goes any way toward providing management of expectation or governance 
of behavioural patterns for contracting parties. Managers, publishers and recording 
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company executives cannot, it seems, learn from these cases that they have a particular 
fiduciary relationship with their artists which involves a duty of care over advice and 
information beyond that which they already believe they provide. This in itself seems 
one sided as it assumes some form of weakness, idiocy or incapacity on the part of the 
complainant. However, the current legal view127 puts all the onus of responsibility on 
the other side, as stated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt128 
... the law imposes a 
heavy duty on fiduciaries to show the righteousness of the 
transactions they enter into with those to whom they owe [such] duties. 
The term inequality of bargaining power is not, as can be seen in these cases, 
interchangeable with undue influence, nor had the court, during these decades, 
developed the habit of applying the term as suggested by Lord Denning. Whether 
actionable undue influence is best confirmed by proof of victimisation on the one part or 
by disproof of onerous behaviour on the other is a question largely academic in nature. 
So it is felt that Lord Denning was correct in his assertion that an assertion of inequality 
of bargaining power, hitherto most often a common law assertion, raised in connection 
with restraint of trade in music industry cases, would go further toward drawing a 
clearer scenario for analysis in court and for the public perception of what was wrong 
about the parties' conduct post case. An action of this nature could be clearly guided by 
the advice of Gibbs CJ. As given at page 58 above, where it is made clear that it is not 
the mere bargaining power of the parties, but the taking of an unfair advantage which 
will lead to liability. 
It has already been suggested that none of these legal concepts are new. A summary of 
the intention of Lord Denning and the reasoning of Lord Browne-Wilkinson or Gibbs 
CJ. can be obtained through Adams J. in Harris v Richardson (1877) 129 
It sufficiently appears that the principle on which equity originally proceeded to 
set aside such transactions was for the protection of family property; but this 
principle being once established the court extended its aid to all cases in which 
the parties have not met upon equal terms ... in the case of the "expectant 
heir". or of persons under pressure with inadequate protection, and in the case 
of dealings with uneducated ignorant persons, ' ° the burden of showing the 
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fairness of the transaction is thrown upon the person who seeks to obtain the 
benefit of the contract. 
While artists are prepared to rush into signing the contract which they believe will 
realise their dreams; 
I was so overwhelmed I would have done whatever they told me in order for 
them to make me a pop Star. 131 
it is certain that many publishers, manager and record company executives do not 
recognise their position as being one from which they can be held out to be undue 
influencers (in lay terms bullies) in the terms of the law. And while Lord Scarman's 
perspective, that the facts must be meticulously examined, is unarguably valid and 
largely agreed with here, the fact remains that law is one of society's greatest advisors. 
Classes of law are recognised and adhered to by classes of society because they are able 
to understand and relate to what the law suggests. If a music industry executive ever 
turns his mind to the matter at all, the chances are, at present, he would misinterpret and 
believe the expression `undue influence' to represent a form of deviant or `bad' 
behaviour, even, given his industry's background, analogous with blatant attempts at 
fraud -a far worse behavioural trait than he would recognise in himself when it comes 
to forging relationships with artists. 132 If this is so, then the reason that the legal 
rationale of the cases cited above are misunderstood or ignored each time, is because the 
legal rules and assertion are presented in such a way that the applicable class(es) cannot 
make sense of them. Unconscionable construction of a contractual relationship and 
inequality of bargaining power both seem to be governing principles which industry 
Personnel might more easily have understood and adopted. 
A recent and most blatant example is that of Nicholls and Another v Ryder, 133 already 
discussed throughout this discourse. The event of this case can only serve to prove that 
no lesson was learned within in the industry via the judicial reasoning and declarations 
of prior cases. To add to this the law is made no clearer to potential recipients in that it 
was remedied in court through the introduction of the concept of estoppel and/or waiver. 
On the matter of undue influence the very fact that the new managers had the artist sign 
his contract with them whilst he was under the influence of drugs, combined with the 
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fact that the document he signed was not remedied to comply with his advisor's 
recommendations and that he had no means of referring to his advisor's 
recommendations or considering them before he signed, must add up to at least undue 
influence if not a charge more sinister. Furthermore, the managers had the artist sing to 
a record company for which they were employees. By O'Sullivan case standards alone 
undue influence was very much at play here. Furthermore, the court, in this instance, 
failed to question the `independence' of the advisor to Ryder, given that it was decided 
that he was acting in a quasi managerial role as well as advisory. Instead Ryder 
himself was accredited with the knowledge and capability of the advisor as if the two 
were one and the same person at law. Sean Ryder was clearly not making any 
decisions or forming any opinions for himself. 
5: 4 The Stone Roses Case 
It is clear that progress of time has allowed the judiciary, in the absence of statutory 
intervention, to consider the relationship between the bargaining process itself and the 
consequent contractual terms. Also, somewhat ironically, that this course of 
consideration is enabled by the continuing appearance in court of artists claiming that 
their contracts are in either in restraint of trade or brought about by undue influence - or 
both. On the matter of equality of bargaining power in Silverione Records Ltd. v 
Mountfield and Others134 Humphries J. observed: 
The Stone Roses themselves were not highly educated, had no legal experience, 
little or no business experience and were very much under the influence of Mr. 
Evans. They had little or no income. Some indeed I think were on social 
security. 
and went on.. . 
I find that as between the parties negotiating and entering into the agreement 
there was immense inequality of bargaining power, negotiating ability, 
understanding and representation. It is, however, possible even if one person 
has superior Imowledge and bargaining power for a fair agreement to be 
reached. Not everyone who is in a position to do so misuses his power to take 
advantage of the weaker party.. 
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The record company in this case, Silvertone Records were assigned the contract via 
Zomba Production Ltd. while Zomba Music Publishing kept the publishing rights on the 
band's material. Interestingly, by comparison with the Schroeder contract, these later 
publishing contracts normally have a `reasonable endeavours' clause, as did this one. 
Furthermore, Silvertone Records claimed that the potential for perpetuity in the 
unlimited options clauses in this particular contract was the result of a drafting error. 
What is more the recording contract and the publishing contract provided by Zomba 
could only be signed as a joint package. Not only does this reflect the complex series of 
relationships displayed in O'Sullivan V) 4M135 but it also resembles the issues raised in 
the Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd36 case. These factors 
would suggest lack of adequate independent advice on the part of the artists. 
Humphries J. considered that: 
... the investigation of reasonableness of 
bargains made by persons not under a 
disability, is only undertaken in a limited number of circumstances, so that in 
this case if the contract is not properly called a contract in restraint of trade 
further investigation of the term does not arise137 
However, the contract dictated that Zomba/Silvertone would have the right to exploit 
the Masters (recordings) of The Stone Roses in perpetuity and that they could exercise 
the right to discontinue or recommence the production and exploitation of the band's 
records at their discretion. 138 This is not a covenant in restraint of trade strictly so called 
but is restrictive of the artist's liberty to expect progressive career or sales development 
as what would be released, and when it would be released was forever at the whim of 
Zomba. The contract also contained a covenant that The Stone Roses would not 
perform for the manufacture or release of records any material embodied within the 
Zomba Masters for a period of ten years post contract, nor any material during the life 
of the contract for recording by any other person, firm or company (even if it was 
material which Silvertone/Zomba did not want to exploit). 139 These elements combined 
with the joint package deal in the publishing assignment were sufficient for Humphries 
J. to find as a matter of construction that the company had it within their means to 
prevent the band from trading or earning a living for several years and as such the 
contracts were in restraint. 
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6: The Initiation of The Application of the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade, Leading 
tip to A Schroeder Music Publishing Ca Ltd v Macaulay [19741 
The next point expressed will be that it is an unsatisfactory, confusing and inexpedient 
development in contract law to have allowed the contractual doctrine of restraint of 
trade to extend to bring remedy to disputes raised during the life of the contract. The 
difficulties caused by this development have made it something of a hardship to explain 
exactly why parties continue to turn towards restraint of trade for remedy. Before 
proceeding with that point in full, it is felt pertinent to refer to Brownsword. He may 
have gone some way toward explaining how this, somewhat paradoxical, development 
appears to be an acceptable course. 140 He states that effective contractual co-operation 
must include voluntary restraint from certain actions of self-interest. "' From this idea, 
cases such as A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay, 142 can be said to 
display misguided expectations in the spirit of community co-operation, as the 
Schroeders could very reasonably have expected their writers to restrain their ambitions 
and work in co-operation even without the need for written standard form restrictions. 
If the party believed that such restrictions were voluntary (almost like fidelity in a 
`good' marriage) then how can he think that his contract is void for being in restraint, 
sterilising capacity etc. In his mind the paper contract may well reflect his expectations 
for the voluntary behaviour of the other and no more. As discussed later, it might be 
natural for a publishing house or recording company to assume (following their huge 
investment of time, expertise and funds) that the artist willingly gives up the liberty to 
chop and change allegiance whenever the fancy takes him. On a daily basis, until a 
dispute arises, there is a great deal of community spirit in music industry contractual 
relationships, but it is definitely not all driven by altruism. '43 
So, `Why do aggrieved parties from the music industry attempt to execute charges of 
restraint of trade iiztra-contract? ' The answer lies in the expansion of the scope of that 
doctrine following the case of Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. 
144 It is suggested here that that case does not truthfully represent development per se, 
but rather opened the gates for digression on an ad hoc basis. The difficulty of 
interpreting how the doctrine could become operable in the circumstances surrounding 
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Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Lid 145 is documented in the 
comments made in the House of Lords at the time: 
I have found it no easy task to determine how far principles developed for the 
original categories have been or should be extended 146 
or 
... depends to some extent on two 
doctrines denied in the court below. 
Restraint of trade does not apply during a contract... 147 
Restrictions in development of common law are not advocated here, but it is felt that the 
traditional purposefulness of the doctrine has been diffused where it has been applied 
during a contract. It is believed that the clarity and effectiveness of a set of rules has 
been diluted so that the substance of this law, when it is later invoked, is thin and 
difficult to manage. This in turn leads to mis-managed contractual behaviour followed 
by misdirected litigation and a legal outcome which is difficult to assess. Lord Pearce 
was cautious enough to note that the wider the doctrine of restraint of trade, the more 
scope there will be for " ... chicanery and 
delaying tactics"18 are a pre-requisite to the 
application of this strain of restraint of trade. Lord Wilberforce, having analysed the 
matter, came to the apposite conclusion that the doctrine of restraint of trade is 
ambiguous. He suggested : 
The common law has often (if sometimes unconsciously) thrived on ambiguity 
and it would be mistaken, even if it were possible, to try to crystallise the rules 
of this, or any, aspect of public policy into neat propositions. 149 
This statement is, surely, so unsatisfactorily vague that, if it stopped there, it would be 
hard to see how any litigant or lawyer would ever manage to raise the principle again, or 
how any judge managed to interpret the intention at law: 
The doctrine of restraint of trade is one to be applied to factual situations with a 
broad and flexible rule of reason ... 
how can such contracts be identified? No 
exhaustive test can be stated - probably no precise, non-exhaustive test ... 
1so 
The governing principle which seems to be at play in their lordships minds here, is that 
equity will not suffer a wrong to go without remedy, vis-ä-vis the principle and 
somewhat broader protective intention of public policy decisions. Fair enough, but 
restraint of trade is a common law doctrine. 151 Also, common law surely does not 
`thrive on ambiguity'? The quality of having more than one meaning should generally 
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prompt the court to lengthy and critical discourse resulting in a firm proclamation of 
precisely what it does mean, and of which words will, and which words will not, satisfy. 
Setting the question of ambiguity aside (for it is one of great depth sufficient for a 
detailed study in its own right) and returning to developments via the case of Esso 
Petroleum Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. 152 what have been extracted and 
brought forward as principles of the law concerning restraint of trade are these: 
(1) The super-added obligation invoked by a solus agreement may, if onerous or 
sterilising, be enough to constitute good cause in restraint of trade 153 
(2) That where one party has no alternative but to enter into a bargain with a 
party of far greater financial or other commercial strength, then restrictions 
operated by that bargain must be proven to be reasonable or will be deemed to 
be in restraint of trade154 
(3) That even when the dispute arises during the currency of the contract, the 
principles at (1) and (2) are capable of finding remedy under the doctrine of 
restraint of trade. l55 
Prima facie there is nothing onerously complex about these principles, but an 
examination of the reaction in subsequent hearings, where the precedent was required, 
exposes the difficulties. For example, within the course of the benchmark music 
industry case intone vA Schroeder Co. Ltd 156 Russell L. J. commented: 
We have been rather puzzled by an approach to restrictions on trade during the 
currency of exclusive contracts which appear to deny them the quality of 
restraint of trade ... 
157 
And during the same case at appeal Lord Reid added: 
Normally the doctrine of restraint of trade has no application to such 
restrictions 158 
and in a later case, with reference to A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v 
Macaulay, Lord Denning M. R. gave the view: 
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An agreement such as this is not an agreement which is 'in restraint of trade' 
strictly so called... 159 
This passage commenced with the question `Why do members of the music industry 
attempt to execute charges of restraint of trade intra-contract? '. The simplistic answer 
is that they are following other music industry in the true nature of the principle of 
precedent. However, the point that this sequence is intended to demonstrate in the 
following passages, is that later litigants have remained ignorant of that which so 
puzzled the judiciary, and this ignorance in itself illustrates that badly formed precedent, 
even where it is merely persuasive, gives rise not only to difficult law but also to bad 
contractual formation since nothing can be learned from a muddle at law. Later it will 
be seen that the artists George Michael and Shaun Ryder misguidedly relied on restraint 
of trade at great cost. Evidence throughout this discussion suggests that one side 
(generally an individual, the artist) will use this extended strain of restraint of trade as a 
threat to get his own way. 160 The other side (generally corporate bodies) cannot foresee 
any fault in their own practices or amend those practices because the law now presents 
them with a puzzle. 161 The desired effect of the restraining clause is to create 
exclusivity during the relationship. This would otherwise be described as a term of 
fidelity. This exclusivity is an absolute requirement, it is the intention behind the 
contract, it is the very core of the relationship and it is precisely what both parties crave 
before they meet. Of course it is one-sided. 
In general the corporation (record company, publisher, management, etc. ) needs to have 
several successful artists or writers working under its auspices or else (rnondun: 
auspicium) its kudos in the industry will remain limited. The power of that kudos is one 
of the prime elements for which the individual (artist, writer, etc. ) is bargaining. 
However, the costs of manufacturing, advertising and promotion to achieve success in 
this industry are high. So, in return for industry skill and investment based on faith in 
nothing more than artistic talent, the corporation requires a commitment, exclusivity. 
Thus the company ensures that the relationship is not interrupted while both parties net 
their agreed percentages of the anticipated returns. However, it is very often the details 
of percentage shares that need renegotiation rather than the duration of exclusivity. 
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As a result of the unruly development in this area of contractual behaviour, strategy on 
the part of advisory lawyers in this industry has become opportunist to say the least. In 
interview one lawyer has admitted: 
... when I set my stall out, and comment on their 
[the artists'] agreement 
generally (often in writing) I might well tell them that their contract is manifestly 
unfair. Then, in the future, when my client is, hopefully, successful and a fair 
renegotiation does not take place there is arguably an option to say 'this is not 
enforceable, its an unreasonable restraint of trade' and then the threatened 
'walk out' exists162 
This type of contract then, represents industry standard. The practice described above is 
derived from the effect and post-hearing interpretation of the music industry case: A 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. vMacaulayl63 and others which followed suit. 
How then, turning on the principle developed in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper's Garage 
(Stourport) Ltd, '' was the doctrine of restraint of trade applied in A Schroeder Music 
Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay? '6s In his examination of Esso Petroleum Lid v 
Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. Heydon166 suggests, contrary to the feeling held 
here, that the House of Lords was correct in rejecting the traditional limitations on the 
doctrine of restraint of trade. He describes the doctrine as one intended to remedy the 
"fettering of an existing freedom". From this perspective, he draws attention to the test 
proposed by Lord Reid: 
Restraint of trade appears to me to imply that a man contracts to give up some 
freedom which otherwise he would have had 167 
In the Esso case the freedom under question was the freedom to trade whatever brand of 
petrol or any other goods, at whatever prices the Harpers saw fit. They gave this up to 
enter a solus agreement with Esso. On analysis, this test proves too wide because it is 
dependent upon the freedom being in place before and at the time of the solus 
agreement. It would not be hard, if that was all that the test amounted to, for subsequent 
solus supply dealers to incorporate a pre-requisite that the property or material over 
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which freedom is exercised be transferred before the solus agreement is activated. That 
would, it is believed here, be a true display of inequality of bargaining power. 
If this pre-fidelity freedom test had been applied in A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. 
Ltd v Macaulay" it would probably have rendered every artist or writer's contract 
immediately voidable. It is axiomatic to a contract of exclusivity that the artist or writer 
gives up his freedom to record or sell one song at a time, which is exactly what Tony 
Macaulay did. It must be noted here that it is quite usual, before any long-term contract 
is offered by any company, that creative competence will be established by artists or 
writers through a period of trading here-and-there, selling one-off songs or albums 
which represent their potential and confirm their style and technique. Thus the potential 
for value they would bring to a long-term commitment is established. 
Heydon, quite rightly, dismisses the Lord Reid test and turns to that framed by Lord 
Pearce which is a test to find whether there has been sterilisation of capacity. As this 
test addresses the degree to which the complainant is adversely affected by living with 
the terms of the contract, it is more credible. It was this rationale which was applied in 
the case of A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Lid v Macaulay. 169 Indeed it is the 
substantial link between the two cases. Lord Pearce explained that 
The doctrine does not apply to ordinary commercial contracts for the regulation 
and promotion of trade during the existence of the contract, provided that any 
prevention of work outside the contract, viewed as a whole, is directed towards 
the absorption of the parties' services and not their sterilisation. 170 
So, sterilisation of capacity in the instance of a petrol retailer, may occur where the 
supplier lowers the price to other retailers within the territory diverting and reducing the 
retailer's trade, while holding him to a (now) disproportionately high price by the terms 
of the formal agreement. The loss of business, coupled with an obligation to trade 
solely in product from the one supplier, will soon damage the retailer's profit. He is 
contractually bound to bear the resultant loss until he can no longer afford to trade at all. 
The introduction to the courts of the concept of sterilisation so far as performing artists 
are concerned is, perhaps, best illustrated by the case Warier Bros. Picture Inc. v 
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Nelson. 171 Here the court, on the matter of the effect of industry-wide restraint clauses, 
considered whether Ms. Davis could, if she needed to earn other monies, take up 
employment outside the field of acting, without breaching Warner's terms. 
6: 1 A Closer Look at A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay 
What must be made clear at this juncture is that it is not the fairness or otherwise of the 
Macaulay/Schroeder contract which is to be questioned here, it is the effectiveness for 
the contracting community of this development in the doctrine of restraint of trade. The 
intention here is to provide a view of the approaches attitudes and intentions of the 
judiciary, so far as these can be deduced. Furthermore the judicial and legal effort 
which has been expended on this, and subsequent similar cases, serves to illustrate the 
high cost or investment to which the industry remains vulnerable because cases begging 
the question of restraint of trade continue to occur over twenty years after A Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay. 172 
By contrast to the Esso case, it was suggested in A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd 
v Macaulay that sterilisation of capacity occurred because the publishing company was 
under no specific obligation to invest in, or promote, the writer's songs to any 
measurable degree, while the writer was tied to the publisher for a minimum of five, 
probably ten, years: 
The respondent is bound to assign to the appellants during a long period the 
fruits of his musical talent. But what are the appellants bound to do with these 
fruits? Under the contract nothing ... As 
has been said they may put then: in a 
drawer and leave them there ... 
173 
6: 1: 1 Lord Reid 
From this juncture there seems to be a void in understanding between the judiciary and 
the business they are addressing. If Lord Reid was merely pointing out that the terms 
suggest that the publisher could so sterilise a writer's capacity to earn, then that would 
be fair comment. However if he genuinely supposed that a publisher would do that then 
he is missing the point and misinterpreting the intention of the contract on both parts. 
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He is not making that suggestion, so it is difficult to understand what are the grounds for 
this passage of deliberation? Lord Reid speculated a great deal over whether a 
publishing (or equally here a recording) company might be tempted to pursue greater 
commercial gain from channelling investment to a different writer to the neglect of the 
one in hand. But he did not expand his reasoning to consider whether this would (surely 
naturally) result in the negation of options clauses, and thus reduce the term of 
obligation to its minimum duration anyway. If an artist or writer produces such poor 
works that the company cannot profit from them, then it is doubted here whether there 
would be any argument over letting the individual go. Overall Lord Reid seems to have 
set in his mind that the agreement was not a fair one. This is largely derived from his 
assertions that the full extent and meaning of the terms were not very clear174 coupled 
with the generally speculative nature of his interpretation of the effects of the 
agreement. An attempt had been made to invoke the doctrine of good faith of which 
Lord Reid took a very narrow perspective and his comment could be read as 
contradictory to his prior argument in respect of the possibility of publisher refusing to 
publish. He said: 
It was argued that there must be read into this agreement an obligation on the 
part of the publisher to act in good faith. I take that to mean that he would be in 
breach of conduct if by reason of some oblique or malicious motive refrained 
from publishing work which he would otherwise have published. I very much 
doubt this but even if it were so it would make little difference. Such a case 
would seldom occur and then it would be difficult to prove. 171 
Throughout the case no question is raised in their lordships minds over the obligations 
in good faith which must be on the writer [or artist in other cases]. Neither is the 
question raised directly of the presence of bad faith. There is an opportunity in this case 
to explore the attitude of the publishing company in respect of improper accounting 
toward Macaulay. However the court found that moves were in hand to correct 
accounting procedures after the error became apparent to the Schroeders and the 
analysis that lack of actual bad faith might show an intention of good faith in the 
relationship. 176 
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An impression formed here is that in respect of this case there appears to be an 
assumption by the judiciary that the writer is busy creating suitable songs, in a timely 
manner and that his general behaviour is beyond reproach. This assumption is largely 
footed in the image of the writer as a young and inexperienced man, "' which seems to 
have been interpreted as one bearing wholesome attributes and clean ambitions. It 
seems that Lord Reid did not give time to consider the possibility that the writer 
Macaulay might have been able to discuss or re-negotiate the contract. He accepts from 
the facts that the writer is trapped without recourse. 178 No thought is expended on the 
known fact that he came to this contract knowing the industry well enough to have 
ambitions toward becoming a record producer, 179 potentially a much more powerful 
industry position to attain, or that he did negotiate some of the terms of this agreement 
for himself at the outset. 180 He had had other, one-off publishing agreements in the 
past, had worked in collaboration with at least one other writer and was now, in the 
1970's, making an income far in excess of £5,000 per year in order to trigger the 
continuing life of the contract. 18' So far as can be understood he was not an idiot and he 
was not starving in a garret. Furthermore, notwithstanding that he had written for Elvis 
Presley and had at least one charted single in the UK, 182 his writing career was not so 
high profile in nature as to suggest that he would be precluded from pursuing other 
income generating activities if he so wished. 183 
The idea engendered by case reports and surrounding reportage is that the quantity and 
presentation of standard form clauses defeats the ability of individuals like Macaulay to 
interpret whether they fully represent intentions and expectations. This would, in turn, 
beg the suggestion that writers and artists come to the source of the contract, in this case 
the publisher, with an attitude of either trust or ignorance. They certainly would not 
wart to doubt that the source is offering what would amount to the first steps to long- 
term success, but many of them may be subconsciously deceitful in that they expect that 
success to bring the power to rewrite the contract to their own specifications. In 
opposition to Lord Reid and his contemporaries' view of artists this aspersion could 
lead to the view that artists habitually form contracts in bad faith, albeit unwittingly so. 
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6: 1: 2 Lord Diplock 
However, presupposing good faith on the part of the writer and finding it to be 
analogous with naivete, and because this contract in its paper form was based on A. 
Schroeder Music Publishing Company's standard form, albeit with adjustments, Lord 
Diplock saw the `standard form' as core to the problem. He found that the doctrine of 
restraint of trade invoked protection of public interests (public policy) and that the 
presence of the standard form could suggest to him inequality of bargaining power at 
play. '84 As Trebilcock'85 points out Lord Diplock, at least exercised caution enough to 
state that the mere possibility of take-it-or-leave-it transactions arising from standard 
form contracts raises: 
"... no presumption that they use it to drive an wiconscionable bargain ... [but 
that] special vigilance on the part of the court was called for to see that they had 
ttot" 186 
It is assured that Lord Diplock was mindful of some of the potential repercussions of 
developing the notion of unequal bargaining in these circumstances. For it would have 
been absurd if as a result all standard form contracts had become voidable due to a 
diversity of market-place status amongst the parties. Very many standard forms 
represent a contract binding a commercially small trader (supplier, parts manufacturer, 
buyer, independent retailer, craftsman, artist etc) to a financial giant. In addition to the 
present point Trebilcock adds: 
... the assumptions underlying Lord Diplock's analysis of the use of standard 
form contracts is fallacious ... the reason why such contracts are used is to 
facilitate the conduct of trade or, in economic terns, to reduce transaction 
costs. 
187 
In other words it is not to be supposed that the standard form in this industry is 
necessarily a tool of deception utilised by the commercial entity against the individual. 
The somewhat innocent or naive interpretation of the persona of these artists could be 
the foundation for an argument that they require a similar degree of protection from 
standard form contracts, as do the general public in their guise as consumers. In its 
capacity as a protective authority Parliament has responded to public need by enacting a 
variety of consumer protection law. '$'4 So far the available legislation has not 
encroached on this particular common law territory of contracts for services, but, to 
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utilise the term of Lord Kenyon, 189 it seems probable that artists and other music 
industry entities are not equal to protecting themselves. 
In general recording, management, agency or publishing agreements do not represent 
unusual terms, the terms have grown up in this industry over more than fifty years. 
Neither, in essence, do the demands of duration and exclusivity exceed that which it is 
reasonable for an investor to expect in exchange for his commitment to the 
partnership. 190 The agreements are however, lengthy, and accuracy necessitates 
complexity in their presentation. To have to create each one afresh would be an onerous 
requirement in itself. Lord Diplock did not intend to reproach the general act of 
standard form contracting, it was that he imagined that one party had no say at all in the 
content (take-it-or-leave-it) and he opined that the industry had not been active for 
enough years for the standard terms to have been honed to fairness by stronger 
forebears. In addition, as he stated himself 191 it is not actually possible to pin down a 
publisher (or record company) to give a promise of any given degree of commercial 
success. 
6: 2 The Standard Form: Clauses From The Schroeder Contract 
One general difficulty in this type of relationship agreement is the propensity of artists 
and writers to rush headlong to the commitment. 192 The effect of standard form 
contracting and possibilities for general improvements to this method of representing 
the contract will be discussed fully later. The following is a selection of the clauses 
from the Schroeder/Macaulay Agreement. Examination of these clauses will go some 
way toward justifying both popular and judicial mistrust and ill feeling toward their 
complexity: 
Clause 1 states that the contract will `remain in force for a period of five (5) years from 
the date hereof (hereinafter called "the said term"). Clause 9(a) [following those clauses 
which quantify levels and percentages for payments and royalties] states that "If during 
the said term the total of the Composer's royalties hereunder and all advances thereon 
(if any) shall equal or exceed £5000 then this agreement shall automatically be extended 
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for a further five (5) years and for the purposes of this Agreement the said period of five 
(5) years shall be deemed to be included in and be part of the said term. 
By these clauses the writer had committed himself for an indefinite period (subject to 
his royalties and/or advances exceeding £5000 during the initial term). It could be 
argued here that this indicates a certain level of commitment by the Publisher. If their 
intention through clause 9(a) was to retain the services of the writer indefinitely then 
they must make efforts to exploit his material. No level of income can be achieved by 
putting songs `in a drawer and leaving them there'. 193 
Clause 2 c) says that "The Composer will not during the said term directly or indirectly 
work for or render services or be affiliated to or be interested or connected with any 
person firm or corporation engaged in the music publishing business other than the 
Publisher 
... alone or 
in partnership". At Clause 3, "The composer hereby assigns to 
the Publisher the full copyright for the whole world ... " Furthermore, at Clause 11 it 
stated that " The Composer agrees that if and when any copyright in any musical 
composition or lyric written or composed by him prior to the date hereof which is not 
owned or controlled by him at the date hereof shall revert back to him during the said 
term, then he will forthwith assign such copyright to the Publisher ... 
" 
What was quite astonishing to the court was that the Publisher had, at clause 9(b), the 
right to terminate the agreement "by giving the Composer one month's notice (subject 
to the postal clause at 14)". Alongside this the Publisher, at clauses 15 and 16, had the 
right to assign the Agreement or any particular work "to any person". While at 16b, 
"The Composer will not assign his rights without the Publisher's prior written consent". 
In other words the Publisher could determine or assign the agreement but the Composer 
could not. 
It would be difficult for the lay reader to fully assess the individual and cumulative short 
and long-term effects of clauses of this type, scattered as they are through such a 
document. 
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6: 3 The Paradox of Duration 
The paradox of duration is the complexity of the relationship between the industry, and 
particularly artists' and writers' desire for a long-term relationship/career/commitment- 
against-investment, and the restraint of trade dictum that the enforced tie must not go on 
for longer than is reasonable. In A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay194 
the duration of the restriction was measured against the established fact that it is 
impossible to hold a publisher (or for the sake of argument a record company) to any 
quantifiable activity for the successful, commercial exploitation of any specific work or 
number of works. It was considered that the contract was: 
[rJestrictive of the ability of the plaintiff to turn to account his compositions .. 
. irr a manner that was against public interests. 
195 
Thus, the onus was on A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd., as the party seeking to 
rely on the restraining clauses, to prove that enforcement of this covenant would be in 
reasonable protection of their commercial interests, Lord Reid said: 
... if no satisfactory positive undertaking by the Publisher can be devised, it 
appears to me to be an unreasonable restraint of trade to tie the Composer for 
this period of years so that his work will be sterilised and he can earn nothing 
from his abilities as a composer if the publisher chooses not to publish. 196 
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7: Abusing a Doctrine Will Cause Further Lack of Clarity in the Law 
Notwithstanding the difficulty for inexperienced laymen of understanding formal 
contractual documents, and the presence of the duration paradox, it is felt here that 
circumstances encourage parties to rely on what might be a misunderstanding of the 
intent of the legal doctrine of restraint of trade, even allowing for the super-added 
principle of inequality of bargaining power. What this strain of contract law does 
achieve, is a means to resolve a bad relationship that would otherwise involve quite 
nasty, often personally damning allegations. Some variation of a `walk-out'197 threat 
can be assumed to be quicker and cheaper than charges of, say, criminal deception, 
especially where the chief desire is release. 198 The fact is that Tony Macaulay entered 
into litigation with the singular intention of being released from his obligation to the 
publishing company. The company had made an accounting error and was actually 
attempting to correct it, but Macaulay suspected (possibly wrongly) that some of his 
royalties payments were being deceitfully withheld. Although the case, in the end, 
turned on a strain of restraint of trade to facilitate his release from future obligation, this 
was not his initial choice for action. However, in response to his plea that A Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co. Ltd. had repudiated, Russell L. J. found that: 
In connection with this matter there were undoubtedly a number of very strange 
circumstances on the Schroeder side which might have been indicative of a 
deliberate plan to defraud the plaintiff . the judge did not find fraud on the 
Schroeder side, and in our view it would be quite wrong for us in the 
circumstances to make such a finding on a paper trial .. Not to put too fine a 
point on it the plaintiff was trying to get out of his contract ... we would not, 
therefore, have agreed with the judges conclusion that the contract, if 
enforceable, was repudiated As, however, we agree with him that the contract 
was unenforceable as being in restraint of trade, it follows in our opinion that 
the plaintiff was entitled to succeed in his action. 199 
The confusion arising from the apparent difficulties in applying restraint of trade, in 
cases where it is inappropriate, is possibly the reasoning that prompted George 
Michael20Q to expect as a necessary corollary that he would be seen as something of a 
helpless victim, subject to the Sony Corporation's will. Thus he too hoped to have his 
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contract declared unenforceable and his approach was the allegation of restraint of 
201 trade. 
Parker J. could not 
".. find sufficient grounds for excluding [the 1988 agreement] from the 
application of the doctrine ... its provisions require to be justified by reference 
to the Norden feldt test ", 202 
and having applied that traditional test he found that no such onerous restraint was in 
operation. Dissatisfied with the application of restraint of trade in this case Parker J. 
cautioned: 
... it is dangerous to attempt to extrapolate by reference the decisions in a 
particular case, or to apply a decision on one set of facts to cases with different 
facts. Were the doctrine of restraint of trade capable of being applied in such a 
straightforward manner, both the hearing of this case and this judgement would 
have been a good deal shorter. 
However, such a caution in such a high profile case has not, it seems, deterred later 
artists from continuing to consider the doctrine as a tool to undo their obligations. For 
example Robbie Williams, 203 immediately after leaving the successful band, `Take 
That', sought to veto the final release of the band's work together, Take That Greatest 
Hits Collection. BMG owned RCA were reportedly asking a cash payment and 
override of up to £lmillion. The singer was making his first preparations for the release 
of his first solo album and felt that the Take That material would interfere for a variety 
of reasons. His party alleged restraint of trade' reasoning that this would render the 
contract, inclusive of a `leaving member' clause, unenforceable. That contention was 
settled by a compromise agreement for Williams to honour his obligations to the 
company. The cost of preparation for the action, which would have been heard in the 
High Court, was estimated at £100,000.204 
Furthermore, restraint of trade, albeit a late addition to the pleading, was possibly 
always in the back of the mind of Sean Ryder's advisor: 
... he kept his views about the enforceability of the management agreement to 
himself.. 
. 
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That comment has strong untertones in the light of the interview material provided by 
Greenfield S, Osborn G& Boon A. 205 at page 77 above, where there is virtual admission 
that advisors set up grounds for a plea in restraint or trade before the relationship proper 
is even begun. This in itself puts the artist in the position of breaching the doctrine of 
good faith as expounded by Lord Mansfield: 
The governing principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good faith 
forbids either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other 
into the bargain, from his ignorance of that fact and his believing to the 
contrary. 206 
Although not specifically mentioned in the case, this principle would go a long way 
toward explaining the legal point of view regarding Sean Ryder and his advisor. 207 
One distinction that must be noted is that George Michael had, on more than one 
occasion, personally renegotiated the terms of his contract. This negated, according to 
Parker J., any consideration of inequality of bargaining power. The same distinction, on 
analysis, also fetters the Macaulay strain of restraint of trade which would otherwise 
hold that an agreement restricting free trade would be void unless proven reasonable. 
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8: Why Has this Area of Contract Remained in the Domain of Common Law: 
Why Not Statutory Intervention? 
Around 1747 Lord Mansfield considered the possible effects of legislation as a form of 
control over the trading practices in the marine insurance industry. His conclusion was 
that such law was too often likely to be built upon biased or mistaken opinion causing 
the imposition of rigid and inappropriate rules. Free and profitable fair trade could be 
fettered if legislative intervention were to be encouraged. 208 He said: 
We ought to be cautious in making any new regulations or prohibitions with 
respect to trade, however plausible the pretences may be that are offered for 
introducing our approbation. 209 
This view can be extended to suggest that all legislative intervention is similarly 
dangerous and susceptible to contemporary political biases. Interestingly, Atiyah 
continues to point out Lord Mansfield's disapproval for ordinary juries: 
... in commercial cases he was convinced that the unpredictability of a jury's 
decision was a major source of dissatisfaction to businessmen. 210 
When considering the governance of a specialist industry such as the music industry 
both of Lord Mansfield's notices of caution seem valid. Add to this the view held here 
that similarly to juristic unpredictability, Judicial horse sense alone is not efficient at 
guiding the behaviour of a general business population, and it becomes difficult to 
evaluate who should formulate and deliver qualitative law for behavioural governance 
within specified business sectors. Lord Mansfield overcame this by calling in special 
juries. 
They were to decide the individual case in such a way that that the judges would 
then be able to use that decision as a base for the erection of general rules of 
law. In this way the law could at once become more predictable, more regular, 
and more in accordance with commercial customs. 211 
Of course this is not a practicable option any more but it is felt strongly here that the 
judiciary should examine the possibilities for exploiting their potential as influencers 
and governance factor to business communities such as the music industry. While they 
may not be able to specialise per se, they are surely in a position to develop more 
specialist communication techniques in respect of the business man on the street. 
Taking a broader view, any type of person or group can become involved in long-term 
92 
or far reaching contractual relations, so it would be difficult, extreme and restrictive to 
expect Parliament to invent and draft sufficient, suitable legislation. Innovation in this 
area is better done at common law. The alternative doctrine, suggested here to be a 
doctrine of Unconscionably Constructed Contract, has not been formulated because the 
common law has not yet been properly stimulated to think it through thoroughly. 
Although the concept has often been initiated through common law debate, no judge has 
yet drawn up a conclusion. The Law commission, 1965, did consider the possibilities of 
codifying contract law. This came to nothing and has been described by an academic 
colleague as `pious aspiration'. However, and as previously mentioned, in response to 
public pressure and in protection of welfare, Parliament has drawn up legislation to 
regulate some areas of contract law. 212 
The following statement by Lord Denning shows that the common law will not and 
does not need to await legislation for reform, instead dependence lies upon the 
flexibility inherent in the nature of common law: 
There is a bill now before Parliament which gives effect to the test of 
reasonableness [i. e. The bill which led to UCTA]. This is a gratifying piece of 
law reform; but I do not think we need wait for that bill to be passed in law. You 
never know what may happen to a bill. Meanwhile the common law has its own 
principles ready to hand, ' 213 
It must be made clear in this discussion that the machinations of common law and 
legislation are not as much at loggerheads as might be suspected. It is not a simple 
contest of either/or. The weak spot here seems to be that although judicial Realists are 
excellent innovators, they seem to be inadequate designers. If Parliament were to 
attempt to codify contract law much of it would have to be rewritten in order to 
encapsulate it. That exercise would take too long and would be in danger of damaging 
that which is good by the inevitable attempt to restrict concepts on paper. 
It seems that the judiciary themselves cannot agree on the most effective method for 
reform or enlargement of contract law. For example, the concept of inequality of 
bargaining power was raised obiter by Lord Denning M. P. - in Lloyd's Bank v Bundy 
21 
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and his analysis and suggestions for structured categorisation in this area opened the 
possibilities for common law to construct a new chapter. This venture, like many of 
Lord Denning's proposals, was not without support. Chitty, 215 for example, responded: 
Unless and until a general doctrine along the lines suggested by Lord Denning 
is recognised it seems that a contract will only be set aside if it falls within one 
of the recognisable categories of 'victimisation' - such as duress, Purdue 
influence or taking advantage of poverty and ignorance. 
On this matter however, the Formalist216 approach, chiefly brought to the fore by Lord 
Scarman, prevailed. 217 Is this juxtaposition of Realists and Formalists in fact a conflict 
barring progress? Or is it that the natural inter-play of the judiciary prevents the formal 
adoption of prima facie weak and difficult law? It is felt here that the latter is more 
often true. However, this practice so far has evoked a tendency to focus narrowly on a 
concept, such as inequality of bargaining power because it has a title and has been 
raised arguendo with much credibility. Once such focus dominates progress then new 
law cannot simply develop. What must be hoped is that because of the nature of the 
machinations of common law, when an important suggestion has been thrown into the 
ring, cross-case debate will ensue. The difficulty for the population with a vested 
interest is the passage of time. It is possible for decades, if not centuries to pass 
between the suggestion of a legal concept and the satisfactory adoption of that concept 
into a structured doctrinal tool. 
In this instance, Lord Scarman was perhaps over cautious in his bid to protect the clarity 
of existing law and did not seem to deal comfortably with the possibility of new rules of 
law except where they are drafted by Parliament. This suggestion is supported by his 
comment on "the world of doctrine" in the passage below. He pays no attention to the 
fact that undue influence, the doctrine he intended to protect from corruption, was itself 
a development at common law in equity. During the 1760s, in an un-reported case Lord 
Mansfield is credited with having said: "What! Pass a judgement to do mischief, then 
bring in a bill to cure it)" Lord Scarman does not intend to suggest this, he in fact 
states: 218 
Biere is no precisely defined knv selling limits to the equitable jurisdiction of a 
court to give relief against undue influence. M is is the world of doctrine not of 
94 
neat tidy rules. /He continues, however, to attempt to neaten and tidy the 
approach he must now take: ] The courts of equity have developed a body of 
learning enabling relief to be granted where the law has to treat the transaction 
as un-impeachable unless it can be held to have been procured by undue 
influence. It is the un-impeachability at law of a disadvantageous transaction 
which is the standing point from which the court advances to consider whether 
the transaction is the product merely of ones own folly or of the undue influence 
exercised by another. A court in the exercise of this equitable jurisdiction is a 
court of conscience. Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine 
whether a transaction is or is not unconscionable: this is a question which 
depends on the particular facts of the case. 
He has had to jump from his general preference on the one hand of the rigidity of 
legislation for the purpose of filling gaps in common law, to an acceptance on the other 
hand of the fluidity and flexibility of the notions of equity as an agent of judicial 
conscience. It is felt here that to leave definition of the ethos of law to be altered ad hoc 
at the discretion of the judiciary (especially where it must be applied to long-term 
business relationships) cannot provide any framework or governance to guide future 
behaviour and is, as a practice in itself, unfair and potentially damaging. What is 
suggested is that there should be an amalgamation of the approaches of Lords Scarman 
and Denning. There can be quality development via common law cross-case debate, 
provided that the discussion is focused on the needs of the litigants and potential 
litigants rather than on the methodology of law itself. When good conclusive rules are 
generated they will necessarily guide both judiciary and contractors alike. 
On the matter of formulation for a foundation for new progress, both the doctrine of 
undue influence and of restraint of trade, where inequality of bargaining power has been 
considered to some effect, are developing, and probably sufficiently in their own niches. 
By setting aside these areas, the opening exists for framing unconscionability at 
common law rather than having it via legislation. Starting afresh would offer flexibility, 
debate and formulae at levels which the legislative time-tabling necessarily restricts. 
Whether or not stimulation for such activity is stirring in contemporary law remains to 
be seen. There is certainly evidence that the law in this area is currently being 
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progressed. If Lord Scarman was uncomfortable with progress via common law, footed 
in decisions requiring judicial conscience to focus on public policy, then that hardship 
has been brushed aside in the later case CIBC Mortgages Plc V Pitt 219 where Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson has taken up the issue that: "Unfortunately the attention of the 
House in Morgan220 was not drawn to the abuse of confidence cases". In fact Lord 
Scarman did not ignore or overlook this issue he diverted consideration of it by 
criticising those cases: 
" [a] mis-representation of the facts, as is all too frequent in this branch of law, 
of words and phrases such as `confidence', 'confidentiality, ' iduciary duty "'221 
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9: The Concept of Co-operation 
The great majority of what is discussed here is generated from studies of judicial 
activity. However, case law sparks a great deal of learned interpretation beyond the 
confines of the court. Of particular interest here is the concept of co-operation. 
Logically it must be said that co-operation ought to exist as a matter of course, given the 
duration of many long-term contractual relationships. However, the question framing 
this concept is whether such co-operation exists or whether it is merely a misconception 
underpinned by observation of activities otherwise intended to achieve utility 
maximisation. It is natural play in business to insure realisation of the maximum self- 
benefiting gains from the contract. The point of view supported here is that contract law 
should provide a governance structure which would include provision of clear 
behavioural rules, co-operation in mutual good faith being key among them. The 
following analysis is intended to establish whether it is feasible to propose rules 
encompassing co-operational behaviour, i. e. does such behaviour exist? 
The 1994 Annual Conference of the Socio-Legal Studies Association held at the 
University of Nottingham has provided several papers discussing the possibilities of co- 
operation. Of these, three have been selected for discussion here: 
9: 1 Co-operation Intra-Contract or Mere Economic Self Interest and Utility 
Maximisation: The point of View of Roger Brownsword222 
As Brownsword acknowledges, the classical model of contract concentrates on discrete 
or spot transaction in contractual behaviour, not long-term relations. That model is too 
narrow to attract credibility in a study such as this. Despite the popular model a great 
percentage of contracts are either long-term performance dealings or are units within a 
series which represent a long-term business relationship. Brownsword also joins voice 
with Stewart Macaulay223 and Ian Macneil224 in supporting the view, here concurred, 
that the standard western market-economics model must be criticised for distorting 
reality for much the same reason. This model tends to assume perfect market 
information in addition to discrete transaction. "Accordingly", Brownsword suggests, 
"a new co-operative model of contract beckons .. 
" 
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The next question which he addresses is whether the currently acknowledged spirit of 
co-operation is driven by morals or prudence? In examining the criterion of co- 
operational contractual behaviour he suggests joint investment, mutual dependency and 
reciprocal performance which, he says, accrue obligations of mutual responsibility and 
restraint on the natural prioritisation of self-interest. He encapsulates this by concluding 
that: 
... therefore, the criterion of co-operation is whether self-interest action 
by a 
contracting party is compatible with the contractual community of interest. 225 
Next he examines the scope of co-operation in contract and here he introduces the 
concept of the doctrine of good faith as a carrier for co-operation [The development of 
`good faith' in this context is intended to be discussed separately later]. The scope of 
co-operation is dependent on the interpretation of the relationship between the principle 
and the contract. For example, that if the view is contract-specific, Brownsword feels, 
the scope of the principle is that it is operational post formation, so that self-interest is 
not served as a priority over performance. Alternatively if the view is relational, then 
periods between any series of contracts in a long-term [business] relationship as well as 
negotiation and formation are also subject to the principle. Self interest should not be 
prioritised during this interaction either. Finally if the view is institutional, then mutual 
trust and confidence come into play almost before the parties even meet, as pre- 
relational expectations. The element of co-operation being to live up to those 
expectations permanently, without specified effort on either part. 
Brownsword then returns to the question of whether co-operation during the term of a 
contractual relationship is founded on a moral basis or driven by prudence and self. 
gratification? It is felt here that he goes into a question that is impossible to answer, 
because co-operation might well suit to serve self-interest. The two are not mutually 
exclusive and it is not often possible to say whether the initiator is, in truth, morally or 
commercially driven. At any one time one can only take his word for it. The case used 
to illustrate apparent co-operation is Williams v Roffey Bros. and Nicholls (Contractors) 
Ltd 226 where the Court of Appeal, as Brownsword notes, saw the behaviour of the main 
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contractor, in offering financial relief to a sub-contractor, as of "practical benefit" at that 
time. In fact (and the reason for litigation in this case) the main contractor reneged on 
this secondary agreement, so was he being altruistic or deceptive? Was he ever co- 
operating or only ever deceiving? Obviously the court will not indulge in a general 
debate about the scope of moral behaviour and altruism in forging its advice. At the 
bench it cannot be practical for a judge wholly to transpose his reasoning to philosophy. 
However, Brownsword has argued that insisting on the presence of moral motivation is 
the only clear basis by which co-operation can be distinguished and treated as 
governable contractual conduct: 
The answer is that the concept of co-operation can only serve as a significant 
theoretical construct if it breaks free from the model of action guided-by-self- 
interest which is central to the classical view of contract. 227 
9; 2 The View of Hugh Collins228 
Hugh Collin's approach is more pragmatic. He begins by focusing on Williams v Roffey 
Bros. and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd229 and acknowledging that, in that case, the main 
contractor was aware of the financial difficulties of the sub-contractor, which 
knowledge influenced the decision to modify the price rather than insist on strict 
performance of the original contract. 
He goes on to demonstrate his argument by citing other areas, such as commercial 
contracts between engineering businesses230 where co-operation beyond the framework 
of the contract is quite normal. Here he errs on the side of Brownsword's institutional 
interpretation of behaviour, where reputation, trust and confidence are the foundation of 
the relationship beyond the contract itself. Throughout the argument Collins seeks to 
distinguish between discrete contract, the conventional model precept, and long-term 
contractual relations. This distinction, in retrospect, seems hardly necessary unless the 
point is to be made that major adjustments and modifications, which can cause problems 
during a long-term relationship are, invariably, directly addressed in spot contracts and 
are dealt with in the instant. 
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Following his own lead, Collins continues to define aspects where co-operation is 
corollary to contract, such as the actual performance of exchange, long-term mutual 
profit realisation, or the relationship patterns integral to business partnerships. These he 
distinguishes from discrete transaction definitions and he is thus able to suggest that co- 
operation in many guises is intrinsic to long-term contractual relations. It is the 
relationship rather than the rules of contract that will set the behavioural norms. 
Having broadened the scope of his argument to include socio-behavioural patterns 
which may compete with behavioural rules at contract law Collins points out: 
The patterns of behaviour of the main contractor in Williams v Roffey Bros. and 
Nicholls (Contractors) Ltdd31 may be described as vacillation between normative 
referencing points. 
So he has recognised that the decision to increase payment terms and the intention to 
renege (whenever that intention was formed) are both decisions founded in self-interest. 
He concludes: 
... reflect upon the improbable task that theories of long-term contract have set 
themselves. These claims that long-term contracts involve co-operative 
behaviour seem deeply mysterious, for they commence with imagining strangers 
in the marketplace being drawn together out of economic self interest, but then 
these strangers form a contract in which self-interest is sacrificed to a 
commitment to a common goal. How does this metamorphosis of behaviour take 
place? My suggestion is that it simply does not. What does take place however, 
in long tern: business relations is that the parties concerned have multiple 
objectives, not simply to er joy the fruits of any contracts, but also to preserve 
that relation, which itself will depend upon observance of competing norms of 
behaviour. 232 
At his conclusion Collins, like Brownsword, suggests that for ease of legal analysis, the 
doctrine of good faith must be incorporated into future courtroom deliberations as a 
foundation on which concepts of expectations and flexibility over the duration of a 
long-term contractual relationship can be designed. He adds that the relationship itself 
must be viewed as a whole and not just in accordance with the fixed terms of the 
contract. Both Brownsword and Collins have described their perspectives in greater 
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depth than may be suggested here, and they provide valuable bases for behavioural 
analysis. 
When describing Procedural Uiiconscionability233 as inclusive of all the circumstances 
surrounding the contract, the intention here includes that this will encompass the 
relationship beyond the contract and all the expectations so raised. Music industry 
relationships such as those of Macaulay, O'Sullivan or Panayiotou234 demonstrate long- 
term relational expectations very well. The disputes which have arisen in this field 
display disappointments which were formed not only during the life of the contracts, but 
also as a result of expectations built on the understanding of the relationship as a whole. 
9: 3 The view of Morten IIviid235 
Morton Hviid provides a more demonstrative analysis of long-term relations and co- 
operation. He sets out by making the point that manufacturers only rarely eise the terms 
of contracts or resort to contract law to settle disputes in ongoing relationships. 236 It 
must be stated here that it is believed that The Contract is constantly an issue in music 
industry relationships and is frequently levied as both sword and shield in resolving 
difficulties either in or before litigation. 
Hviid moves on to define the nature of the relationship he is intent on analysing, and 
provides four important [to the relationships under general discussion here] measures: 
i) Repeat performance within the contract; 
ii) No definite pre-specified final date of the contract or fixed number of 
performances; 237 
iii) A complete contract cannot be written, and states where obligations cannot 
be defined can occur throughout the life of the contract; 
iv) The contracting parties are rational, intelligent decision makers, maximising 
their own utility function. 
In relation to point (iv) Hviid intends to show that maximisation does not necessarily 
reflect conflict of interest, because: 
co-operative behaviour can emerge to the extent that the contracting parties 
will rely on each other to renegotiate in good faith where any gaps emerge. 
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This supports the view of music industry contractual structure, especially in relation to 
record company contracts. The gaps suggested are where obligations are not defined 
within the text of the contract or where one party believes there to be a gap. Those gaps 
and the act of overcoming them where they are discovered are not necessarily viewed as 
bad behaviour or bad contract building, they are just facts of the effects of the passage 
of time. Hviid's point, and largely the point under discussion here, is that these gaps 
and the resulting behaviour are potential catalysts for a breakdown in relations. 
Similarly to Hviid's view it is the understanding here that the form of the contract is not 
reduced in importance if contract law is found to be lacking, or is avoided altogether 
when the parties reach an issue requiring resolve. 238 
He then turns to the model provided by Kreps: 239 the "trust' game, by which he proposes 
the probable behaviour within long term contractual relationships given variations on 
outcome depending upon the criteria of reaction to given levels of trust and subsequent 
action and reaction. It is conjectured that both bargaining power and expectations are 
taken into account under this method of analysis. 
The trust game model is as follows: 240 
Player II Honour 1's trust Abuse 1's trust 
Player I 
Trust 11 10/10 -5/15 
Don't Trust II 0/0 0/0 
The figures show the supposed balance of gain according to whether trust is invested by 
player I and whether that trust is abused by player H. If, as Hviid suggests, the game 
were to be repeated throughout the life of a contractual relationship the outcome would 
suggest one of two possible strategies be adopted: 
1. Start by co-operating on the Trust outcome. Continue co-operating 
until the other party breaches, then never co-operate again. 
2. Start by co-operating on the Trust outcome. If someone deviates from 
the agreement, punish for a number of periods long enough that any 
initial gain from breaching is wiped out. Then forgive and return to 
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the co-operative agreement. Any breach either of the initial promise 
or the agreed punishment phase results in restarting the punishment. 
This reads like something relating to nursery strategy suggesting the training of small 
children. 241 Scenario 1., triggered by breach and with no forgiveness is known as the 
grim trigger strategy. Scenario 2. is called the stick-and-carrot strategy. 
Hviid moves on to include four more issues which he feels must be important for 
ensuring co-operation: 
a) The gain from deviation 
b) The value of punishment 
c) The importance of the future 
d) The speed of detection 
He concedes that the possible immediate benefits from opportunistic behaviour which 
results in deviation may, in the mind of the relevant party, outweigh the future losses 
brought on by punishment of future loss of trust. It is believed here that this state of 
mind is common and dangerous in the music industry as it betrays short-sightedness 
and failure to recognise long term career objectives. Combined with historical 
experience and industry custom which dictate suggestion that the life expectancy of 
artists' careers will average five years, 242 deviation justified by a shallow acceptance of 
the four above criteria (immediate gain; bravado toward `punishment'; devalue the 
future and promote ignorance) may play a major role in the tendency toward non co- 
operation, non trust and relationship sullying in many instances. On the other hand, 
each relationship in the music industry is founded in the hope and expectation that it is 
the beginning of a long and fruitful career, so it would not be true to suggest that `the 
future' is not significant. 
Overall, Hviid has pulled together a useful, simplified approach for identifying the 
behaviour and expectations of parties to some long-term contractual relations. As he 
suggests at his conclusion, the arguments are simple and the assumptions are stark. 
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10: The Nature and Characteristics of Those Who Constitute the Music Industry 
In order to understand exactly why the area of contract law under discussion has, as 
contended here, failed to communicate with classes of contractual relationship holders, 
it is necessary to define the nature and characteristics of those classes. Of interest to 
this study are those sets that make up the popular music industry. Once the qualities of 
these sets are understood, and the shortfalls of attempted communication identified, it 
will be possible to address a fresh and more successful approach. Before breaking them 
down into groups of type, there is one character trait which they can be said to hold in 
common and which must be recognised as critical to understanding their relationships. 
That is that they are all entrepreneurs. Having said that, there is some academic 
contention over the meaning of the term entrepreneur so Appendix 4 is intended to 
elaborate on what is meant by the term here, and thus how individuals within the music 
industry fall into this criteria. In brief, they are each risk takers, and each will commit 
substantial investment to the bargain. 
It is intended here, to establish patterns of reactive behaviour in given circumstances 
and from that study to model a best-approach hypothesis for potential influencers such 
as contract law. The study will view the industry as one made up of two distinct factors: 
Businessmen243 and Creative Artists. Although the initial cost for either may not 
necessarily be a money-cost, it is presupposed that there is a risk-investment for each at 
the outset of any project, i. e. opportunity costs will be inherent in the commitment to 
any one relationship, and thus both maintain entrepreneurial status. The structure for 
the following study is footed in Eichner's model of anthropogenic studies, 244 requiring 
the study of all personal development influencers. This includes family type and 
background, school type and experiences, experiences in the work place and work 
places experienced etc. This approach will be combined with the similar approaches by 
Briggs-Myers245 labelled Nomothetics, which is primarily concerned with the collection 
of group data but which studies evidence of personality traits in order to produce 
measurements and draw comparators for behavioural patterns, and with the suggestions 
raised by the work of Dr. Albert Rothenberg, M. D., in Madness and Creativity. 246 Thus 
it is suggested that the theoretical legal doctrine of Unconscionably Constructed 
Contracts can be designed and tested here on an ex post model (reactive response to 
105 
legal rules as guidance and governance factors, predicted on the grounds of experience 
rather than simply predicted) rather than the classical approaches which tends to be ex 
ante in nature. 47 
10: 1 The Businessmen 
First of all, who are these people? What have they got in common beside their careers? 
Although the cases and jurisdiction under question here are English, it cannot be 
ignored that the industry executives who are involved come from a variety of countries 
and cultural backgrounds. In fact, one of the most recent significant cases, Panayiotou v 
Sony [1994)248 involved Japanese decision makers. This cultural distinction is 
comparatively new to this industry and note will be made, where relevant, of any 
significant behavioural or reactive factors in long term relationship building. 
The table at Appendix 5 shows a break-down of the background and reported 
characteristics of a sample of executives relevant during a time span encompassing A 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay; 9 and Panayiotou v Sony [ 1994]250 
From studying this selection a conclusion is drawn that these people are all quick to 
learn, impactively decisive, and, as a combination of these factors, quick to make 
judgement and act on it without necessarily referring to any past event or knowledge. 
(These conclusions are supported by some ten years of personal experience, working 
alongside some of this set in the music industry. ) Furthermore they are each in a 
position of considerable decision-making power, they are surrounded by others similar 
to themselves who are either their 1) counterparts, 2) market opposition or 3) advisors. 
The majority of the subjects have switched from artist-management/agency, to 
publishing, to record company work according to career opportunities and industry 
circumstances. All of the above is generally achieved by operating in isolation which in 
turn highlights either volatility in nature because the subject is very self-focused and 
used to thinking in terms of achieving his goals instantaneously, or acute shyness, 
sharing important ideas and weighty expectations only with selected trusted colleagues. 
All the subjects are prone to private and very detailed time-tabling and planning. The 
privacy of this solo event management process means that the subject will be hurt, 
surprised or aggravated by interference with his expectations, but his belief in himself 
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and his instinctive capabilities continues to dictate that he will not expose his mind to 
others. 
This group has a tendency to fall in to the Myers-Briggs category INFP, the exact 
significance of which will be discussed shortly. By analysing the nature of their 
perceptual process, an understanding can be developed of how they approach 
contractual relationships and how they will react to the outcome of litigation or respond 
to the threat of litigation. It is assumed here that perception is the apparent root-cause 
of behaviour. Consider, for example, three typical responses to a request for 
information: 
1) one group may perceive the request as a threat and expect the information to be 
embodied in an attack against them; 
2) another group may have no specific objection but will suspect that the information 
will culminate in some future interference in the way they go about their business; 
3) another group may be very open and will give information freely with-out suspicion, 
expecting the free exchange of information to bring better relationships and forge a 
unity of trust. 
Given the nature of this group it is felt that they will fall into category 2. It is unlikely 
that they will behave in the manner described in category 3). This means that they are 
not likely to develop contractual relations with any strength of bias toward good faith or 
co-operation. An example which illustrates these characteristics in long-term contractual 
relationship formation is: 251 
Timing is almost as crucial to star making as talent is. Grossman252 gave the 
impression of an unhurried, unscheduled man, yet he had amte Swiss movement 
ticking in his mind. He worked out in detail his timetable for launching Dylan. 
Dylan was not always aware of Grossman's strategic move, just as Grossman 
was not always aware of Dylan's. ... One of Albert's deals had to proceed 
without Bob's knowledge, for nothing is so fragile as a young performer's ego. . 
.. 
Grossman bought out Roy Silver's share of their partnership using OPM - 
other people's money. The OPM principle minimises risks and keeps ones own 
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capital free.... The deal was kept quiet mostly to give Dylan the feeling that he 
was achieving everything on his own. 
The next quotation, written about himself by erstwhile English agent/manager of Shirley 
Bassey, Michael Sullivan, 2 also gives some insight into they type of relationship 
which prevails in this industry. It illustrates what, in their minds at least, is some 
justification for the almost dictatorial behaviour of executives, which is the very 
behaviour which may be turned against them in a case relying on undue influence or 
restraint of trade. In fact Mr. Sullivan and Miss Bassey, at the time of this reported 
conversation, were some three weeks away from a court booking for just such a dispute 
over his exclusive management agreement with her. On this occasion they continued 
their relationship and the court case was dropped: 
Mickey', she said, you always treated me like a child. Like a freak. You 
arranged things without telling me and I only used to find out about them when 
somebody else told me or I read about them somewhere. 
`I know that you were trying to save me from disappointment if things did not 
materialise, but at the time I thought you were doing things behind my back. 
`People said to nie "He's deceiving you" and I believed them. They said 
"You're the star. He only works for you ". 
The above information gives an outline sketch of those who were dominant in the music 
industry up to one commercial generation ago. What of the present day executives? 
Sony Music's President, Nobuyuki Idei, represents himself and his company as and 
entity which will make dreams come true for both artists and consumers. 254 But at his 
time of falling out with Sony, George Michael stated that they treated artists as little 
more than software, 255 while a Sony spokesman mentioned sadness and moral 
obligation as well as legal commitment. 256 In 1996 Gerald M Levin, Chairman and 
C. E. O Time Warner Inc. delivered a speech discussing giving life to dreams and quoting 
classical literature and poetry to enhance his points. 257 
Whether from large or small companies the executives display a strong charge of 
motivation to continuously progress and build on the success of their own artists. The 
108 
nature of the category of artistic genre towards which the artist gravitates will dictate 
whether he or she will be developed as a gregarious and bright character such as the 
pop-star George Michael; an eclectic word-smith such as Bob Dylan or the quiet 
thoughtful writer such as Gilbert O'Sullivan. The scope of the executive personality is 
sufficient to adapt to the differing needs of each artist in his development. However, the 
weakness in the relationship is evident when either the artists wishes to substantially 
alter his persona, or when it transpires that the executive misread the persona and has 
attempted to cultivate the artist into something which he or she cannot become. 
Discussions about the fulfilment of dreams and citation of poetry are shallow (though 
not necessarily insincere) disguises when the relationship is, in fact, to be built solely on 
the grounds of productivity and commerce. The expectations of the creative party may 
be misguided. 
However, it is possible to show that an approach of mistrust toward executives has 
brought about what might, to some degree, be construed as a harsh result through the 
court. The series of events which lead to Denmark Productions Ltd. V Boscobel 
Productions Lid. 258 included the fact that, Ray Davies, a member of the band The Kinks 
refused to travel to America on an important promotional tour unless the co-manager 
Larry Page (of Denmark Productions Ltd. ) agreed to travel and to remain with them 
while they were abroad. This condition demonstrates a substantial degree of 
dependence and value vested in the management skills of Page. Surely it would have 
been foolish and financially risky if Page chose to test this relationship without genuine 
good cause. However, five days after the tour had commenced Larry Page needed to 
return to England, he told the rest of the group but did not tell Ray Davies that he was 
going back. Ray Davies became upset when he heard of Page's departure and the band 
made a decision to sever their management relationship. The grounds for severance 
were that the group had been left in the lurch so that there was a breach of trust and a 
total loss of confidence. Prima facie it could be suggested that, in this instance at least, 
Mr. Page had made every effort to compromise and fulfil the artists' demands to the 
extent it was possible for him to do without otherwise abandoning his other day to day 
business commitments. 
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Sometimes a manager or other executive will attempt to market the artist by unsuitable 
methods which the artists' real characteristics will eventually betray. The manager of 
pop band Take That, Nigel Martin-Smith, for example, insisted that the boys could not 
indulge in girl-friends, smoking, drinking to excess or swearing, they were to be good, 
clean, uncomplicated and available? " This is a common and an understandable 
method for developing artists image, in this case - five boys from the north of England 
aged between 16 - 20. Martin-Smith was grooming them for a lucrative and successful 
pop-music career. But it quickly transpired, and eventually came to a head with Robbie 
William's threat of litigation to be released from his contract, that the personality of 
these individuals could not be forced to comply with the executive's preconceived plan. 
In the first instance the off-stage activities of the boys, particularly Robbie Williams, in 
bars and hotels and the like, appeared to be high jinx. However Nigel Martin-Smith 
could not be malleable enough in his visionary role to allow the genuine personality of 
Robbie Williams to be exposed. Severance of this relationship became inevitable. 
These developments have to move outside of the contractual relationship and nurturing 
them is beyond the current scope of fiduciary duty. These are the areas which might 
call for some form of co-operation within the contract to avoid the confrontational 
methods of escape which have so-far prevailed. After all, it is felt here that this type of 
character sterilisation is akin to that which supported George Michael complaint. He 
claimed he wanted to shift from teen-pop appeal to an adult rock audience, the record 
company did not support this in the short term because of the level of income that the 
teen-pop market represented via George. 
It would be easy to derive an impression, from the anecdotes cited above, that the 
average music industry executive is an earnest and well meaning business man who 
occasionally pays the price for acting on bad instinct or mis-advise. 
10: 2 Development in the Industry - Will it Change the Characters Who Forge the 
Relationships? 
As Entertainment Industry companies become dominated by yet larger corporations, 2 ' 
it is expected here that Artists will find themselves dealing less often with those who fit 
the characteristics described above and more often with the less volatile and less 
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emotive business character such as those businessmen who might already be found 
within Sony. Canadian Management Company Song Corp. along with Roger Dent, city 
analyst at Yorkton Securities Inc., Toronto, predict that acts who sell less than 100,000 
units per album will be dropped by these large organisations. 261 The focus for the new 
corporations will undoubtedly be on a requirement for high-volume turnover and the 
companies will be the owner-controller of all forms of entertainment from production 
through playback technology to consumption. While analysts are recommending a 
strong-buy in the smaller independent labels and distributors it is felt here that history in 
this industry already suggests that the independents will not have a long trading life 
before they are either bought out or pushed in to liquidation by the larger companies. 
Of the anticipated `purging' band manager Allan Gregg commented: 
It is not because Time Warner or F. MI are malevolent. It is done to satisfy the 
needs of a large organisation. 262 
It will be the playback technology, presumed here to be computer operated, modem 
based, in-home multimedia/ entertainment centres, 263 which will dictate the format for 
the output of music. It is probable that the consumer will select and rent or purchase at 
home rather than in record stores. Roger Ames, Chief Executive of Warner EMI Music 
and Ken Berry, Chief Operating Officer said at a press conference that the Internet 
would change the music industry even more profoundly than either the Sony Walkman 
or the compact disk did in the eighties. 2'1 
This shift in the distribution of music will render the Pollock QC. /Sony list of 
expectations 265 more critical and less flexible toward the whims of those of an `artistic 
nature'. It is, therefore, of greater importance during the present period of change 
throughout the industry to establish the responsibilities of the corporate parties in 
relationship management and fiduciary terms. In simplistic terms it may be possible to 
say that these organisations are graduating from business which exist to promote the 
(ostensibly) best interests of their members to and profit from the resulting co-operative 
output, thus increasing their market share and status; to those which exist purely with 
the objective of raising profit for which market share and status are engineered by 
acquisition. 266 This is not to suggest that the newly evolving corporations will be 
strictly impersonal toward artists but they will surely not indulge in the manner of knee- 
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jerk renegotiation or variation which has been entertained in the past. This is already 
apparent in the October 1991 meeting between George Michael, his manager Rob 
Kahane, publisher Dick Leahy and Sony World President, Norio Ohga, Sony Music UK 
Head Paul Russell, Head of Sony Music world wide, Michael Schulhof. It was at this 
meeting that George expected to be believed that it would have been in everybody's 
best interests if his contract was simply terminated and the material released back to 
him. The Sony executives simply did not agree, George Michael and Wham product 
represents a lucrative back catalogue (which Sony still own) and, while he was working 
to the `pop' market, an equally lucrative foreseeable future could be predicted from his 
output. George was left to decide whether to pursue his desires through the courts. The 
Artist's decision was clearly not commerce or profit motivated as Sony's had been. 
During the build up the recent Time Warner-AOL-EMI merger, it is reported26. that 
artists' agents and managers say: 
... EMI's most powerful stars, which include the Rolling Stones, the Spice Girls 
and Radiohead, are likely to have change-of-control clauses in their recording 
contracts ... If large numbers of artists seek new contracts, it could 
dramatically increase EMI's costs or lead to widespread defections. 
What is more, Mick Fleetwood of Fleetwood Mac is among the first Artists to pioneer 
their own major league, artist-run alternative. Fleetwood is expanding his own 
company, Point Group to run an e-commerce website and is supported by the giant 
Microsoft: 
Without being a sour grape, some artists have not had a good crack of the whip 
in business .. that has given me a sense of purpose. 
2b8 
Critical to the discussion here is the city analyst prediction that: 
The answer for record companies is to break new acts.... You've got to catch 
`em when they're young and native, get them on a good contract and make a 
fabulous amount of money out of that. After that they're up for grabs. 269 
If there is a deliberate move to seek out and exploit the young or naive as new product, 
this approach to relationship building smacks of the Llo)& Banks v Bund) ; 70 type of 
inequality and undue influence. It is possible that the new wave of artists to be signed 
up will be contractually less sophisticated than their predecessors as the desired 
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market/workplace becomes more global, appears `new' and is subject to high profile 
discussion. The suggestion inherent in the comment quoted above is supported by Time 
Warner's own press release271 that concentrates heavily on the potential developments 
of digital media as a distribution service for music and states: 
... it is the proven ability of Roger [Ames, C. E. O. Warner EMI[ and Ken 
[Berry, Chief Operating Officer Warner EMIJ to find the newest acts and 
nurture the best talent that will truly distinguish Wanner EMI music. 
It is surmised here that, although current artists and substantial back-catalogue 
ownership are key to the immediate success of Warner EMI the hint given about their 
ability to source new [naive] talent is critical to future development. What must be kept 
in mind is that, with the anticipated forthcoming Internet trade , as established artists 
leave the label the back-catalogue of material in which the label will retain ownership 
will be vastly valuable, this is capable of outweighing the loss of any individual artist or 
group. If contractual relationships are not governed from the outset by factors such as 
good faith, co-operation and the general concept of unconscionable construction then 
inequality of bargaining power is looming large at this juncture. 
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11: The Artists 
During research for this work272 interviewees have frequently responded to questions in 
the same manner: 
Q: "Why would Fleetwood Mac/Macaulay/ Gilbert O'Sullivan, (etc. ) enter into 
contracts containing such amazing provisions? " 
A: "They just wanted a contract ". 
"Music business lawyers used not to be so prevalent as they are nowadays" 
"Somebody had a lot of money and a promise of success, the details were 
overlooked" 
"They often believed they were going, jointly', into a business partnership! " 
There seems a strong tendency both in and out of court to perpetuate the notion that 
artists as a class are, at least during their early careers, incapable of negotiating a fair 
deal. This appears to have remained true even when it became customary to employ 
`independent' advice. The most recent case, Ryder v Nicholl and Another, 273 proves an 
absolute inability on the part of the artist to negotiate terms for himself. In addition it is 
questioned here whether the advisor genuinely falls in to the category of `independent'. 
Even-so the Appeal judgements begins thus: 
The appellant is about 36 and a rock musician. He had a difjllcult childhood in 
Salford and was a registered drug addict when still in his teens. Irr 1982 he 
formed a band called the `Happy Mondays' which survived for ten years... 
The respondents are husband and wife and of an older generation. They each 
have over twenty years experience in the music industry when they met the 
appellant... 
With or without a drug addiction it is contended here, with all due respect, that a 36- 
year-old is no innocent, especially after a good ten years' working in the rock industry. 
(Personal experience here would support this view. It can be confirmed that this 
experience enables verification that artists prefer to be relieved of as much business 
responsibility as possible while they do their work, but that experience also enables 
verification that this trait does not necessarily imply naivety or dull wits. Those with 
addictions are just as aware and opinionated about the industry within which they 
operate. Furthermore, on the part of business parties, in this as much as in any other 
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industry, longevity does not as a necessary corollary equate to a high degree of 
sophistication. That is to say that the one may be just a competent or incompetent as the 
other. ) The overall suggestion which seems to prevail through the courts, however, is 
that artists constitute a class of people who, for over fifty years, have remained naive 
and have, as a result, foregone responsibility for the habit of rushing into commercial 
agreements without reviewing the terms. In part this behaviour has been explained 
already, as it seems this class of people are often so desperate to attain these contractual 
relations that they dare not delay. Alternatively, they are careless and fulfil their need 
for the relationship by accepting whatever is presented to them. There is an element of 
self-sacrifice here as well as a blind faith that the corporate party will help them sort out 
their lot after they have proven themselves. Here then, there are personality traits which 
seem common; a combination of impetuousness 27 and whimsical lifestyle shifts. If the 
manager, record or publishing company cannot, given current market place beliefs or 
bottom-line income requirements, indulge these shifts with the artists, then at the artists 
behest, there is more likely to be a breakdown in relations than any compromise. 
11: 1 A Propensity toward Lifestyle Shifts is an Artist's Character Trait Which 
Can be Damaging to Long-term Relationships 
One example of this can be given through noting what happened between The Beatles 
and Brian Epstein: 275 As late as 1965 The Beatles were still paid £50 per week pocket 
money while Brian Epstein took care of all their expenses. The relationship was strong 
and they trusted him, he had managed their career to their satisfaction. The Beatles were 
certainly influential to other artists to aspire to gain a high percentage of ownership over 
as much of their publishing and recording product as possible. Owning a substantial 
share in the publishing company as well, if possible, as writing the material will greatly 
increase the revenue of artists and writers. Brian Epstein had signed The Beatles to a 
five year deal, this was and is customary as described in the passages above. By the 
fourth year of this agreement they had become successful, had established their own 
song writing companies and owned substantial shares in Northern Publishing. They had 
experienced touring throughout the world and were far more worldly and sophisticated 
than when they set out. Their expressed intention had been "You look after the money, 
Brian - and we'll look after the songs". There remains an unanswerable question as to 
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whether they would have continued a fresh five year period with Brian Epstein or 
whether they would have looked for a way to separate from him. During their fifth year 
in contract with Brian Epstein, 1966-7, they cut back on public appearances and did not 
release a new Christmas album (EMI brought out a compilation album). They spent 
four months in the Abbey Road studio developing new ideas with their recording 
manager, George Martin. This smacks of the later behaviour of George Michael which, 
in his instance was a fundamental element of his fight against Sony. The Beatles 
changed their image from clean, neat black suits to `hippie' flower-power and probably 
led fashion trends as much as they themselves were affected by them. This was a 
creative era during which they came up with the innovative Sgt. Peppers Lonely Hearts 
Club Band. Here then is evidence of their first great lifestyle shift. However, 
diagnosed as suffering from depression Brian Epstein died of a drugs overdose in 
August 1967. There is some speculation that a significant cause for his personal demise 
was the changing nature of The Beatles' life style, theirs no longer being compatible 
with his own. It is felt here that Epstein made a fundamental mistake on his own part, 
when he turned down an offer of £3.5 million for the contract to manage The Beatles. 
At the time John Lennon cautioned him "The Beatles aren't for sale, Brian ... if you 
sell us we won't work". From the legal perspective it is speculated here that because of 
his financial standing and business background, if this relationship had come to 
litigation, Brian Epstein would have been perceived in court as being the stronger of the 
two bargaining parties. The Beatles would have been perceived as a naive group of 
flamboyant innocents. This series of events would have been contemporaneous with the 
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd276 hearings, as to the possible 
outcome no further speculation would be sensible here. 
Other examples of life style shifts include Gilbert O'Sullivan who had recently moved 
into his own house, away from the protective cover of Gordon Mill's bungalow and he 
had adjusted his stage outfits from exaggerated hats and short trousers to appear in more 
`normal' clothing. George Michael wanted to switch from `teeny-pop' pop idol to a 
more eclectic style of music and based a lot of his argument with Sony on his allegation 
that they would not support him in his projects. 
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Dressed in a black suit and his trade mark designer stubble, Michael said Sony 
had decided to teach him a lesson by "killing" his 1990 album `Listen Without 
Prejudice' when he refused to market it with a video featuring himself. Michael, 
30, felt that a video might derail his transition to an "adult-oriented artist. 27 
Other artists, such as David Bowie, have made life style shifts integral to their career. 
So, of course not all artist or writer and executive relationships break down over life 
style shifts, each is dependent upon the artist's or writer's level of success, the current 
market for his product and the executive's instinctive response to the shift as it occurs. 
Sometimes the shift will even be initiated by the executives. In either case, it is equally 
likely that the activities surrounding planning and preparation for substantial change 
will be buried in the day-to-day progress of the business in hand. From an outsider's 
point of view this may make the shift appear sudden and impetuous, as if it is innovative 
and inspired by artistic flash. The truth is that there is rarely such an intense, 
inspirational moment in any form of creative work. 278 These shifts are quite genuine, 
however, and can be distinguished from cases such as that of Robbie Williams 279 where 
the artist simply became less and less capable of disguising character traits which had 
always prevailed but had been suppressed. A further distinction, in business terms, 
must be made between the type of long-term contractually based relationship being 
discussed here and long term builders' or manufacturers' relationships where 
personality is unlikely to affect the ongoing trade and where machine tooling and other 
forms of engineering constraint will necessarily force innovative acts to be planned in 
detail. 
11: 2 Destructiveness 
While it must be made clear here that not all artists display destructiveness or have any 
such nature, there is scientific evidence280 that destructiveness is a common 
characteristic of those involved in creative work. This can mean a tendency toward 
self-destruction manifest through self-abuse. This behaviour is accepted to the point of 
tradition in the popular music industry and most commonly manifests via alcohol or 
substance abuse combined with general recklessness. Note that those executives who 
have been successful and who have habitually indulge or over indulge in stimulants and 
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behaviour-affecting substances, tend to be those who do not to outwardly display self- 
loathing or day-to-day fear of failure as this would negate their command for respect 
within their field of business. The most publicised forms of outwardly displayed 
destructive behaviour are those of artists such as the antics of Keith Moon of The Who, 
who was renowned for breaking up stage equipment, driving into swimming pools and 
causing damage to hotel suites. There are many instances of this type of behaviour 
reported in the popular and rock music industry press, details of which are not 
significant here. 
What is significant is the calculated tolerance of this behaviour among corporate parties. 
To a certain degree it is a marketing tool and it is only beyond toleration when it 
damages the publicised public persona of the artist, and even then when there is no 
possibility of public forgiveness. Again, it must be noted that not all artists or writers 
have these characteristics. Some have more gentle mood swings, some operate with 
perfect mood stability and many have a more simple tendency toward melancholy, and 
that only when they are at work. 28' 
Prima facie these types of behavioural factor may be taken to go beyond the scope of 
contract law. However, if acceptable models for the scope of contract law are to 
develop to incorporate long-term, contract based relations, and it is proposed here that 
they should, then the doctrines of unconscionability, good faith and co-operation can be 
utilised. Reference has been made throughout this discourse to know drug addict Sean 
Ryder. His substance abuse habits had been established before he entered the music 
industry and were known to the Nicholls who, ten years after he was established, 
undertook to become his managers as the first leg of his recording career fell into 
decline. This relationship raises many questions regarding who holds what onus of 
good faith, unconscionable behaviour and there are a secondary series of questions 
regarding third party undue influence (extending to third party contractual rights) in 
connection with the facts to the Ryder v Nicholls and Another2K2 case. For these reasons 
this case will shortly be used here to moot a test of the proposed hypothetical doctrine of 
unconscionably constructed contracts. 
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12: A Paradigm of The Artist - Built From Survey Responses and Interviews 
Combined With Information From Relevant Case Reports 
The following is an analysis of the results of the questionnaire given to up and coming 
and would be artists and writers during the period September to October 1999. 
Accepting that the group who responded to questionnaires are a fair sample of `young' 
rock and pop artists, they can now be described as predominately Myers-Briggs283 type 
E-N-F-P. It is felt that this personality trait analysis gives a credible method for 
establishing a) what type of people `young' artists and writers are, and b) how best to 
approach and deal successfully with them. As well as Myers-Briggs, the work of Dr. 
David W. Keirsey284 commonly known as Keirsey Temperament typing, has been 
considered. However, Keirsey is less commonly referred to in the circles where this 
type of analysis was reviewed for this discourse and, it is felt here, seems to provide a 
less accurate portrait of the subjects. Overall Keirsey does not provide satisfactory 
material to give the basis for designing a best approach to bargaining and business- 
relationship building with the subjects. However, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI) matrix gives a more thorough, more commonly used set of results. More 
detailed information about the questionnaire used, Keirsey and Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicators is at Appendix 10. 
The first task here is to explain the meaning of the statement that the group are 
predominantly ENFP: 
E, Extroversion: this means that the majority of the group show a preference for 
drawing energy from their external environment, for example interacting with other 
people, taking part in activities and obtaining material possessions. 
N, Intuition: this means that the majority of the group show a preference for taking in 
information through an intuitive sense such as gut reaction and have a tendency to 
notice what might be rather than what is actual. 
F, Feeling: this means that the majority of the group show a preference for organising 
and structuring information so that they can reach a decision based on their personal 
values and judgements. 
P, Perception: this means that the majority of the group show a preference for living 
spontaneous, flexible lifestyles. 
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The opposing alternatives are: 
I, Introversion: which indicates people who have a preference for drawing energy from 
their own thoughts and emotions. The group showed only a 31.25% I tendency. 
S, Sensing: which indicates people who have a preference for taking information 
through the five senses and have a tendency to notice what is actual. The group showed 
only a 39.69% S tendency 
T, Thinking: which indicates people who have a preference for organising and 
structuring information so that they can make decisions in a logical, objective manner. 
The group showed a 43.44% T tendency. 
J, Judgement: which indicates people who have a preference for living planned and very 
organised lives. The Group showed a 44.69% J tendency. 
12: 1 Questionnaire Analysis Results 
The next task here is to compare the questionnaire responses with MBTI traits and to 
review MBTI advice. Those answers which have been singled out are the majority of 
those where 75% or more of the group gave the same response. 
Q3: Is it worse A) To have your head in the clouds, or B) To be in a rut? 
87.5% said that it is worse to be in a rut. 
MBTI suggests that ENFPs live in a world of exciting possibilities, the details of 
everyday life are seen as trivial drudgery. They place no importance on detailed, 
maintenance type tasks and will frequently remain oblivious to them. They tend to 
become unhappy when they are confined to strict schedules or mundane tasks. 
Consequently, ENFPs work better when they are in a flexible environment working 
with people and ideas. Many ENFPs go in to business for themselves and they have the 
ability to be very productive as long as they are excited about what they are doing. The 
"head in the clouds" concept can be equated to that trait shown by all of the artists and 
writers who have approached or entered in to litigation as discussed above in that they 
are each described as being averse to business matters. This trait is explained either 
because of age and experience such as with Gilbert O'Sullivan2ss who at 23 years old 
was described by the Court of Appeal as a young man. Despite his prior contractual 
relationships in the industry was implied to be naive in connection with business 
matters, however a different reading of this case can lead to the impression that 
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O'Sullivan was more inclined to concentrate on his ambitions as a singer songwriter and 
leave the business matters to his manager/advisor Gordon Mills. Notably, when 
O'Sullivan became unhappy with the arrangements he consulted solicitors. Similarly 
The writers McVie and Welsh from Fleetwood Mac286 who brought a case against their 
publisher/managers and Sean Ryder287 whose mangers brought a case against him, were 
well known for their substance abuse and generally casual lifestyle. Thorpe L. J. 
referred directly to Ryder' background in the opening paragraph of his judgement 
saying 
... he 
had a bad reputation in the music industry partly because of his 
dnig abuse and partly because of his behaviour. 
Describing the relevant members of Fleetwood Mac Lord Denning said 
They were composers talented in music and song but not in business. In 
negotiation they could not hold their own. That is why they needed a manger. 2811 
Similarly, Tony Macaulay 289 was described as young and inept in matters of business, 
again despite the fact that he had had prior business and contract negotiation experience 
and a clear idea of his ideals and ambitions. Inclusive of George Michael29° it is felt it 
can be said here that not only do the subjects prefer to keep their head in the clouds as 
far as their business conduct is concerned but it is quite probable that the description of 
`being in a rut' was a key component in the decision to initiate litigation. 
Q: 8 At Parties do you - A) Stay late and gather increasing energy, or B) Leave early 
feeling yourself running out of energy? 
93.3% said that they stay late and gather increasing energy. 
Q36: Do new and unexpected meetings with strangers A) Stimulate and energise you, 
or B) Tax your reserves? 
86.67% said that new and unexpected meetings with strangers stimulate and energise 
them. 
MBTI confirms that ENFPs are enthusiastic, energetic and can get very excited. They 
are emotionally highly charged, having a strong need to be liked and are generally well 
liked because they are able to intuitively understand a person with whom they have 
close contact. 
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Q9: Are you more attracted to A) Sensible people, or B) Imaginative people? 
80% said that they are more attracted to imaginative people. 
MBTI suggests in general that individuals in their business environment will be more 
comfortable with those who have similar interests and perspectives as opposing 
characteristics require a motivated and patient approach. 
Q1O: Are you more attracted to A) What is actual, or B) What is possible? 
86.67% said that they are more attracted to what is possible. 
MBTI suggests that members of this group are typically bright and full of potential. 
They live in the world of possibilities, and can become unusually passionate about 
ideas. 
Q11: In judging others are you more swayed by A) Laws than circumstances, or B) 
Circumstances than laws? 
93% said that they are more swayed by circumstances than laws. 
Q44: Do you go more by A) Facts, or B) Principles? 
75% said they go more by principles than by facts. 
It would appear that facts, along with minutiae and detail do not attract the attention of 
this group. MBTI suggests that ENFPs are able to see meaning in everything and have 
and uphold strong values. However they continuously adapt these values so that they 
can walk in step with what they believe is right. 
Q14: Does it bother you more to have things A) Incomplete, or B) Complete? 
86.67% said that it bothered them more to have things incomplete 
MBTI states that ENFPs are project oriented but that they have a need to focus on 
following through. When they become excited about a new possibility they may drop 
the project in hand and risk not achieving a great accomplishment. 
Q16: In doing ordinary things are you more likely to A) Do it the usual way, or B) Do it 
your own way? 
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81.25% said that they are more likely to do ordinary thing their own way rather than the 
usual way. 
MBTI confirms that ENFPs have a strong need to be independent and will resist being 
controlled or labelled, although they will not attempt to control others as their dislike of 
suppression is absolute. 
Q24: Are visionaries A) Somewhat annoying, or B) Rather fascinating? 
75% said that they find visionaries rather fascinating. 
MBTI suggests that ENFPs are inspirers which in turn would suggest a dependency on 
there being visionaries to inspire. 
Q29: In company do you A) Initiate conversation, or B) Wait to be approached? 
75% said that in company they will wait to be approached rather than initiate 
conversation. 
Initially this response seemed surprising but MBTI suggests that a well centred ENFP 
will evaluate the immediate contact in order to maintain their self control and personal 
values. It might be supposed, here, that waiting to be approached can provide time for 
such evaluation. In addition, in connection with the answers to Qs 8 and 36, above, it 
can be conjectured that the reluctance shown here for making the first approach is 
related to a fear of being rejected and disliked. 
Q38: Are you more likely to A) See how others are useful, or B) See how others see? 
81.25% said that they are more likely to see how others see than see how others are 
useful. 
Q66: Is it harder for you to A) Identify with others, or B) Utilise others? 
78.6% said that it is harder for them to utilise others. 
MBTI describes this group as exceptionally intuitive and as having the flexibility to 
relate to others at their own level. It is claimed that ENFPs can be successfully 
manipulative but that this is a trait which is adverse to their values and so they would 
want to relate to others rather than see how they could be useful. 
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In addition to those question singled out above, the following are both examples of 
majority agreement amongst those who completed the questionnaire and are 
satisfactorily compliant with MBTI casting. While this may be something of a bland list 
it is considered critical to evidence the relevant personality traits of those who are likely 
to become or are just recently bound in long-term music industry contracts. 67% said 
that they tend to be more spontaneous than deliberate. Only 53% said that they prefer 
clarity of reasoning to strength of compassion. 71% said that they tend to be more 
whimsical than routinised. There was a 50/50 split about whether the structured and 
scheduled is more appealing than the unstructured and unscheduled. Only 53.33% said 
that they prize a strong sense of reality more than a vivid imagination. 57.14% said that 
in relationships most things should be renegotiable rather than random and 
circumstantial. Only 40% said that it is preferable to make sure that things are arranged 
than to just let things happen. 60% said that they are more comfortable after a decision 
than before a decision. 71.43% said that they are more inclined to be fair-minded than 
sympathetic. Only 53% are more likely to trust experience than to trust a hunch. 62.5% 
claim to be more satisfied while discussing an issue thoroughly than when an agreement 
has been reached. 56.25% feel more comfortable with feelings rather than standards 
when making decisions. Only 53.34% put more value on the definite than the open 
ended. There was a 50/50 split between those who considered themselves a practical 
person and those who considered themselves a fanciful person. 60% consider it worse to 
be unjust than merciless. 62.5% prefer to be in the state of having the option to buy 
rather than having purchased. 53.34% prefer consistency of thought to harmonious 
relationships. 68.75% consider themselves more easy-going than serious and 
determined. 53.34% make decisions somewhat impulsively rather than carefully. In 
approaching others 66.67% tend to be more personal than objective. 56.25% claim to be 
more realistic than speculative. 56.25% claim to be more drawn towards the convincing 
than the touching. 
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13: The Potential Impact if Law Continues to Evade the Industry Mind Set 
It is interesting to note that George Michael was the first singer/artist in the UK to 
attempt to avoid his recording contract through the High Court. 291 If he had won his 
case, that in itself with the surrounding publicity, just as much as a hearing at the House 
of Lords, might have substantially altered the formation of exclusive relationships of 
this nature. The George Michael case, and the published discussions surrounding it, 
serve to demonstrate a generalised illustration of music industry attitudes to the law as it 
is perceived. In addition this case is one which shows the law in operation in this field 
twenty years after Macaulay vA Schroeder Music Publishing co. 292 
However, the point to be made at this juncture is that the industry appears to be open to 
receive guidance or governance. In this instance it seemed expected that the case would 
force some substantial element of change on behavioural patterns. The case had the 
capacity to undermine the investment levels which record and publishing companies are 
(generally) prepared to sink into the promotion of an artist before they expect his 
success to bring pay-back. It also had the potential to impact on the drafting of options 
clauses and the management of renegotiation throughout long-term relationships. These 
suggestions are supported through articles like that of Melinda Wittstock, published in 
The Times Magazine: 293 
What began three years ago as a personal row between the moody mega-star 
and the grey suits of Sony Corporation, one of the world's largest entertainment 
and consumer electronics companies, has become a test case that threatens to 
alter forever the record business' future composition. 
Although the industry awaited the outcome of this case, the outcome did not inspire any 
great substantial change in industry practices after all. The only evident change of any 
significance has been that since the case it is possible to state that the major record 
companies have reduced the options clauses in their standardised contracts so that an 
artiste is obliged to produce five albums rather than ten within the fixed term duration 
period. It is now probable that an artist in interview, rather than stating excitedly that he 
"has got a record deal", is more likely state that he has "got a five album deal", although 
the tone of excitement is not reduced. The significance of the tone of excitement is that 
it is this element of the relationship which, in many cases, betrays the still naive 
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approach of the artist and the lack of forward thinking which he has brought to the 
relationship. All that matters to these artists in the instant is that the contractual 
relationship has been created. 
Modern media communications are strongly influential and Panayiolou v Sony 
represented a great opportunity to set new precedent and effectively dictate new 
behavioural procedure to the music industry. Had the case gone through appeal to the 
House of Lords there is even the possibility that Parker J's sensible approach would 
have been upheld, and that this would have reversed, or at least curtailed the progressive 
use of the ratio decidendii of A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Lid v Macaulay. This 
is felt to be so because that 1974 case turned on the complexity of the contract, the 
difficulty in understanding its effects and the fact that it was a standard form, combined 
with the assumed naivete in the nature of the artist/writer. All of these elements were 
felt to render the contract unfair in that the artist/writer was overpowered by it. The 
contract to which George Michael was, later, subject was also industry standard, the 
terms and clauses of were not dissimilar to those of the Schroeder/Macaulay contract 
with reference to complexity, duration, options etc. Macaulay had been contractually 
active and had negotiated some of the terms of his contract with the Schroeders, 
although not to the extent that George Michael had done with his recording company. 
If it had been in place, clear legal governance could have brought support to the efforts 
of artists, writers, recording and publishing companies (or of their advisors) to build 
profitable, flexible relationships. One comparatively recent change in behaviour is that 
more often than not since the 1980s, common practice ensures that independent advice 
is sought by the artist or writer before 'signing'. 294 Even so, what has the industry 
learned? Why, as a general rule, do artists' representatives or solicitors not intervene in 
a more constructive manner at the earliest stages? In discussing the formation of 
contracts between artists and record companies, Osbourne, Greenfield & Boon 295 
revealed (through focus research with music industry solicitors) that time-pressure 
exerted by the record/publishing company is a major force rushing inexperienced artists 
into only partially negotiated contracts. A sense of urgency is invoked in order to get 
the first recorded release to the market in time for some key marketing event such as 
Christmas, or to coincide with a printing or advertising deadline. The artist/writer may 
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also, according to that research, show a tendency to develop a driving fear of being `left 
on the shelf if he does not sign the contract quickly. He does not feel protected in his 
ambitions during the time taken to negotiate properly. 
The industry as a whole and the independent advisors (lawyers) have developed a 
tendency to assume that once the relationship is underway and signs of success exposed, 
renegotiation or litigation will rectify unsatisfactory terms. This is not good practice. It 
is deceitful towards the judiciary and it is a bad form of societal relationship with law. 
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14: The Principle and Operation of the Hypothetical Doctrine of Unconscionably 
Constructed Contracts 
As given on page 35 above, the general principles intended under the hypothetical 
doctrine are: 
2: 1 General 
2: 1: 1)To influence behaviour and provide an aid to expectation 
management between those entering into long-term contractual 
relationships in the music industry 
2: 1: 2)To provide substantive tests to establish whether a contractual 
dispute has as its root cause unconscionable construction of the 
contract 
2: 1: 3)To provide guidance toward the remedy of such a dispute as 
might be identified at 2: 3: 4, but not to dictate quantum or other 
individual, measurable remedies 
By drawing together the information and historical evidence selected for this research it 
is now proposed to moot-test the hypothetical doctrine against the facts of the two most 
recent cases pertinent to this area of study. 
14: 1 George Michael, Personal Characteristics and Career Building 
In 1981 Georgios Kyriacos Panayiotou (George Michael) was an overweight, north 
London teenager, with a `craving' for fame. 296 That year saw the beginning of his 
`dizzying success' as half of the pop music duo `Wham! '. By 1988, aged 25, he was 
working solo as one of the world's most successful artists. By 1990 he was living as a 
virtual recluse in a £12million home in Hampstead. 
To all intents and purposes George Michael's public persona is that of an extrovert 
character with an eye to the future and with confidence and capability to initiate and 
realise plans. "When I was about nine, " he is reported as having said, 297 "I realised that I 
dominated the people I went around with". In court29s Parker J. described him as 
... both intelligent and articulate.... refreshingly candid... has a distinctly 
independent cast of mind .. very much his own man. 
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Strong determination is evident when it is considered that through 1982 George and his 
musical partner Andrew Ridgeley (Collectively Wham. o had initiated their pop career 
by touting self-penned, self-recorded songs around the major record companies where 
they sometimes, apparently, gained an ear by pretending that they already had an 
appointment with an executive. As a result of this activity, confidence, drive and 
demanding they were introduced to ex Phonogram employee Mark Dean who had 
established an independent recording company, Inner Vision, which had the market 
place benefit of a prestige distribution deal through industry major, CBS. With the help 
and advice of his solicitor Robert Allen George Michael negotiated to have `artistic 
control' of the duo's output so that he became contractually responsible for writing or 
selecting their songs and co-producing their recordings. He displayed a high degree of 
understanding of marketing and the market place within which he was now working, 
... we were out and out pop ... We 
didn't want to be subversive in any sense. 
We wanted to be huge stars. I knew I could do it. I knew I had the capability, 
craftwise, to put its ahead of groups like Duran Duran and Culture Club, so I 
just went for it. 
However, while this initiation gives the appearance of a young artist with plenty of 
confidence and communications capability, by the end of 1983 Wham! 's lawyer had 
informed Inner Vision that the duo wanted to be released from their recording contract, 
the relationship between Wham! and Mark Dean having soured. The claim put forward 
was that the contract was restrictive. Parker J. gives a brief resume299 and states: 
... Mr Michael, who considered that he and Mr Ridgeley had been very badly 
and dishonestly treated by Mr Dean, had decided that he wanted to get out of 
the Inner Vision agreement and sign with a 'major ': 300 
In fact in March 1984 that dispute was resolved and the contractual challenge 
compromised when the duo was transferred to CBS subsidiary label Epic. This 
achieved a significant career move as Epic was, for example, the label through which 
The Jacksons and other similarly established artists were released. Although Wham! 
were, naturally at this stage in their career, signed to the UK office of the company 
rather than the more significant US office. By this time George Michael had secured 
the services of hardened negotiator and music industry solicitor, Tony Russell. This 
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choice of relationship in itself may be another indicator of the strength of character of 
George Michael. 
Both as a member of Wham! and as a solo singer George Michael, the product, was one 
of the most successful in the industry. The 1984, CBS/Epic contract provided for one 
album with a series of seven options, so it was an eight-album deal. 301 The first 
contractual option was exercised in 1985 but in 1986 the duo split up and CBS Epic 
exercised their leaving member clause so that George Michael and Andrew Ridgeley 
were each subject to the original terms of the 1984 agreement. This leaving member 
clause has come in to common usage within record industry standardised contracts 
because of the possibility of significant individuals wishing to leave either bands or 
duos during commercially successful periods. 
Following the four million sales of his solo album Faith, during 1987, George Michael 
was in a position to renegotiate the terms of his contractual relationship with CBS Epic 
and a renewed version was signed in January 1988. During the 1994 dispute, President 
of Sony Music Entertainment Europe, Paul Russell, talked about George Michael's 
attendance at a sales convention in Vancouver where a number of tracks from the yet to 
be released album `Faith' were promoted: 
The value of [Mr Michael's] appearance was enormous, both in assisting [his] 
cause in the negotiations and in creating huge goodwill between [him] and the 
various marketing and sales teams throughout the world who were set to work 
on his album when it was released. 
There are several elements here which continue to suggest commercial confidence and 
market understanding as well as good communications capabilities on the part of the 
artist. Although he had highly experienced advisory lawyers working on his behalf, 
general reportage and case commentary strongly suggest that George Michael was 
dominant in managing the events of his own career. 
14: 2 Events Leading To Panayiotou v Sony [19941 
This discussion must focus on George Michael, as he was principal to the contract. It is 
acknowledged that his advisors were extremely influential to his opinions in certain 
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aspects of his record company relationships. Their conduct greatly influenced the 
course of events which constituted his business. The major event leading up to 
Panayiotou v Sony [1994]302 was that while George Michael was negotiating the 1988 
version of his CBS Epic Agreement, Sony Entertainment were already negotiating to 
take over CBS. The contractual relationship was, therefore, transferred, via the 
assignment option exercised by CBS in accordance with the contractual terms 
standardised in these types of contract. Proprietary rights in George Michael's output 
was passed from one record company to another without the artist having any recourse 
to affect this alteration in his business dealings. Prima facie, it must be said that the 
natural assumption in commercial and economic terms must be that such a take-over is 
designed to modernise, improve and stabilise the existing business, so that anybody 
trading or dealing with the company can expect to proceed with renewed vigour. 
The resultant effect on George Michael's 1988 Agreement in combination with the 
Sony take-over was that: a) George would earn higher royalties from his output; b) the 
options had been increased by two albums with a fifteen year duration for the entire 
contract (i. e. there were eleven years now remaining, since the 1984 start, during which 
a total of ten more albums must be produced, accepted and marketed); and c) Sony now 
had a commitment to three albums, of which Faith was counted as the first, with options 
for five more albums to follow. 
For the purpose of minimising tax liability, while he was on tour for the greater part of 
1988, George Michael accepted accelerated payments against royalties from Sony of 
almost £11.5 million. While Faith topped the UK album charts and stayed on the chart 
for some seventy-two weeks as the result of several successful singles, in addition to 
which it stayed at the top of the US charts for twelve weeks, selling in excess of 
fourteen million copies, George's next album, Listet Without Prejudice, Volume 1, 
released in September 1990, sold just over five million copies. 303 Much of the Listen 
Without Prejudice sales can be attributed directly to the work of the record company in 
honouring its part in the relationship. 304 Album sales would have been considerably 
lower without marketing support and promotional activities on the part of the company 
as George Michael had, now he was in his mid 20s, developed a desire to align himself 
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to a narrower, more adult, rock oriented sector of the market. As a result of this 
decision he proceeded to remove any visual reference to himself from the promotional 
and marketing product accompanying his new releases, including videos. In his 
evidence during the later court case against Sony, George said: 
I decided to remove my physical image from the marketing and promotion of 
my records, at least for the foreseeable future, hoping that in the long term I 
could reach an audience with whom I was comfortable.. 305 
Progress lead to the conclusion of further renegotiated terms between George and Sony 
in July 1990. For an artist of this calibre continued success will, it seems, continue the 
potential for on-going negotiation, the chief purpose of which is to increase royalty 
payments to the artist in reflection of his success. George Michael was conducting his 
business affairs with a significant degree of decision making and continuing confidence. 
At one juncture in court he had said: 
... Their offer certainly seemed 
better than the alternative, which was to remain 
with my existing terms. It was also at the back of my mind that I would be in a 
position to seek further improvements in the future if `Faith' was a successful 
as seemed likely. 306 
However, in February 1992 he took advice which suggested to him that he could contest 
the enforceability of this relationship with Sony on the basis that the 1988 version of his 
contract was in restraint of trade. His personal drive was toward an `adult rock' market 
as described above, and George had become convinced that Sony did not give the 
fullness of support to his endeavours that he expected. ( In the alternative, he was 
advised, that the agreement was in contravention of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 307) 
Further details of this case have been reserved here for the purposes of moot-testing the 
hypothetical doctrine proposed as a result of this research. 
14: 3 The Onlooker's View of the Case From Sony's Perspective 
Much of that material, legal, journalistic or academic, which is produced in respect of 
music industry cases of this nature, is focused on the perspective of the artist or writer. 
An impression of the pattern for presentation suggests that the artist is the focal object. 
He will be described and his hopes and aspirations examined and expressed to the extent 
135 
that they can be interpreted or understood (this process is not always accurate but it is 
rarely damaging to the artist). This is generally followed by an account of the opinion 
of the judiciary (where they have been involved) of that artist or writer and then of how 
the company (recording or publishing etc) measures up in its treatment of that artist. 
There may be two key and one consequential reason why the material is presented in 
this way: 1) That the artist or writer is generally the complainant so it is natural that 
attention is drawn to him first. 2) That the artist or writer is often more `famous' and has 
a public persona so that those who seek to judge or observe can rapidly draw up at least 
a characature whom they believe that they know and can describe. 3) That the 
development of concepts such as inequality of bargaining power, combined with a 
populist attitude to the music industry, drives the tendency to believe that the artist or 
writer is naive and altruistic at heart while industry executives are perceived as greedy, 
sharp, capitalistic and usurious. So it is natural that sources of information in this area 
seem biased in terms of the weight of representative content. 
The Panayiotou v Sony [1994]308 case was decided in favour of Sony, none the less 
subsequent articles and discussions tend to be about George Michael. The shame of this 
is that Sony provided a clarity of information through this case, which should might, for 
example, be considered as substance for negotiation and expression of intent during the 
formation of these types of contract in the future. To argue justification for the terms of 
fidelity, exclusivity and the potential longevity of Sony's contract Pollock QC described 
on behalf of the record company their commercial and relational desires: 309 
1) The desire to sell as many records as possible 
2) The desire to ensure that there is an even and adequate flow of product 
3) The desire to be able to plan ahead 
4) The desire to have available proven successful product for as long as 
possible 
5) The desire and need to be able to compete on equal terms in an international 
environment against other record companies which have long term signings 
6) The desire to be known for continued and high calibre releases by long term 
successful artists in order to maintain a reputation with customers, dealers 
and new, unsigned artists 
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7) The desire to maintain morale and enthusiasm amongst employees 
8) The desire to need to recover investment made in a particular artist 
9) The desire to make profit on that investment 
10) The need to have available sufficient product to finance (a) losses on 
unsuccessful product, and (b) the fixed costs of the infrastructure (including 
overheads) 
11) The desire to accumulate property rights as an asset 
And 
12) The desire to have a supply of successful product in the future at reasonable 
and practicable prices. 
Part of Sony's mission statement is that it seeks to `make dreams come true'. However, 
what is suddenly brought to the surface through the list given above is that Sony is a 
structured commercial entity with accounts to render and business plans to live out. Not 
all record, publishing, management or agency companies have the well-developed 
business structure that Sony commands, but market developments have dictated that 
fewer of them are single entrepreneurs or 'chancers' as would have been prevalent thirty 
years ago. Also technology and government intervention have had an impact on the 
way that even small businesses tend to be run in the present. All of this would suggest 
that a shift towards changing, for the purposes of clarity and business efficacy, the way 
contracts in this industry are negotiated and formed could be more readily embraced and 
coped with by those prima facie less flexible, fixed entity parties. New practices could 
be costed, planned in and scheduled with foresight by well managed corporations like 
Sony, keeping their own goals in mind and adjusting their targeted expectations. 
Accordingly, lesser companies would fall in to line with what would become industry 
standard. In the end economic gains would either be the same or greater than under 
present practices because the essential business would not be changed while the 
relationships which go to the core of the business would be more content. Sony has 
demonstrated that it has no fear of, and no need to fear exposing what it expects from its 
relationship with artists. At one time there was a sense that commercial activity in the 
industry was shielded from the artistic element as if one would be corrupted by 
exposure to the other. 
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It is speculated here that the long-gone era of Payola engendered a sense of secrecy 
within this industry. Such an ambience of subversion and the `take it our way or leave 
it' attitude read in to industry contracts seems super-protective and power evoking to 
those who have chosen to build on that impression. Sony's modem, open, business 
based and marketing oriented attitude surely points the way to a new era, where 
relationship forming is concerned, but is a marker which has not been recognised. One 
reason for this is that current focus is on Sony's background and relationship with 
technology and hardware. They are seen as market place giants and there has been an 
assumption that they intentionally treat software and artists alike, as production line 
`product'. Overall, this would not be good practice and it is felt here that it is unlikely 
to be a truism. It is an emotive rebuke to the new kids on the block and part of a natural 
pattern of resistance to change. 
The general attitude of Sony is encapsulated by a statement released the day before the 
court case commenced: "We are saddened and surprised by the action George has taken 
against Sony Music UK. There is a serious moral as well as legal commitment attached 
to any contract and we will not only honour it, but vigorously defend it"310 There is no 
evidence to suggest any emotional deceit in what is expressed here. 
14: 4 Panayioutou and Others v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) W211 
Summary of events: In 1983, proceedings commenced against Inner Vision, over a 
contractual relationship which already existed. The purpose behind the dispute being to 
terminate the existing contract and form a new one with Inner Vision's distribution 
agent, also a record company, CBS. CBS was, of course, more substantial in the market 
place than Inner Vision. Wham! hoped from their action 
.. for a declaration inter alia that the 
[preceding and concurrently terminated] 
Agreement was void and unenforceable as being unreasonable restraint of 
312 trade. 
The 1983 dispute was brought to an end by the termination of the Inner Vision 
Agreement and the formation of an agreement between the plaintiffs and CBS, the 1984 
Agreement. The 1984 agreement both established the relationship between George 
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Michael and CBS, later to be taken over by Sony, and lay at the core of the judgements 
surrounding the 1994 dispute to be analysed here. In 1988 and again in 1990 the 1984 
Agreement was renegotiated and the terms of remuneration were varied. In 1992 the 
Plaintiff, by then George Michael as a solo artist, was advised that it was open to him to 
contend that the 1988 agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade due to inequality 
of bargaining power which allegedly affected the relationship in 1988. The 1984 
Agreement was presumed, in this contention, to have been enforceable. [There is no 
intention here to consider or discuss the alternative pleading from this case, that the 
contract was void as being contrary to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. ] 
Notwithstanding reports and reportage which surrounded this high profile case, judicial 
summary and advice handed down did not have the impact on the community that the 
judiciary might have hoped. As proof of this, following the George Michael case and 
all its surrounding publicity, in 1998 singer Shaun Ryder's advisor continued to advise 
his client to attempt to avoid his contract on the grounds that it was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. Had the judicial and legal governance of the George Michael case 
been successful, surely Shaun Ryder's advisor would have given quite different advice, 
and indeed, have acted quite differently himself during that relationship. In concurrence 
with Parker J. it is felt strongly here that: 
It [is] d cult to see how exclusivity of exploitation arising by reason of the 
outright sale and transfer of copyright could be classified as a restraint at all. 
The sale and transfer of property rights was pre-eminently a matter of bargain 
and there was no public policy interest in preventing an outright sale of a 
property right. 313 
and... 
The duration of the Agreement was a function of success, in that it would only 
run the full course if the defendant (record company) exercised all its options, 
which would only occur if the [first] plaintiff continued to he success/41.314 
Analysing for restraint of trade per se is not an ideal approach to this relational problem. 
This suggestion is supported by evidence that restraint of trade is not a natural point for 
consideration to the mind of an artist in the day to day management of his lifestyle and 
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all that contributes to that. That evidence is given by George Michael in relation to the 
1988 renegotiation of his contract with CBS: 
As in 1984, I did not ask for or receive any advice as to whether my amended 
agreement would be in 'restraint of trade. I had no reason since 1984 to 
develop any understanding of that concept, and there was no reason now for the 
matter to cross my mind In short, it did not occur to me to question the 
enforceability of my agreement. My dealings with CBS had by and large run 
smoothly. CBS had not tried to interfere artistically. My career had progressed 
as I and my record company had wanted it to progress. 315 
14: 5 Testing the Hypothetical Doctrine 
Q: How could the court have gone about establishing whether or not there was an 
Unconscionably Constructed Contract? 
Clearly there is no question about whether the parties depended upon long-term, 
contractual relationships such as this one for their lifestyle, livelihood and business in 
accordance with item 2: 2: 1 above. But what evidence is there to show whether or not 
they came together in good faith, and was that good faith maintained during the 
relationship as it proceeded, in accordance with 2: 3: 4 ii) and iii). It is felt here that the 
first component of good faith must be consensus ad idem, a meeting of the minds. In 
order for there to be such a coming together there must be a full understanding of what 
the other party wants, needs and intends to achieve from the relationship. Because this 
particular Agreement arose out of a dispute, it is necessary to look to facts surrounding 
that dispute and see what intentions, on either part, can be demonstrated. George 
Michael and Andrew Ridgely felt that they were treated dishonestly by Mark Dean the 
representative of their former recording company. By 1983 this relationship had fallen 
into ruin and George Michael 
Had decided that he wanted to get out of the Inner Vision Agreement and sig71 
with a `major': a decision which was already in his mind [-]. He felt that Wham! 
Would be unlikely to have any success in the United States if they stayed with 
Imier Vision, and was looking for a legal reason to get out of the Inter vision 
Agreement 316 
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During the 1994 case under study here, witness and Plaintiff's solicitor, Mr Tony 
Russell, was asked whether, from an early stage in the 1983 dispute, it was his objective 
that there would be negotiation with CBS, the end result of which would be a deal 
between CBS and Wham!. He replied that that was absolutely correct. 317 
Q: Have intentions and expectations of both parties been clear, understood and 
honoured? 
There is no need to search deep for the intention of George Michael pertaining to the 
1984 (and subsequent) Agreement. It was simply to enter into a long term 
relationship318 with a suitably `major' record company in order to increase the success 
of his career as an artist, at that time a member of Wham!, but later, as it transpired, in a 
solo capacity. 
His further expectations, having achieved a long-term relationship with CBS/Sony 
included free artistic control in his work, which was already incorporated as part of his 
agreement with Inner Vision and which was honoured and carried forward to the 
agreement with CBS by clause 4.03 319 Tony Russell gave evidence that this factor 
dominated the early part of the negotiations with CBS. It must be born in mind here 
that it is the intentions and expectations of George Michael which are to be considered 
here, and not, where that might occur, interpretation by his representatives of those 
intentions and expectations. The position of the representatives, advisors and other 
parties to the events under discussion will be discussed separately. 320 Somewhat 
poignantly, one of the artist's strong contentions throughout his dispute with Sony was 
that he was treated like software. 321 George Michael felt the integrity of his expectations 
toward maintaining artistic control of his own productions was threatened. The acting 
out of this expectation was apparent in his decision in 1989, during a rest period, to alter 
his teeny-pop, public image. Thus he would be able to create and sell a style of music 
which he was coming to prefer, and which would narrow his audience to a more mature 
and select group. He was aware of the ongoing marketing implications this would raise 
with the record company, but he expected co-operation in compliance with clauses 4.05 
and 13.01 f of the Agreement. 322 
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The record company's intentions and expectations from the agreement are clearly given 
at page 135 above. All of Sony's points, however commercial at heart, depend for 
success upon there being longevity of relationship between artist and company. In fact, 
in this case, during the 1987 renegotiations it was Tony Russell himself who proposed 
that CBS/Sony commit to four albums (six years at the average of one every eighteen 
months). 323 It is an accepted part of the course of dealings within this industry324 that 
improved success demands improved royalty terms, which demand in return a 
commitment to further album production. However, at times of negotiation no thought 
is given to duration which surely negates the restraint argument as in this case. 
During his determinations Parker J., as well as establishing whether the case attracted 
the doctrine of restraint of trade, was courteous enough to go so far as to apply the 
Nordenfeldt tests for reasonableness. In the event he found that there was no cause in 
this action for public policy restraint of trade325 (the Macaula/26 kind) and his analysis 
throughout supports what is felt here. 
What is put forward here is that in 1992, just as in 1983, the artist desired to escape 
from his relationship and sought legal grounds to achieve this. From the facts it is felt 
that it was the integrity of the artist's artistic control which was sensitive, more 
important to him than any other matter, and which George felt to be threatened by the 
ongoing relationship with Sony. As already stated, when he was tied to CBS he felt that 
they did not interfere with his art. 
My dealings with CBS had by and large run smoothly. CBS had not tried to 
interfere artistically. My career had progressed as I and my record company 
had wanted it to progress. 327 
There can be no doubt that the matter of artistic control was expressed throughout 
negotiations, nor that the artist's intentions were subsequently represented in the written 
contract. Further, when he felt that he had earned the right to expect higher royalties, 
the record company were content to enter into variation of the appropriate terms. So, in 
terms of consensus ad idem, it seems that the evidence supports that a fully understood 
agreement was reached at the formation stage, and was carried, through the written 
contract, throughout the relationship. 
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Q: Can it be said that good faith was at play and that all expectations and intentions 
were honoured for the duration of the relationship? 
Good faith may not be restricted to the formation stage of a contractual relationship, but 
must incorporate the living-out of that relationship. This will include co-operation 
between the parties at such time as flexibility is required in their course of conduct. It 
will also, surely, look to whether or not expressed grievances and aggrieved opinions 
are footed in fairness and reasonableness. A rule such as this, which requires the parties 
to come together with `all their cards (openly) on the table', 328 must view the living-out 
of the contract as part of the contract. The cards `cards must remain on display'. 
Throughout the life of the contract, it is thought here that CBS/Sony achieved this 
requirement, but that the George Michael party did not. While the principal, George 
Michael, did not indulge in malicious behaviour, he did accept badly considered advice 
which allowed the allegations of restraint of trade and of inequality of bargaining 
power. This is an act goes against the principle of good faith as it is interpreted here. 
In this case Parker J. states: 
I am fortified in the conclusion which I have reached by a consideration of the 
way in which the renegotiations proceeded in 1987 and in 1990. Thus, as I have 
found, the negotiations leading to the 1988 Agreement took place in good faith 
and on the fooling that the 1984 Agreement was enforceable. The same 
situation obtained in the 1990 renegotiation, which took place on the fooling 
that the 1988 Agreement was an enforceable agreement. As a result of the 1987 
renegotiation and the 1990 renegotiation, Mr Michael obtained substantial 
commercial benefits. The fact that the terms renegotiated in 1987 and 1990 
represented an improvement over his then current terns is demonstrated by the 
fact that Mr Michael elected to accept them. 
Q: Does any part of the contract go against public policy or bring about terms which 
must be prevented from passing into common currency? 
Firstly, some wisdom can be contrived from Browne-Wilkinson J. (at that time): 
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... In my judgement a 
bargain cannot be unfair and unconscionable unless one 
of the parties to it has imposed the objectionable terms in a morally 
reprehensible manner, that is to say, in a way which affects his conscience. 329 
It cannot be said that the conduct or the contractual terms drawn up by CBS/Sony 
visited doubt on their conscience. Conversely, some of the intra-contractual behaviour 
of the George Michael party might have visited doubt on his conscience, an 
uncomfortable feeling indeed, and one which may have been seated at the core of his 
other doubts about Sony's support for his work. This is not enough, however, to undo 
the contract at law. Parker J. was concerned to ascertain public policy implications. He 
felt that this was an overriding principle and found evidence that it 
Underlies and is reflected in all the other statements of principle in Esso33° 
The principle which Parker J. chose to examine in context is that which states that 
public policy will add support to the finding that a term in a contract is unreasonable (in 
restraint of trade or, indeed in any other respect). 331 In addition, there must be a balance 
between preventing the future currency of an unreasonable term and supporting the right 
of freedom to contract. 
The question of reasonableness is a question in its own right and need not be 
inextricably linked with the complexity of deciding whether or not restraint of trade is 
in evidence. 332 In connection with the George Michael case it is felt here that it is not 
the written terms of the contract which go against reasonableness, but the lack of 
continued good faith as defined above, and the failure to attempt co-operation or 
flexibility between the parties. It is this behavioural pattern which is damaging to the 
public if long-term contractual parties are allowed to continue with it 
In continuing to explore whether there was an unconscionably constructed contract, in 
terms of items 2: 2: 3 and 2: 3: 1 at page 35 above, the matter of equality of bargaining 
power at the time of negotiation is essential. Having grappled at some length to seek 
the proper application for restraint of trade in this case, the general faults and 
difficulties for which are examined at section 6 above, Parker J. turns his attention to 
establishing what relevance inequality of bargaining power can have in the context of 
the application of this doctrine. At first333 he finds that from the influential Esso334 case, 
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Lord Reid provides that even where the parties bargain on equal terms public policy 
may dictate that a harshly restrictive clause, even if they have been readily and freely 
accepted, should be enough to justify intervention at law. 335 This Parker J. finds 
supported by Lord Morris of Borth y Gest336 and by Lord Pearce 337 This information is 
given to show that inequality of bargaining power is in the minds of the judiciary, and 
must remain prominent there. However, the extended principle that the contract itself 
must be able to stand a test of reasonableness to prevent it becoming the carrier of 
onerous practices into a business or trading community, has not been extracted to any 
stand alone status. Surely it is most clear from Parker J's determinations that the real 
issue for judicial consideration is the question of whether the contract is an 
unconscionably constructed contract. This, it is felt, is further demonstrated by the 
statement of Parker J.: 
In my judgement, [-J, Mr Michael's state of mind cannot affect the objective 
existence or otherwise of inequality of bargaining power ... Mr Michael was in 
a very strong negotiating position indeed. 338 
Given all the re-negotiating that occurred throughout George Michael's career, it 
became obvious, as much to his own counsel as any one else, 339 that there were no real 
grounds here to argue inequality of bargaining power. It was pleaded that, whether or 
not the 1984 Agreement was enforceable, Mr Michael: 
Was not free of assumed or asserted contractual obligations, which at all 
material times it was in the power of Sony Music (then CBS UK) to release, 
when the [1984 Agreement] and the [1988 Agreement] were negotiated and 
concluded Accordingly, the negotiation of those agreements was undertaken in 
circumstances of unequal bargaining power. 
Parker J. interpreted this as meaning that: 
... there was inequality of bargaining power 
because at all material times he 
assumed (rightly or wrongly) that he was bound by the 1984 Agreement: that is 
to say, there was inequality of bargaining power because he believed that there 
was inequality of bargaining power. 340 
As the record company contended, and is agreed with here, Parker J. took the view that 
from the outset of the 1984 Agreement between George Michael and CBS (later Sony) 
there was a continual relationship subject to amendments at 1988 and 1990, rather than 
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two or three distinct contractual terms. As Parker J. put it, to take any other view would 
be to allow form to triumph over reason. 
Following this line of thought, Parker J. makes two comments which are taken as 
supportive to what is felt here, First: 
Thus, inequality of bargaining power may (depending oll the facts of the 
particular case) be relevant to negative an argument to the effect that the 
covenantor (in all cases the artist)cannot complain that the terms of the contract 
are capable of being work unreasonably against hing, since in entering into the 
contract he chose to repose a measure of confidence in the covenantee. 3a1 
This is interpreted to mean that it is the relationship, the degree of trust and confidence 
which establish that relationship, and the continued honouring of that trust and 
confidence which Parker J. finds to be relevant. This must surely harp back to the 
question of consensus ad idem and the critical presence of good faith, without which 
present, it could be argued, there is no contract at all because there can be no real 
`agreement' in place. The scope of the doctrine of unconscionably constructed 
contracts must be broad enough to add that a mere signature to a long-term relationship 
will not be enough to force that relationship to be binding at law unless a high degree of 
recklessness is present in the act of signing, and that must be without the presence of 
undue influence. 342 
Parker J's. second comment shows the willingness of the court to recognise that there is 
a genuine grievance at hand and not to restrict any avenue which may be open to attend 
to the propriety of that grievance: 
As I see it, to recognise the existence of limits on the court's ability to inquire 
into and to take account of the background against which the contract was made 
and the circumstances in which it was negotiated would be to deity the 'rule of 
reason' referred to by Lord Wilberforce. 343 What weight (if any) is to be 
attached to any particular factor or circumstance will of course depend on the 
facts of each particular case, but a blinkered approach would to my mind be 
entirely inconsistent with the approach required by the 'rule of reason '. 34; 
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Genuine inequality of bargaining power, where it occurs, is a question of substantive 
unconscionability345 and, as such, has little relevance to the structure of the hypothetical 
doctrine of unconscionably constructed contracts. This is because it is not necessarily 
an issue concerned with the conduct of long-term contractual relationships. However, 
that is not to suggest that where there is an unreasonable and damaging contract in 
circulation, to which one party has been unreasonably induced, that it should not be 
arrested in the name of public policy and ceased from further incorporation, for the sake 
of public protection. 
Q: At the stage of formation, on the evidence provided in this case, can this contract can 
be asserted to have been an unconscionably constructed contract? 
In short, the answer here is no! Both sides were fairly represented and advised. The 
artist had clear intentions and expectations based on experience. The intentions and 
expectations of both parties were expressed and understood by each other at negotiation 
and formation. The latter, to such an extent that an artistic control clause was 
incorporated (unusual at such an early, unproven, stage of an artists career). Given all 
the above, there seems to be little or nothing to support the suggestion that, at the stage 
of formation, this was an unconscionably constructed contract. 
The examination must turn, then, to the conduct of the ongoing relationship. The test of 
the hypothetical doctrine would suggest that the next area for scrutiny is the play of the 
advisors, particularly insofar as George Michael is concerned. This is done with the key 
point in mind that it was George Michael and not his representatives who was bound to 
carry on his lifestyle and living within the confines of this relationship. From the outset 
of this line of examination there are two important factors. The one is that George 
Michael felt that he contributed a great deal to the decision making and direction of his 
own career. He was in no way naive or incapable in business terms, especially by 1984 
when he had some considerable experience of the music industry and had formed his 
own realistic ideas about his career ambitions. On the other hand his representatives, 
Mr. Tony Russell, his solicitor and Mr Rob Kahane, his Manager, were strong and 
demonstrative personalities who often, generally not incorrectly, undertook to speak on 
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George Michael's behalf. Character assessments have been provided346 so that of Tony 
Russell, Parker J. says: 
[He] is a solicitor of great experience in the record industry, with a reputation 
as an extremely tough negotiator.. 
He also found it necessary to say: 
... I regard his recollection of events 
[as] unreliable, due no doubt to the 
passage of time coupled with the pressures of litigation and the fierce loyalty 
which he clearly feels towards his client. 
The judge's comments about Rob Kahane, however, may be more significant toward 
consideration of the conduct of the parties relationship as a whole. The nature of such a 
relationship, when viewed from the outside, must be coloured by the characteristics 
displayed by those involved in it, so that judgements of that relationship must be made 
with due precaution. 
1 found Mr Kahane to be a thoroughly unreliable and untrustworthy witness. 
and 
In the first place his evidence was coloured to a significant extent by his obvious 
and intense dislike of Sorry and all its works. It may be that this dislike derives 
from the poor personal relationship which, regrettably, appears to exist between 
him and Mr. Miner, the head of the 'Columbia' label at Sony US... 
In the second place, in giving his evidence I found him motivated to an 
unacceptable degree by self-interest and a desire to protect his own position: 
characteristics which he also manifest in the course of events leading to the 
present dispute 
The judicial assessment of George Michael was that he was: 
... intelligent and articulate, and he gave his evidence with clarity and 
conviction. To say that he was not overawed by the formalities qf the 
proceedings may be something of an understatement, but his evidence was 
certainly none the worse for that. He was refreshingly candid, and I have no 
doubt at all that in giving his evidence he was doing his best to do so fairly and 
honestly.. 
. 
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... That said, 
however, an opinion, however honestly held, is only as reliable as 
the facts upon which it is based - and where the facts are reported, the validity 
of the opinion depends (among other things) on the accuracy of the report and 
on the integrity and impartiality of the reporter. As Mr. Michael gave his 
evidence, it became progressively more apparent that his views of Sony's 
attitudes, motives and competence derived less from first hand experience and 
knowledge on his part than from-reports made and views expressed to him by his 
closest advisers, and particularly by his manager Mr. Rob Kahane. 
That is not to say that Mr. Michael's opinions were not his own: that would be 
to underestimate hint.. 
And quoting from the cross examination between Pollock QC and George Michael, 
Parker J. provides: 
Q:... Is this a fair comment, that most of your complaints against CBS 
throughout the period of your relationship with them ... are based on what you 
have been told by others in your entourage ... 
A: Yes absolutely. I have relatively little conitact with executives in comparison 
to my managers, which is normal for an artist of my type. 
At the conclusion of this assessment Parker J. sates that 
I have no doubt that since Mr. Kahane came on the scene as his manager in 
1986 Mr Michael's attitudes to and opinions ofSonty, and his suspicions as to 
Sony's motives, owe far more to Mr. Kahante's input than Mr Michael can have 
realised when these proceedings began. 
Finally, about Mr Paul Russell, President of Sony Music Entertainment, Europe (and 
previously legal representative for the record company) Parker J. felt: 
Mr Paul Russell possess a very much more phlegmatic teinp vrameirt that does 
Mr Tony Russell. He displayed considerable patience... 
... I am satisfied that throughout his evidence Mr Pauul Russell was doing his 
best to give his evidence fairly and honestly and generally to assist the court to 
the best of his recollection 
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Having accepted these assessments, full consideration can be given to the part played by 
the independent advisors. This must be done if a judgement is to be made about 
whether or not there is an unconscionably constructed contract. 
Firstly it may be commented that the implementation of item 2: 5: 2, i. e. 
The initial Agreement should incorporate a quasi-contract which imposes on the 
Advisor an obligation to ensure that (a) he is acting in the best interests of the 
principle party whom he represents and (b) that he will not issue any advice or 
cause to be incorporated any term or condition which has as its purpose the 
effect of damaging or reducing the expectations of either principal beyond what 
is reasonable347 
could play an important role in relationships like that between George Michael and his 
record company. For example, the adoption of this policy might check the influences 
offered by parties such as Rob Kahane. In any event it is capable of putting the onus 
upon intervening third parties to take responsibility for the results of such influences 
and inducements as they might engender. However, given the circumstances which 
obtained, the following evidences must be examined in their more original context. 
In 1983 Tony Russell had counsel (Mr Cran) prepare a nineteen page letter which 
suggested that the agreement between Wham! and Inner Vision was void or voidable. 348 
In evidence during the 1994 case, Tony Russell told Parker J. that his aim was 
.. to negotiate the release of 
Wham! from the Inner Vision Agreement and to 
sign Wham! direct to CBS (UK). To that end, on the same day [-] he telephoned 
a Mr Oberstein (of CBS) and Mr Rodwell (Inner Vision's solicitor), nolif ed 
them of the terms of the letter [-], and expressed the hope, off the record, that it 
might be possible to negotiate a new deal direct with CBS (UK)... 
As previously stated here, the impetus for this act was that George Michael no longer 
wished to continue his relationship with Inner Vision and he did want to enter a 
relationship with a more substantial record company for the sake of his career 
development. However, it is made clear through this case that Tony Russell carried out 
negotiation tactics in whatever manner seemed most appropriate to him. In addition, it 
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was not the principal to the contract, George Michael who manipulated the event in this 
respect. 
The impetus, desire and purpose which led to the 1988 renegotiation was that George 
Michael wanted to be elevated to what is termed `superstar' status, although he wanted 
to continue his relationship with CBS. In essence this would be achieved by improving 
the terms of remuneration, extending the artistic liberty of the artist, and assuring him 
that his output would have full marketing support and promotional expenditure from the 
record company. George felt that, to achieve this, it would be necessary to shift the 
office where the Agreement lay from the UK to the US where the majority of music 
industry `superstars' were contracted. This was clearly a move toward further improving 
George's market position in the US, such a development as was his expressed intention 
from the outset. The following course of events, as reported, 49 reads something like a 
French farce. Over a period of time various individuals, including Rob Kahane and 
Tony Russell, travelled to or wrote to or telephoned, parties in the US, holding 
discussions with a string of influential individuals including CBS Chairman and C. E. O. 
Walter Yetnikoff and highly influential American lawyer Allen Grubman who was, at 
that time a close associate of Mr. Yetnikoff, whilst at contemporaneous meetings with 
CBS' UK offices denying or altering accounts of arrangements they were intending to 
enter on George Michael's behalf. It is not possible to ascertain the exact truth of all 
negotiation related events from the evidence, except inasmuch as that, during these 
periods, George Michael's representatives were selective with the truth and did not 
share with all parties their full knowledge of circumstances which obtained at any one 
time. This fact is only partially mitigated by their obvious drive to achieve what George 
wanted, namely `Superstar' contract terms with CBS (US). Obviously while they 
carried on it was necessary for them to continue to cosset and protect the relationship 
with CBS(UK) incase they could not achieve what they wanted elsewhere. The 
evidence suggests that George Michael himself was not fully aware of the exact 
activities or outcomes of his representatives own doing during this time. Given the 
complexity generated by the variety of negotiations and the amount of information 
which appeared to have been withheld between those involved, it is not surprising that 
George said in court 
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My response was one of disappointment, given the expectation generated [by Mr 
Grubmart... J... . 
However, concerned not to antagonise Walter Yetnikoff, George accepted the terms 
CBS had offered and the contract was signed in January at the same time as Sony took 
over from CBS. Various clauses were included, in particular Clause 2.01,2.02(a) and 
2.02(b) which provided for the relevant sale, transfers and assignments to Sony Music. 
There is some value in pointing out at this stage that the representatives under 
discussion here constitute what the law accepts as independent advisors. It has become 
clear that, in the music industry, this is often a contradictory title even for lawyers as 
they take a far more involved role in the maintenance of the relationship than the 
suggestion at law supposes of them. Because of this it has been suggested here, 350 that it 
would be an improvement if due legal responsibility could be apportioned to these 
advisors, in their capacity as secondary parties to the chief contract. Thus the period of 
continuator activities mentioned above would have been able to give rise to reasonable 
grounds for a claim on the part of both principal parties, that this contract, as presented 
to the court is an unconscionably constructed contract. This argument necessitates a 
view of the contract in its entirety which must incorporate that it is an ongoing 
relationship, so that entirety includes all contractually relevant activities at all times. 
This principle is founded (as before) on the premise that there must be consensus ad 
idem, that is an agreement between the parties, all the terms and conditions of which 
must be known to each. Where there are intervening bodies acting independently on the 
principal parties' behalf, a mere signature, surely, should not be taken as proof in law of 
knowledge of all that has been put in to building that agreement. So far as it is 
understood here, if the position of the advisors is viewed as having extended to become 
that of an agent, in legal terms, then they would carry not only a fiduciary duty to the 
principal, but also, it is possible that they may be subject to an obligation to indemnify 
the principal against liability incurred by reason of the agent's negligence in doing what 
he has been commissioned to do. To date the status of music industry lawyers has 
remained strictly independent but the Shaun Ryde? sl case, as discussed shortly, may 
indicate a shift from this. 
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The degree of intervention in the performance of the living out of the long-term 
contractual relationship may be illustrated by the next sequence of events drawn from 
this case. George informed his representatives/advisors in February 1990 of his 
intention to withdraw from all publicity for his forthcoming album so that his `pop' 
image could be withdrawn and replaced over time by a more adult rock persona. 
Meetings were held between the representatives/advisors and Sony with the intention of 
preparing for a variation to further improve George's royalty rights. These meetings 
took place in February, March, April and May 1990. 
... at no time during this stage in the negotiations was any mention made to 
Sony Music of any intention on Mr Michael's part to change the nature of his 
promotional activities in relation to future albums. 352 
At the end of June 1990 the negotiations were concluded between Tony Russell and 
Sylvia Coleman, Director of Corporate Affairs for Sony Music and appropriate 
signatures were exchanged. 
Still no indication had been given by Mr Michael's side of any change of plan by 
Mr Michael in relation to his promotional activities... 353 
There follows evidence of some confusion during July of that year as to exactly what 
Sony Music were told and what they understood. It was not, according to the reputable 
Mr Paul Russell, until October 1990, when he first learned of the full extent of Mr 
Michael's "change of direction". 354 It can be suggested that it was at this juncture that 
the relationship between the principals began to break down, it can further be suggested 
that the root of the breakdown355 was a misunderstanding of expectations on each part 
coupled with the sudden change of management at Sony (US) which impacted on 
George Michael's sense of stability in the given circumstances. Here it could be said 
that it is clear that, due to the conduct of the representatives/advisors Sony were not in 
possession of all the facts pertaining to George Michael's planned course of progress. 
Additionally, George Michael was not aware that Sony were not fully informed of his 
decisions, at a time when that knowledge would have been critical to their performance. 
In a letter, given as evidence, he wrote 
... I was assured of a positive attitude from CBS Records on the current single 
and promotion of the albuni from now on. 
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Unfortunately the results of this new found spirit are nowhere to be seen 
And in another paragraph which betrays George's attitude to his still being assigned to 
Sony (UK) rather than Sony (US): 
... I am shocked by the lack of commitment (or perhaps competence), especially 
having done all I could this year in response to CBS UK's apparent desire to re- 
establish George Michael sa UK signing. 356 
There is little doubt that, if armed in advance with full knowledge of George's plan for 
his "change in direction" CBS/Sony would surely have developed appropriate, 
innovative marketing tactics. This, after all was an artist who had previously sold over 
14 million on one album. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the artist was content 
with the reduced volume of sales on this new album, which indicates that his response 
was to a perceived attitude rather more than to factual events. 
Item 2: 4: 9 above 3'7 recommends regular meetings at suitable intervals between the 
principals to long-term contractual relationship, and outlines a suggestion that these 
should be tabled to air grievances between them and agree any appropriate course of 
action with an option to wind down the relationship if no such agreement can be 
reached. It is felt here that procedural unconscionability can be extended to incorporate 
the procedures of living out long-term relationships of this nature, in which case it is at 
this juncture that the series of events can be said to have led to what amounts to an 
unconscionably constructed contract. This means that the contract, while not frustrated 
per se has become unsuitable for both parties to continue to live it out. Attendance at a 
2: 4: 9 type meeting could negate the necessity to apportion blame or lobby criticism, 
there is clearly no point in attempting to enforce a relationship when it has reached this 
stage and it can be said that there is loss of confidence on both sides. In fact, had a 
meeting been arranged it is possible that Sony, who had not lost all confidence, could 
have found a means to reassure George Michael and reinforce their relationship for the 
future. However, once an agreement to wind down has been reached it would remain 
with the parties (possibly in court but preferably on their own) to account for payments 
due and proprietary rights. This is a relationship which cannot cease in an instant, 
attempts to do that are invariably what have led to music industry litigation in the first 
place, however it is also the conduct of a series of business transactions. As businesses, 
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each in his own right, financial and proprietary accounting should not be the trigger for 
angst or undue harshness. It is felt that it is not part of this discussion to go any further 
in to pecuniary issues. 
14: 6 Summary of findings in respect of whether there was an unconscionably 
constructed contract: 
In the early stages of considering an approach which could appropriately address the 
problems identified through this research one question commanded attention: Is he 
equal to protecting himsel58 The question may seem too broad - but it must be 
considered in context, and needs to be flanked by several others: 
(i) had he contracted in good faith? 
(ii) did his understanding of a standard form contract 
give rise to reasonable expectations? 
(iii) did he come to the contract blinkered? 
(Needs, wants, cravings and ambitions are drivers that tend 
to have a `blinkering' effect) 
(iv) was he competent to negotiate with clarity 
in all the circumstances? 
These test questions conform with Trebilcock's approach to being in formationally 
impaired. 359 Trebilcock also identifies what he calls a Structurally Impaired Market, 360 
by which he means a market imbalanced through control by an oligopoly or even a 
monopoly. On analysis, this description concurs with one view of the cause of 
inequality of bargaining power. 361 Such a market will not offer the flexibility in 
negotiation or choice of alternatives that a fully competitive market would. This 
certainly puts the aggrieved party at considerable disadvantage, possibly laying him 
open to duress, undue influence and restraining clauses of all types on a `take-it-or- 
leave-it' basis. 
However, and as Trebilcock himself points out, the music industry includes over 1200 
record companies and almost a thousand publishing companies. 362 Managers and agents 
are really unquantifiable as any person or company may elect to take up these roles. 
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In addition to this mass of outlets, it must be recognised that many artists work 
independently, outside the system, and often make considerable sums in doing so. - For 
example one band 363 produced and sold 1,800 albums `on the road' in 1995, while 
comparable product, listed at about number 100 in the album charts was reported to 
have sold circa 1000 copies. The independent band accounted for some £12,000 - with 
no percentages to pay out. Thus it cannot be said of artists, or to some extent writers, 
that they are dealing in a restricted market place in the sense that Trebilcock outlines. 
Furthermore, Parker J. in his exploration of the standard form, monopoly/oligopoly, 
take-it-or-leave-it argument found that 
Although, as the BPI statistics show, the five majors (that is to say Sony, EMI, 
Warner Brothers, Polygram and BMG) dominate the market in terms of volume 
of product sold, it would be a mistake to suppose that the majors are not at the 
sharp end of competition. They compete vigorously with each other and with the 
`independents '... 364 
and 
... [on] the alleged 
factor that majors do not substantially compete with each 
other in the terms of their standard contracts, or their royalty rates ... 
363 
... I am satisfied that comparably 
between the financial rewards offered to 
artists by different majors reflects the action of market forces. That is to say, far 
fron demonstrating a lack of competition between the majors, it is the product 
of competition. 366 
In terms of the levels of negotiation Parker J. found that : 
Renegotiation of a recording contract after an artist has had a successful adbrum 
is commonplace. 
367 
and in his opinion (agreed here) 
In a renegotiation an artist cannot expect to be treated in exactly the same way 
as he would be if he were negotiating on the open market free front any 
contractual ties. There is bound to be a degree of discount to reflect the fact 
that the artist is already bound by an existing recording agreement. , 
3611 
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In conclusion, when the George Michael case is viewed as a paper contract with several 
incarnations, this is not an unconscionably constructed contract. However, if the eye of 
the law can be persuaded to look wider and view the living-out of the long-term 
relationship as an integral part of the contract itself, then, all facts being considered, this 
relationship does not pass the tests of reasonableness, good faith, or infra-contract co- 
operation. For those reasons it is felt here to be subjectively procedurally 
unconscionable and objectively of unconscionable construction and against the interests 
of public policy in its nature. 
The recommendation here would be that the contractual relationship be wound up and 
account taken of the due apportionment of profits and gains. The proprietary rights in 
songs and material produced during the contract have been freely and willingly given up 
by the artist and he should maintain the right to future royalties which may be generated 
by those productions. The obligation to properly account for and pay all due royalties 
and other payments has been freely entered into by the record company and continuance 
of this in respect of future exposure as well as past and current sales would not impose 
hardship. 
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15: Arguments Which Support the Proposed Approach 
Factors which have been considered during the development of the proposed approach 
for the hypothetical doctrine can be categorised into four distinct areas: law, economics 
considerations, other academic suggestions and the findings of behavioural traits among 
the relevant parties. 
15: 1 Inequality of Bargaining Power 
From current law three principles seem to operate in this context. The first is inequality 
of bargaining power. In ascertaining the exact place in law where this principle should 
rest, it can be said that there is a certain level of protection in introducing a new doctrine 
through `equity'. For example, there is the simple rule that when the common law and 
equity disagree, equity will prevail, 369 it being the purpose of equity, in keeping with its 
historical development, to provide the law with a vehicle to intervene and prevent unjust 
and unreasonable agreements. It seems that it is the maxims and dictums of equity, that 
prevent its active intervention becoming stochastic or too much personalised in the will 
of the judiciary. Lord Nottingham L. C (1673-82), (approving Coke C. J. ) held that 
equitable conscience should only intervene where there was a conflict of rules or where 
there was no precedent. This principle was upheld by Lord Hardwicke L. C. (1736-56). 
Lord Eldon L. C. (1801-27) further established a series of case law with the result that 
equity took on an element of predictability(certainty). Since the Judicature Acts, 1873, 
equity has become incorporated with the Common Law - although 'The streams flow 
together, but the waters do not mix 1370 One maxim which plays an important role in 
maintaining distinction between the two formats of law, is that one must come to equity 
with clean hands. For example, if Macaulay371 or Holly Johnson372 had actively 
breached their contracts by negotiating an alternative elsewhere then pure common law 
could have overlooked this `hand dirtying'. 
So can inequality of bargaining power be said to be an equitable principle? There seems 
to be a great deal of `equitable protectionism' in the frequent speeches of Lord Denning, 
as well as in those of Lords Reid and Diplock in the Macaulay case. Indeed, they seem 
to be stirring together the "waters" of common law and equity quite effectively in 
considering equality of bargaining power, and by introducing the notion of 
unconscionable bargaining. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy - but 
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that is not intended to mean that equity will lay the foundation to extend common law. 
When regarding inequality of bargaining power, however, there can be little doubt that 
despite it being an equitable principle it was born from the development of the common 
law principle of restraint of trade. Naturally any legal rule or principle must evolve with 
the passage of time if it is to remain effective, it is not intended to suggest otherwise. 
Since feudal times, socio-political struggles as to the status and rights of the "employed" 
ensued. For example Dyers' Case373 illustrates that contracts preventing or restricting 
business competition were not only regarded as void374 but, at that time, parties who 
created such contracts could face imprisonment. These struggles became stronger and 
more prevalent with the coming of the industrial revolution, as craftsmen and trained, 
skilled workers, faced the influx of steam power and mechanised production. Workers 
skilled and unskilled struggled to secure their rights. But, prior to the development of 
workers and trades unions during the 19th century, members of various local (medieval) 
guilds375 turned-on? 76 for better pay or working conditions facing punishment under the 
common law charge of "Conspiracy in restraint of trade". Conditions were settled by 
statute such as The Statute Of Artificers [1563] under which justices had power to fix 
the wages of both artisans and labourers, and impose penalties on masters or workers 
for any breach of contract. Regulation of this nature continued until circa 1700.377 It 
is during this period that the traditional question of equality of bargaining power was 
framed and, perhaps, annexed to common law questions of restraint of trade. The 
differences between an ordinary individual and those of commercial power and stature, 
or those represented by a successful trade union, were extreme - and obvious as such. 
The fashionable attitude to what may be viewed as the growing pains of `capitalism' 
and changing social-class boundaries was indeed laissez faire. By the late 18th century, 
following a string of enactments and reform Acts Parliament had apparently, fully 
adopted a more laissez faire policy. For example a worker may have been subject to a 
contract which offered him mere subsistence whilst his employer gained great profit as 
the result of inexpensive labour. In essence there was no policy for intervention against 
such a contract which had been freely entered into. It seems that, in the mind of 
Parliament, the greater protection for the balance of the economy would generate from 
allowing the labour force to bind itself to such restraining clauses as employers saw fit 
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to draw up. But the struggle to form `combination' representation or trades unions to 
realign the status of the working masses continued. What might now be perceived as a 
shortfall in the protection of public policy may be largely due to the fact that the first 
MPs seated from the ranks of labourers and workers did not arrive until 1874. Prior to 
this: 
Ministers of the crown in most cases knew very little about the lives or, f eelings 
of the manual workers; and any signs of organisation among them were 
frequently regarded with alarm as being potentially criminal or seditious. 378 
As Sir Henry Maine saw in 1864: 
[tJhe movement of progressive societies had... been a movement from status to 
contract. 379 
These words aid in making the point that development in contract law is essential. The 
risk and cost factors of transacting without such a framework of behavioural guidance 
as the law should supply are detrimental to both business public and general public 
alike. This concept, freedom of contract, has proven difficult to bring forward to modern 
times. During his deliberations on the matter, Parker J observed Lord Pearce's caution: 
"The rule relating to restraint of trade is bound to be a compromise, as are all 
rules imposed for freedom's sake. The law fetters traders by a particular 
inability to limit their freedom of trade so that it may protect the general 
freedom of trade and the good of the community. Anct since the rule must be a 
compromise, it is difficult to define its limits on any logical basis "380 
As Parker J. also acknowledged, the historical guidance and the source for precedent, 
providing test relevant to restraint of trade, was Norde, felt v Maxim Nordenfelt Gurts & 
Ammunition Co. Ltd 381 It appears to be the so-called Nordenfeldt test which has carried 
the notion of inequality of bargaining power through cases like that of Esso3"2 and into 
the music industry via Macaulay' ' So it can be said that this is the route by which 
inequality of bargaining power, an equitable principle at heart, and common law 
restraint of trade have travelled forward in partnership. 
This line of reasoning has been studied a little further here. Across its historical 
development, it cannot be overlooked that inequality of bargaining power has attached 
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to cases invoking intervention and obtaining remedy because of undue influence. 
Traditionally these cases concern coercion over future properties or rights in reversion; 
bargains unfair and obvious as such ; 3" disagreements where there was no bargaining or 
negotiating per se and a party has given up gifts so substantial as to be beyond ordinary 
motive; 385 or, as in Evans v Llewellyn, 38' where property is sold substantially under 
value. A strong underlying principle in many of these cases seems to be that the 
aggrieved party sacrifices the future for his present needs, and in doing so often 
deceives a third party (current or future beneficiary) in that the third party has no 
knowledge of the bargain which affects their projected expectations. 
It is blurred as to whether undue influence is at play when an artist, who waits to 
become famous or successful, is lured by the challenge to enter the music industry and 
because of this, decides that he wants a management/publishing/recording deal. It 
cannot be said that the other coerced him or that his act deceives an innocent third party 
or affects the economy or real estate values. It can, however be said that the artist, 
especially early in his career, is not necessarily equal to protecting himself and will be 
informationally impaired, he comes to the contract blinkered by his general ambition 
and, perhaps, sacrifices the present with an eye to the future. 
In this light, general discussion, both academic and judicial, tends to return to the 
question of equality of bargaining power. Thus the Macaula? 87 case equality of 
bargaining power principle was applied in Clifford Davis v WEA38$ (the Fleetwood Mae 
case as discussed above) even though it was a case about undue influence. There is an 
important distinction between the outcome of the Macaulay; " case and cases decided 
under the equitable remedy of undue influence. The appellant Macaulay's agreement 
was void, therefore unenforceable. The effect of the ruling was that he was released 
from his obligations with effect from a given date: 
... Insofar as the plaint? has actually executed assignments of copyrights in his 
Compositions to the defendant, that remains effective, and the defendant is 
entitled to the copyright on the agreed terms as to the plaint's share of 
royalties etc. Insofar as the contract would otherwise have operated as an 
assignment of copyright in fixture compositions only under s 37(1) of the 
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Copyright Act, 1956, [in force at that time], the contract being wzel? forceable 
the section does not operate. 390 
Alternatively, for those cases remedied under undue influence, copyrights were 
transferred back to the artist/writer, and accounts adjusted in their favour in accordance 
with the gains and benefits they should have had from the outset, allowing for 
reasonable investment by the other party. 391 In this respect Equity seems better to 
judge and rectify the `intention' of the contract, at least from the artist's point of view. 
Finally, in similar discussions about the notion of unconscionability it can be pointed 
out that - Canadian writers Reiter & Swan392 uses the terms inequality of bargaining 
power and unconscionability as though the two had one and the same meaning. 
Alternatively J. N. Adams393 prefers an analogy with the European style rules of good 
faith. But in a prediction that remains so far disappointed, Slayton394 provides a 
distinction for what he calls unequal bargains, with reference to Denning M. R's words 
in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v Bundy, by saying: 
.. no confidential relationship or duty of fiduciary care is necessary (and 
importantly here) undue influence need not be proved as a fact, but will be 
presumed when bargaining power is impaired and the terms are very unfair or 
consideration grossly inadequate. If this is so, then clearly a new doctrine of 
momentous scope has been introduced into the law of contract. 395 
It is likely that Slayton is to continue to be disappointed in this matter as the wisdom of 
Dillon W. Is preferred: 396 
Inequality of bargaining power must anyhow be a relative concept. It is seldom 
in any negotiation that the bargaining powers of the parties are absolutely equal 
This is taken here to support the suggestion that the principle cannot stand alone. It is a 
subjective concept and will only serve to invigorate and argument or to add weight to a 
suggestion that a contract is invalid where other areas of the relationship or of the 
documentation are detrimental and unreasonable. 
As far as the working of the hypothetical doctrine is concerned, George Michael 
demonstrates that inequality of bargaining power, lays distinctly at the formation stage 
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of a contractual relationship. It addresses the conditions under which the contract is 
drawn up and an Agreement entered into. It is felt here to be a good tool or test to 
establish whether or not a full meeting of the minds agreement was ever reached. It is 
something less that undue influence or duress because there is no coercion, however, 
where there is inequality of bargaining, the weaker party can be described as not equal 
to protecting himself and as being blinkered as to the potential consequences. 
15: 2 Good Faith 
The second of the three principles of law, is that of good faith, an exact definition of 
which is typically illusive in English law. It is interpreted here as meaning open handed 
dealing at all times. 397 Thus the intention behind behavioural suggestions such as: 
2: 4: 5 The Offeree is obliged to incorporate into the contract the long 
term intentions of the Offeree, the expectations of the Offeree and any 
areas of exchange, trading or other dealings where the Offeree is not 
prepared to be flexible or co-operative toward change 
given at page 37 above, is to install a set of common grounds for expectations in good 
faith in this particular area of trade. This goes against the grain of Lord Ackner's 
opinion and that of the House of Lords as expressed in Walford V Miles: 398 
.. a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is repugnant to the adversarial 
position of the parties when involved in negotiations ... A ditty to negotiate in 
good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the 
position of a negotiating party. 399 
Lord Ackner seems to take the view that negotiating parties must be in a position to get 
the most possible from a bargain, whilst giving away as little as possible. For sharp in 
sharp out transactions perhaps that is sometimes the way it should be, but the majority 
of consumers, and Parliament, seem to have other views. With respect, their Lordship's 
view is felt here to be too narrow, especially it is too harsh a view of the process of 
negotiation to be applied to contracts for long-term relationships. A duty to good faith, 
whilst the parties negotiate and reach a meeting of the minds at the beginning of a long 
relationship is surely essential. 
165 
15: 3 Public Policy 
The third legal principle to be accepted here is Public Policy, (if indeed this can be 
called a principle per se). Measures of unconscionable behaviour in commercial 
transactions and binding relationships are very much issues in the realm of public 
policy. In exploring the general hypothesis that the principle of unconscionability can 
be developed into a fully framed doctrine in English law, this realm of legal concept 
cannot be ignored. It has been made clear to this point, that while at times some judges 
exercise flexibility and pragmatism, the majority have refused to consolidate what they 
perceive as broad and currently vague concepts such as unconscionability. Perhaps 
advice like that of Burroughs J. shapes their caution. He considered public policy, ".. 
a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will 
carry you. It may lead you from sowed law". 400 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, however, has 
taken an influential step, in contemporary practice, toward bringing public policy issues 
to the fore. He has firmly put to one side the rationale of Lord Scarman from National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morganao' (for future deliberation) and takes up the question of 
abuse of confidence and/or failure in fiduciary duties, " .. founded on considerations of 
general public policy". In 1902 Lord Halsbury doubted that any court could, ".. 
invent a new head of public policy". 402 But abuse of confidence, breach of fiduciary 
duty and inequality of bargaining power are not new heads. Collectively they can be 
pitted together in a structured presentation towards a code of behavioural practice, for 
which Browne-Wilkinson has paved the way. 403 This is why it is suggested that the 
term Unconscionably Constructed Contract may create an acceptable starting point by 
providing the meaningful `label' apparently required. From this starting point a 
structured mechanism may develop which would prevent the feared stampede of `unruly 
horses', and, for the benefit of the general contracting public, formalise the ad hoc 
invocation of public policy based intervention which otherwise obtains. The general 
ethos for entering public policy into a legal dispute is that it has the quality of licence to 
expand existing law or to justify one off decisions in the name of law. In addition it has 
already been expressed at page 48 that one result of analysis is the belief that law is of 
itself public policy. When discussing whether the George Michael case attracted 
common law restraint of trade as compared with equitable unconscionability Parker J. 
remarked: 
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Both jurisdictions are based on public policy, there being no other justification 
for the court intervening where contractual obligations have beeil assumed 
voluntarily. However, although both jurisdictions may be rooted in a single 
broad public policy, the position has now been reached on the authorities (as I 
read them) where differing public policy considerations - or differing aspects of 
a single broad public policy - apply to each jurisdiction. 
He goes on to do what it is believed here public policy empowers him to do. That is to 
ask the question, which interest or interests must be protected in order for the law to 
provide the best service for the public at large, the contracting community as a whole 
and the trading community to which the case must be addressed. The point that Parker J. 
makes is that: 
There are two limbs to the Nordenfeldt test: reasonableness as between the 
parties and reasonableness in the public interest. The onus of establishing that 
the contract is reasonable as between the parties is on the proponent of the 
contract (a test which he felt this contract passed) while the onus of establishing 
that, although reasonable between the parties, it is nevertheless contrary to 
public policy lies on the party challenging the contract. aa 
Notwithstanding the passing entertainment value of a high profile case like that of 
George Michael, in the tabloid dominated era in which we live, it is felt here that it is in 
the best interests of all and sundry if an unconscionably constructed (or flawed) long- 
term contractual relationship can be coached towards a mutually damage-limiting wind 
down. 
15: 4 Economics Considerations 
In preparing 2: 4 Suggested Conduct and The Terms of an Agreement, and the 
surrounding suggestions, the economics of entering, maintaining and concluding a long- 
term, contractually binding relationship have been firmly in mind. The purpose is to 
reduce the possibilities for contentious surprise in the relationship and minimise the cost 
of managing it while living-out the contract. More specific factors have already been 
addressed such as the monopoly/oligopoly argument raised in connection with equality 
of bargaining power above. In short, the music industry can be diagrammatically 
represented as: 
167 
Record Companies 
UK Subsidiaries of 
International Record Companies 
Management Companies 
Publishing Companies 
Subsidiary & Administered 
Publishing Companies 
Successful Rock & Pop Bands/performers 
Aspiring Rock & Pop Bands/pcrformers 
Writers/Composers 
Writers/Composers 
How Many405 
600 
6 
425 
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3,000 
4,000 
5,000 - (this is thought to be a gross underestimate) 
1,500 - Receiving PRS payments over £5,000 p. a. 
24,000+ 
Of the 24,000 active writers (who are members of the Performing Rights Society) many 
will also be performers. The bands and performers represented here are not necessarily 
all recording artists or artists with a record company contract (some performers record 
and sell their own material `on the road' and there is not room to consider this private 
enterprise here except to say that it, too, plies against the suggestion of monopoly- 
control in the business of making music for a living). It is suggested that the 4,000 who 
are listed as "successful" have, or have had, lucrative recording deals, while those who 
are listed as aspiring do not necessarily have deals or contracts. With some 5,000 
aspiring performers and/or bands to chose from a record company is not necessarily 
threatened by the loss or change of one specific artist. However, it is recognised that 
there would be some development and promotional cost in replacing a big-name artist. 
It must also be recognised that, with few notable exceptions, artists' popularity can be 
sustained only for a limited period of time before fashion and market forces dictate the 
desire for new styles of music and personality. 
In an industry which serves such a fickle and fragile market the trade relationship 
between artist/writer and company needs to be one which is flexible and one which can 
be nurtured and exploited as time goes by if optimum profit and satisfaction are to be 
achieved. Commitment, or long-term exclusivity, for instance, should be addressed as 
an opportunity cost, not as a restriction. 
168 
15: 5 Academic Suggestions 
The most prominent academic suggestion to influence opinions and decisions made here 
is the notion of intra contract co-operation. (notwithstanding that unconscionability as a 
principle in its own right is capable of being viewed as an academic reasoning, but one 
which is finding stronger currency at law as time progresses). 
Following the discussion from page 96 above, it is assumed here that the principle could 
be extracted from Williams v Roffey Bros. And Nicholls (contractors) Ltd. 406 
irrespective of whether it is proven to have taken place during that relationship. The 
suggested conduct and terms of Agreement laid out at 2: 4 above have been drawn up in 
the assumption that intra-contract co-operation is a just and workable expectation for 
those entering into long-term contractual relationships. In addition it is felt that the law 
would have no difficulty upholding this principle and describing to contracting parties 
for their future benefit. An overall reading of George Michael's expectations, as 
established through evidence given in his case against Sony, has led to the belief that 
artists, at least, anticipate a high degree of intra-contract co-operation through their 
relationship. This being so, development of that principle as part of the structure 
towards curtailing unconscionably constructed contracts, would be a mere development 
of natural (good) behaviour. 
It is also considered here that a selection can be made from the following critical 
distinctions of contractual behaviour, and an approach established by which even the 
parties themselves can be encouraged to recognise whether a contract (or contractual 
relationship) is an unconscionably constricted contract. By acknowledging contrasts 
and comparators here the origins and complimentary background of the materials for the 
selected criterion of approach will not be devalued. 
(i) Substantive Unconscionability407 
Terms and conditions within a contract which are: 
(a) .. hidden or not easily accessible to one party in all the circumstances 
(b) 
.. usurious, onerous or substantially unfair and damaging as such 
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These bases for cause in disputes are already subject to the attentions of both the 
judiciary and Parliament and it is not intended to analyse them further as part of the 
proposal here. 
(ii) Procedural Unconscionability408 
Facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract 
(a) The aggrieved party's background; business acumen; advisors and personal 
drives; 
needs and ambitions, where these affect freedom of negotiation. 
(b) Levels of disclosure, where this affects understanding of the agreement to the 
extent that it is questionable whether the contract truly represents consensus ad 
idem, or the intention and will of both parties. 
Of the two, Procedural Unconscionability is the most apt sub-structure for this exercise. 
Add to this: firstly, Trebilcock's approach409 to what he calls an "informationally 
impaired market", divided into three classes: 
(i) Lack of Normal Information-Processing Capacity 
Here he gives an example of an individual momentarily incapacitated by the skills 
of a door-to-door salesman, consequently contracting to buy products which upon 
reflection do not represent a wise or wanted purchase. 
[It is not suggested that these petty sales contracts should be able to be undone under 
law as a matter of policy, but the analogy does portray the philosophy behind the 
suggestion that many of the cases discussed later could have been better addressed. For 
example, the (otherwise) reasonable victim of the salesman could be compared with the 
songwriter Macaulayg0 and, at the beginning of his career, singer/songwriter George 
Michael. 411] 
(ii) Cases where one party fails to disclose material information 
This brings into question openness in contractual negotiations and stands 
comparison with legal rules and doctrines such as flood faith, which operate in other 
Commonwealth and European jurisdictions. 
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(iii) Standard Form Contracts containing clauses which are not read or not understood412 
The music industry cases scrutinised in this discourse clearly illustrate difficulties 
which arise both for the courts and for individuals when dealing with poorly 
negotiated variations of standard-form contracts. This is especially a problem where 
these contracts represent long-term relationships. 
Alternative, though not necessarily conflicting, analysis to that provided by Trebilcock 
includes Yates' opinion43 that by seeking to apply tests of reasonableness there is a 
danger that the law will continue to recognise the consumer as a weaker party (in need 
of legislative protection) and will continue to limit consideration for so-called business 
men. The difficulty identified in the discussion here is established as the complexity of 
assuming an untrained, non-business oriented personality such as an artist can have a 
comparable status with other business community entities. Broadly, it can be said that 
the law assumes a corporate or business based entity to be capable of transacting and 
trading without protection except where there is an obvious fault such as an `illegal' 
monopoly or otherwise deliberate illegitimate acts such as fraud are in play. In reality 
the artist, and other types of small or independent businessman, has much more in 
common with consumers in terms of business sophistication and degrees of agility in 
legal or lawful business conduct. 
In short, although Yates differs from Trebilcock in his approach to standard form 
contracts there appears to be a fundamental agreement in that: 
Society must be aware of the demands of the economic machine for efficiency, 
productivity and profit; in formulating its protections against those who abuse 
their bargaining strength, society must not sacrifice the rational administration 
of the economy. 414 
15: 6 Behavioural Traits 
With no exceptions, those music industry executives who have been approached for the 
purpose of building a picture of behavioural traits have shied away from interview. 
Information about them has been gleaned from indirect sources, Those sources are, 
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personal experience, having worked alongside many of these people for some 10 years 
between 1980 and 1990; biographical material which has been selected either because 
executives themselves have recommended it as an alternative to participating in 
interview, or because the writers have been known and trusted; reportage has been used 
with caution. Approaches requesting discussion about opinions of current law have been 
met with sharp intake of breath and comments such as contract law. .. that's a 
complicated (one even said dangerous) subject. One retired executive P. A. stated that 
he frequently noticed that those high level negotiators who were not lawyers tended to 
believe that their solicitors had the power to do anything! One in particular 
would dictate "bullying" clauses which he thought were protecting his own 
interests but which had to be redrafted and approved by the solicitors because 
they would have done him more harm than good. 
One record company arranged an interview with their lawyer which led to the meeting 
of other lawyers in the same field and their contributions are scattered through the 
discussion above. This response is not beyond analysis as it supports the conjecture that 
music industry executives are essentially introvert characters. When they reach high 
level in their career it becomes obvious that they are a group of people who are 
empowered by their own convictions and who draw strength from independent decision 
making. This observation remains true whether the personality is manifest as 
demonstrative or non-demonstrative. In order to be able to deal with a framework of 
behavioural governance these individuals need the components of that framework to be 
clear and precise. They also need to be able to calculate the cost of non-adherence as 
well as the value of compliance. Their thinking towards their contractual relationships 
already incorporates the long-term view, but their thinking towards contract law is 
evidently less clear and they do not greet it with an open mind. 
Artists have no clear picture of contract law at all. It remains a mystery to them and the 
higher profile artists depend on advisors to steer their dealings. This seems peculiarly 
irresponsible given that they are the principal to contractual obligations. The survey 
done for this research, case studies and biographies, as well as personal experience, all 
support the statement that artists are a class of people who live in the realms of what is 
possible rather than what is actual. This attitude will greatly affect their expectations 
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towards their long-term relationships and towards what they will be allowed to produce 
in creative terms while honouring those relationships. All the research studied here 
agrees that it is the artist's motivation towards his career which is the predominant 
factor in his character make-up. This motivation is more often than not generated 
during childhood. Robbie Williams, for example, talks about the impact of watching his 
father (a professional club singer and entertainer) work to an audience. Robbie 
Williams developed the drive to have an audience admire his own talents. Even the 
most unassuming of artists has, it seems, got the same early cast motivation and drives: 
... and later a few autographs 
like the picture I got of Chris Barber's Jazz Band 
after I went to see them at City Hall in 1956 - they all signed that picture 
'Hank'!. I thought maybe if I learned to play the banjo well somebody would 
415 rush up and ask me to sign one day... 
... In 19571 went to see 
Jim Dale just as he was breaking big with "Me and My 
Girl" and the atmosphere was tremendous. The place was packed and the 
screaming rose to fever pitch. "Wow" I thought, "this is for me ", and I 
resolved really to do something about it ... 
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It is this long nurtured desire which drives them, often carelessly, towards signing a 
contract which will amount to a long-term relationship with the other party. This 
personality trait allows their imagination to predict their future with keen ambition. 
Musical tastes are likely to have been generated at an early age too, and as his career 
develops the artist will expect to be able to embrace experimental or more eclectic styles 
in order to express himself more fully. This last statement can be said to be evidenced 
through the `change in direction' of George Michael, or the manifestation of Sgt. 
Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band during The Beatles' career, or David Bowies' path 
from standard session musician through Ziggy Stardust to whatever his current guise. 
Pub and club musicians observed here also show a tendency to develop towards a more 
stylised choice of music as they become established. 
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Overall it is felt here that if the more corporate parties in the music industry were 
coached to review their approach to long-term contractual relationships, artists 
themselves would be able to broaden their understanding and expectations with a 
modicum of difficulty. The law is capable of being its own messenger in this respect 
and the attitude of Parker J. in the Panayiotou v Sony41 case, it is felt, demonstrated a 
comprehensive commercial awareness toward the business with which he was dealing. 
16: What Has Been Rejected in Formulating the Hypothesis 
That which it is felt augers against the effective development of the hypothetical 
doctrine can be summarised as: 
The increasing practice of alleging and considering at law restraint of trade in the 
circumstances discussed here. During the George Michael case, Parker J. gave attention 
to the workings of the doctrine in these circumstances and concluded: 
Fluidity of classification thus being one of the hallmarks of the doctrine of 
restraint of trade. .. it is not entirely easy to 
discern which yardstick or test is to 
be applied in [-] selecting from the whole range of contracts which are, in 
ordinary parlance, in restraint of trade those contracts which are currently 
liable to be subject to the necessity of justification by reasonableness. On the 
other hand, it is significant, in my judgement, that Lord Reid, Lord Morris of 
Borth y Gest, Lord Pearce and Lord Wilberforce all approach the question 
'Where is the line to be drawn? ' by considering which contracts (being 
contracts in restraint of trade in ordinary parlance) do not attract the doctrine 
41$ of restraint of trade... 
As has been expressed throughout this discourse it is felt that this difficulty in clarity 
and application of the law does nothing to add to the traditional doctrine of restraint of 
trade and does little to advise the parties for future contractual behaviour. Businessmen 
and artists may have a clearer notion of the `off side rule'. 
The Shaun Ryder case, which is to be discussed in full shortly, may go a long way 
toward explaining why continued attempts to examine these contracts as unreasonable 
in restraint of trade seem unacceptable here. This is a case which may be distinguished 
from the others discussed here as it brings to prominence the legal principle of waiver. 
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This was raised during Panayioutou v Sony. Parker J. First dismissed the possibility of 
George Michael having affirmed the terms of his contract 
As to the requirements of affirmation, it is well established that a contracting 
party will not be held to have affirmed the contract unless (inter alia) he airs 
knowledge of his legal right to choose between the alternatives open to him f J. 
In the instant case, Mr Michael learnt on 14 February 1992 that it was open to 
him to contend the 1988 agreement was unenforceable f J. Accordingly, in my 
judgement, no affirmation can have occurred before that date ... 
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Beyond this, however, Parker J. moves to consider Sony's defence of acquiescence. On 
this matter he states: 
It is clear from the judgement of Dillon IJ, in Holly Johnson that, in contrast to 
affirmation, this defence requires a consideration of all the circumstances of the 
case... 
He went on to consider whether it would be unfair and / or unconscionable to allow 
George Michael to claim that the 1988 agreement was unenforceable, considering the 
facts upon which Sony had relied in its conduct during the relationship. He also 
considered the question in the light of counter equities raised by Sony, but in the event 
of his conclusion he reported 
The position remains that it is unfair to Sony Music, and unconscionable, for Mr 
Michael now to assert that the 1988 Agreement is unenforceable. Accordingly, 
Sony Music's defence of acquiescence succeeds. 
Notwithstanding this, it is true to say however, that the bulk of the George Michael case 
was given to considering other matters. Affirmation and Acquiescence make up just a 
few pages of a report which runs to over 200. 
In the Shaun Ryder case, it seems that the judge at first instance was not invited to give 
his attention to Panayioutou v Sony. It is not clear why the case was overlooked as it 
was reported in 1994. However, suffice it to say that the question to be considered in 
the Shaun Ryder case was whether a contract obtained by undue influence and in 
unreasonable restraint of trade had been affirmed or acquiesced in by the defendant and 
was, therefore, enforceable. 
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At first hearing, and at Appeal the judgement in Shaun Ryder was shaped largely by the 
dictum of Dillon U. from [the Holly Johnson case] Zang Tumb Timm Records Lid and 
Another v Johnson, 42° as was the case before Parker J. on this matter. In the Holly 
Johnson case it was found that a recording agreement and a publishing agreement were 
both unenforceable as being unreasonable in restraint of trade. The decision making 
process was naturally influenced by the Esso, Macaulay pattern as discussed extensively 
here above. The defence of Waiver (or acquiescence) held no ground because it was 
decided that it was neither unjust to the Plaintiffs, (a record company and a publishing 
company), nor was it unconscionable for the defendant to assert the unenforceability of 
the two agreements. 
The defence failed in Nicholl and Another v Ryder, and the Appeal failed because the 
singer's advisor and lawyer had depended on one of the terms of the contract so that 
both parties could be said to have irreversibly altered their positions as a result of 
relying on that contract. If it comes to be interpreted in the music industry this case 
might at least make the parties contemplate how they conduct their relationship. For 
example, had Robbie Williams acquiesced when he rallied restraint of trade against 
RCA? Was it knowledge that that was their defence which led him to settle quietly? If 
George Michael's had prepared better would they have realised that this was one of 
Sony's defences and could this have dissuaded George from proceeding with such 
costly litigation.? Alleging that a contract is unreasonable in restraint of trade after 
taking some benefit or allowing the other to act to his detriment in reliance upon the 
contract is unconscionable behaviour indeed. To try to use such an allegation in the 
way that the George Michael party did is an act which flies against ! good faith. Th 
behaviour of the corporate parties as described in the holly Johnson case was, it is 
thought here, reprehensible, unconscionable towards living-out the contract and enough 
in itself to have rendered this an unconscionably constructed contract. lt is difficult to 
define the behaviour of any of the parties in the Shaun Ryder case, as will be seen. 
However, the living out of that contract was not performed in good faith either. It could 
not be found unconscionable to bring to an end that which is unconscionable itself. 
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Also expressed through the text above is the similar rejection of the development of the 
doctrine of undue influence in this field. 
The notion that standard form contracts in the music industry are non-negotiable, overly 
complex and harsh is not supported here and is not supported by Parker J. Having said 
that the view of the House in considering the Macaulay case was that music industry 
contracts were offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Thus the advisory comments given 
at 2: 4 above have attempted to incorporate precaution against non-understanding and 
inadequate advisory practices in relation to these types of contracts. Caution is also 
offered against non-major companies who might build a non-sensible contract or, as in 
the Shaun Ryder case, outlined below who might accept on their own behalf contracts 
which they do not understand themselves and which do not reflect their intentions. 
Where that happens a dispute may become a tit-for-tat debate about what the contract 
amounts to. 
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17: Nicholl and Another v Ryder (1998) 
The judicial approach which is evidently at play in the Shaun Ryder case at first 
instance, is that of avoiding attribution of any form of incapacity to the obviously 
weaker party. The American, Friedman42' gives an account of this type of judicial 
behaviour in his discussion about Kreuger v BtieL422 About Shaun Ryder, Matthews J. 
says 
The Defendant went to a secondary school where he attended special learning 
classes. He left before he reached the age of 1.5. He was 25, he told me, before 
he learned the alphabet and he has always had problems with reading, writing 
and spelling... . 
He has been a registered drug addict since he was a teenager and has abused 
heroin. He denies abusing heroin during the current decade and says that for 
the last 15 years he has been prescribed methadone as a substitute.. . 
It was plain to me that the defendant's health is fragile, and indeed so fragile 
that it gave rise to a request by the defence to interpose his evidence before the 
end of the Plaint's case so that he could return to Ireland The ravages of his 
addiction were plain to see. 423 
The trigger for litigation in this case was a claim that the artist owed commission 
payments to the Plaintiffs, his managers. There was some contention as to the rate at 
which some commissions should be calculated, i. e. whether it should be, by the terms of 
the agreement, 20% of gross or 20% of net income from live performances. 
Q: How could the court have gone about establishing whether or not there was an 
Unconscionably Constructed Contract? 
It is very hard to establish consensus ad idem or true agreement at the formation stage of 
this contractual relationship. Of the artist it can be said that he intended to form a 
relationship with the record company, Radioactive, which was a subsidiary of MCA in 
America. His intention was to revive his career following the demise of his part as 
frontman and singer with the successful band Happy Mondays. He claims that he met 
the principal of Radioactive records, Mr Kurfurst, through a mutual acquaintance with 
booking agent Ian Flooks. 424 
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The Defendant maintained in his evidence that he understood that Mr. Flooks 
and Mr Kurfurst were to be his managers. Then: Kurfürst and Flooks split up. 
Mr Kurfurst appointed the Plaintiffs to act on his behalf to look after the 
defendant. Gary Kurforst told the Defendant that since he was based in the USA 
the Defendant should speak to the first plaintiff when he needed something. The 
Defendant said that he net the first Plaintiff when he was working with Happy 
Mondays. He found him arrogant and obnoxious and took an instant dislike to 
him. He accepted Mr. Kurfurst's suggestion that the Plaintiffs look after him 
only because he was keen to retain the support of Gary Kurfürst, and with 
reluctance. 425 
This extract merits quoting in full because it clearly lays out the beliefs and attitude of 
the artist toward his managers. 
The managers' intentions and expectations are equally as illusive. Matthews J. 
preferred their version of events, particularly since neither Kurforst or Flooks was 
available to corroborate the artist's recollections on the matter. 426 At the outset, the only 
common ground which is in evidence between the parties is the expectation for the 
revival of Shaun Ryder's pop music career, 42' There was agreement that the promotion 
and sale of records would necessitate touring with a band. 
In 1992 both Plaintiffs, Mr and Mrs Nicholl, were employed by another of Mr 
Kurfurst's companies, Red Eye Records Ltd. Mr Nicholl's job was to book tours and 
draw up itineraries for them. Mrs. Nicholl was employed as a secretary for the 
company Overland, also operated by Kurforst. She had worked in this capacity within 
the music business for some 20 years. For more or less the same length of time her 
husband had been involved in the music industry, working as a musician, technician, 
sound engineer and tour and production manager. 428 Matthews J. took this to indicate 
that the two managers were very experienced in the ways of the music industry although 
he acknowledged that neither had had any experience of negotiating record or 
publishing company contracts, or of the management of artists. 429 
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In due course, Shaun Ryder entered into a recording and a publishing agreement with 
Radioactive, for which purpose he travelled to New York. He claimed that Mrs Nicholl 
was not present at the negotiations in New York. However, her passport provided 
evidence that she and her son were in New York at the relevant time. No evidence is 
given or reported in this case which conclusively proves Mrs. Nicholls attendance at 
that meeting, 430 (save that "they were given red carpet treatment"3' on their arrival) 
In the same month as the recording and the publishing deal were initiated, a UK based 
independent solicitor, Mr Law, was appointed. The extent of his independence from 
the living-out of the contract will be examined in due course. 
Remaining with the issue of intentions and expectations, it is clear, since it is the cause 
of this litigation, that the Nicholls expected to receive commissions at 20% on all gross 
income generated by the work of the artist, including live work, touring, merchandising 
as well as record sales and publishing royalties. Mr Nicholl gave evidence that this 
agreement was reached during a meeting at a pub' near Manchester where he said that 
the Defendant was told 
... and subsequently accepted that the 
Plaintiffs would be rewarded for acting as 
his manager by taking 20 per cent commission upon all his ear»ings; in other 
words, commission on touring earnings (the precise matter of the contention 
between the parties) would also be paid on the gross income and not on a net 
basis. 432 
However, there is not good evidence of a meeting of the minds over this matter, as 
Shaun Ryder gave evidence that he did not know whether the plaintiff told him that at 
the meeting because he could not remember. To support her husband's proposition 
Mrs Nicholl told the court that 
... she knew that sometimes managers received 20 per cent commission on ººet 
income from live dates. In those circumstances, however, she said that she 
believed the artist paid the manager's expenses. Mrs Nicholl said that she 
thought it would be impossible to get expenses paid by the Defendant and it was 
therefore better for the Plaintiffs to pay their own expenses and charge 
commission on the gross touring iººcome. 433 
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Expert witnesses gave evidence that it is most unusual, nowadays, for commission on 
touring income to be calculated from the gross. This is because of the expense involved 
in operating the tour itself. 434 Under cross-examination Shaun Ryder said that he would 
not have understood the significance of the alleged conversation with Mr Nicholl. To 
him, he said, it was all just "gobbledegook". 435 
All in all, the evidence discussed above is taken as enough to support the suggestion 
that, not only was there a failure to reach consensus ad idem, there would have been 
great difficulty in doing so without proper memoranda of every conversation held with 
the artist. His consistent use of cannabis, combined with his dependence on methadone 
was enough to render his memory and his attention span very short indeed. This 
condition is not altogether uncommon among artists in the music industry and due 
precautions should be encouraged. Already it can be seen that there are commercial 
advantages in dealing with a large, well organised corporation such as CBS/Sony, over 
dealing with the less experienced in business. John Kennedy, Legal expert for Sony 
stated during the George Michael case that he has evolved a list of over 70 check 
points436 to aid negotiation with artists. Lessons are there to be learned. Teaching those 
lessons, however, is not in the remit of contract law per se. 
If a genuine agreement cannot be evidenced at the formation of this long-term 
contractual relationship, it falls next to look to the living-out of that relationship over 
the few years which followed. 
The artist accused the managers of breach of fiduciary duty and of obtaining payment of 
more than £16,000 by deceitful conduct. The money was the subject of much confusion 
over rates of commission due after a tour in 1996, merchandising commissions and the 
exact source for authority to the accountants to pay the money. 437 The fact that the 
plaintiffs were, at one stage, some 24 hours from bankruptcy was influential in the 
accountant's decision to pay over the money. There is some dispute as to whether some 
of the money is representative of an agreement made by Mr Law, the artist's advisor, to 
pay touring commission at 20% gross on this final occasion before bringing into force 
the alternative agreement to pay at 20% net from tours in the future. 438 lt is not clear 
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whether, in reality, the plaintiffs falsely caused the accountants to believe that there was 
authority for the payments, whether there was genuine authority or some other situation. 
There was a point in time when the plaintiffs advisor/solicitor informed the defendants 
advisor/solicitor that the plaintiffs were in such a poor financial position that they could 
not continue to cover their expenses and would have to withdraw their services if the 
defendant did not release monies which they felt they were owed. During the same 
hour, the artist's solicitor/advisor had notified the other party that his client wished to 
terminate the agreement with immediate effect. He mentioned that he had advised his 
client that the terms of the contact were an unreasonable restraint and therefore 
unenforceable. 439 Presumably he hoped that the managers would leave the relationship 
quietly in respect of his belief that it was unenforceable at law. No mention was made 
before preparation for proceedings about undue influence or breach of trust, breach of 
fiduciary duty or general incompetence per se. 
On a general reading of the evidence as to the carryings on during this relationship, the 
most disturbing factor may be this: The first plaintiff took a written version of the 
management agreement to a recording studio where the artist was working, some 
months after the relationship had commenced. He took his own version of the paper 
contract and not the version as amended by the artist's solicitor. (although he claimed to 
have had that version in his brief case). He persuaded the artist to sign the paper 
contract while the artist was under the effect of cannabis and had been working at his 
music all day. The artist's girlfriend witnessed the signatures and signed as witness for 
the signature of the second plaintiff who was not even present. It was known to the 
plaintiff that the artist did not understand the finer implications of any of what could 
have been written therein and that he objected to business discussions of any nature. 
The first plaintiff had not even read the paper contract himself, even though it was 
prepared by his own advisors. This last fact is known because it was this version of the 
contract which carried a written clause stating that touring commissions should be paid 
at 20% net, industry standard, not 20% gross which is what the plaintiff contends to be 
his intention. 440 Under present law it is assumed here that Walford v Miles44' would 
work against any suggestion that the plaintiff should have been under a duty to contract 
in good faith at this juncture in his relationship with the artist. The opinion here is that, 
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subsequent acquiescence or not, this poor method of obtaining a commitment, in bad 
faith, is an act which goes against public policy. Surely this behaviour creates an 
unconscionably constructed contract under circumstances which no sector of the public 
could desire to be upheld as fit and proper? It was accepted in court that this was a 
relationship of confidence in accordance with authorities including O'Sullivan v 
Management Agency and Music Ltd . 
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At page 35 above the general scope for the hypothetical doctrine of unconscionably 
constructed contracts is laid out. It is thought here that this relationship falls within the 
terms 2: 3: 4 ii), iii), iv), v)a and v)b, vi) and vii). Were the suggested Conduct and 
Terms of an Agreement in place, then regular formal meetings would have occurred and 
many of the issues in hand could have been dealt with by the parties. Failing that 
resolve, then an openly accountable winding down procedure might have been more 
acceptable. 443 
It has been said earlier that this case brings to focus the defence of waiver or 
acquiescence, indeed it does. It also throws open questions as to the proper conduct of 
that defence. In principle the defence does not contradict the workings of the 
hypothetical doctrine. It seeks to prevent parties from being legally entitled to undo that 
which has been commercially relied upon or acted upon in good faith. This protection 
seems to be good public and economic policy. However, if the Holly Johnson, George 
Michael version of the defence were to be applied then it could not be said that Shaun 
Ryder had acquiesced because he had no idea of his legal rights before he was advised 
in 1996 that he could contend the validity of the contract. Under those circumstances 
the defence (a counter claim of the plaintiffs in this case) would not work. Matthews J. 
followed a quite different course of reasoning. Firstly he drew from a case involving 
Elton John444 where Nicholl J. made it clear that there is no "hard and fast rule that 
ignorance of legal rights is a bar". What is more Matthews J. continues to attribute the 
advisor/solicitor with the guise of authorised agent working on behalf of the artist, his 
principle. Many music industry solicitors, and others who work with artists in an 
independent capacity could find this quite alarming. Nonetheless, this attribution was 
firmly upheld in the Court of Appeal. Thorpe LJ. Makes it clear that he takes the Holly 
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Johnson case as authority that the defence is operable in the circumstances, but he 
accepts the decision that 
Mr Law's knowledge of the lack of enforceability of the management agreement 
is properly to be imputed to his principal, the defendant. 
Some future clarity is required here as to when an artist's advisor might become, under 
the law, his agent. George Michael's advisor, Tony Russell, for example is renowned 
for his negotiating skills and the court recognised his propensity for loyalty toward his 
artists. 445 It is something of a benchmark if the later case has the effect of changing the 
legal relationship of people like Russell. 
It is not desired to move to discuss the law of agency here. The impact of the Shaun 
Ryder case has yet to filter through the music industry and no prediction as to the 
outcome is offered. It remains only to confirm that if asked of Shaun Ryder 
(i) had he contracted in good faith? 
(ii) did his understanding of a standard form contract 
give rise to reasonable expectations? 
(iii) did he come to the contract blinkered"? 
(Needs, wants, cravings and ambitions are drivers that tend 
to have a `blinkering' effect) 
(iv) was he competent to negotiate with clarity 
in all the circumstances? 
The answers to i) and ii) are no, he was not in a fit and proper state to comply with 
measures of good faith and he did not pay any mind to the terms of the agreement, or 
his own expectations with regard to that agreement, either before or after the 
implementation of the paper version. The answer to iii) is yes he was blinkered. His 
very nature would imply that he is always blinkered in matters of detail. He was merely 
responding to his own motivation and drive to work in the music industry and to 
become successful again. The answer to iv) is no, it was made clear throughout the case 
that Shaun Ryder neither negotiated on his own behalf or paid any attention to 
negotiations which were carried on on his behalf. In short he was not equal to 
protecting himself. 
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Of the Nicholls the answer to i) and ii) are also no. Neither made any effort to keep 
their cards open with respect to the artists difficulties in dealing with business matters. 
Nor did either of them understand the contract sufficiently well to realise that the paper 
version did not reflect their intentions. The answer to iii) is that they were as blinkered 
by their drive to operate in the music industry as was the artist himself. They were 
motivated to take on what they thought would be a client of some kudos, and to elevate 
their position within the industry. With regard to iv) it must be assumed that the 
Nicholls were competent to negotiate. Their inexperience in this area does not 
necessarily amount to incompetence. Perhaps the blinkering effect defined within 
question iii) reduced their application of skill. 
The nature of this proposed test of unconscionability is not intended to apportion 
blame. It is merely hoped to find a path to reduce litigious contention and costly dispute 
within an industry where long-term contractual relationships are prerequisite and 
integral to success. 
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Relevant (influential) Law from Overseas Jurisdictions 
After some consideration, it was decided that there would be no specific comparison 
between English and other approaches at law within the main body of this work. To have 
done so could have brought unnecessary complexity to this area of study. It is believed that 
such a comparison should be the subject of further, future application. For example, 
developments arising from the future effects of the new Contract (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999, would necessitate a full analysis of comparative law as studied by the Law 
Commission in preparation for Report 242. However, the following, brief descriptions are 
given because it felt that the modicum of understanding and the impression of alternative 
approaches gained while reviewing these possibilities prior to embarking on the main 
discourse here, will have influenced and to some degree affected what has been written. It 
is believed that conclusions and presumptions are inevitable when hypothesising, thus it 
was felt prudent here to include an outline of potential influences. 
Australia may have the most extensive application of the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability. A leading case Commercial Batik of Australia v Amadio (1983) states 
the proposition that the doctrine will be invoked: 
Whenever one party by reason of some condition or circumstance is placed at a 
special disadvantage vis-it-vis another and unfair or tmconscientious advantage is 
then taken of the opportunity thereby created "' 
Proof that this doctrine (rather than those actually turned to in the UK) would be brought 
into play in Australia, is found in Amadio447 where Mason J. went on to explain: 
... entry into a standard form of contract dictated by a party whose bargaining 
power is greatly superior, a relationship which was discussed by Lord Reid and 
Lord Diplock in A Schroeder Music Publishing Co v Macaulay [1974]. . 
See also 
Clifford Davis Management Ltd v W.. EA. Records [19751.. In situations of this 
kind it is necessary for the plaintff who seeks relief to establish unconscionable 
conduct, namely that u nconscientious advantage has beef) taken of his disabling 
a4$ condition or circumstance. 
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In short, the Australian proposition appears very much like an extension of the doctrine of 
undue influence. In fact in cases of commercial transaction it enables the court to make 
decisions which are beyond the intention, and therefore the philosophical structure of undue 
influence. It is not a prerequisite that the weaker party suffers loss or detriment through the 
bargain449 and inadequate consideration is considered in the context of evidence of proof 
on the part of the plaintiff, i. e.: it is not a sine qua non for relief. Also, Hardingham points 
out, the Australian court does not recognise the subsidiary principle of equality of 
bargaining power per se, it concentrates on the unconscionability of the contract itself and 
allows the position of the parties to substantiate, or disprove, the plaintiff's claim. 
This seems to leave the judiciary with a great level of discretion and it could be suggested 
that a doctrine of this kind, operated in this manner, will not bring clarity and certainty in a 
way that the `general contracting publics' can relate to. 
Canada operates a similar doctrine of unconscionability to that of the Australian courts - 
although it does not have such a broad and general application. Crawford45° claims that: 
... the scope of the jurisdiction is extremely difficult to define. 
The leading case here is Waters v Dofine11°51 y where the doctrine was set out. The criteria 
are essentially that the plaintiff was overmatched, oti'erreaclied, without advice and made a 
most improvident exchange - his general condition being ignorance and want of skill. The 
judiciary relied in part on an Irish case: Slator v Nolan452 and the reasoning of Sullivan 
M. R. which incorporated distress or recklessness, or wildness or want of care, which he 
described as being circumstances which might lead to an unconscionable bargain. 
Enman's suggestion is that the Canadian doctrine, which was developed before the "poor 
and ignorance" test in English jurisdiction, 453 is not as narrow as the English counterparts. 
In addition the Canadian judiciary are not as reserved in applying such a principle. He 
suspects that UK law would show reluctance in applying its' "narrow principle" (by which 
he, presumably, actually means equality of bargaining power). 
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To substantiate this, Enman cites Harry v Kreutziger454 a case concerning a mild and 
inarticulate American Indian who: 
... sold 
his 6-ton fishing boat along with its license, largely on the assurance by 
the buyer that as an Indian he would have little difficulty in obtaining another 
fishing license. That statement was untrue but in addition the Indian had a hearing 
defect, ... was not widely experienced 
in commercial matters and with little 
education. 
McIntyre JA in this case said: 
In my opinion, questions as to whether the use of power was unconscionable, all 
advantage was unfair ... a consideration was grossly inadequate or 
bargaining 
power was grievously impaired... are really aspects of one single question. That 
single question is whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent 
from community standards of commercial morality ... the framing of the question 
in that way prevents the real issue from being obscured by isolated consideration of 
a number of separate questions 
Despite McIntyre's apparent clarity, it is submitted that what the English judiciary are 
shying away from, is what they perceive as a level of uncertainty concerning the 
boundaries of rules. 
America comes close to being able to operate a principle similar to that in Germany, 
through the Uniform Commercial Code s 2-302: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract... 455 
Beate suggests that, although Article 2 of the UCC applies only to transaction of goods, the 
courts have applied an analogous doctrine to other contracts. Restatement 2d s 208 adopts 
a similar provision for general application to any contract. Thus it can be said that the US 
courts have approached the application of the code, in dealing with unconscionable 
Appendix 1 197 
transactions, in much the same way as the Germans have with ss 242 BGB - research 
conversations reveal that application of the rule of unconscionability is liberal in the US. 
General opinion is that where an individual is in dispute with a commercial organisation the 
courts will favour the individual (recognisably pursuing equality of bargaining power). 4' 
European courts, on the other hand, have a quite different approach, in that the rules of law 
are set out in codified form. The most prominently effective of these being the German 
version where the structure is as follows: `s' 
The principle attached to formation of contract (Willenserkleirung) is the declaration of the 
will of the parties (i. e.: what was intended). German courts recognise two aspects - the 
objective in what was actually expressed, and the subjective in what was intended. They 
recognise that there may be a defect of intention (Willensmangel), under certain 
circumstances which may justify rescission of the contract. For example, ss 133 BGB 
provides that `in interpreting a declaration of will one must seek out what was really 
intended and not adhere to the literal meaning of the words used. .. 
"'"- this is closely 
analogous with UK rules of interpretation. Similarly ss 123 provides that `the declarer (of 
his will)'s freedom of choice may be affected by deceit or unlawful duress. Again this is 
analogous with UK rules of mistake, duress etc. 
The most important sections, which do not seem to be echoed in UK law are: ss 138 par 2 
BGB which provides that `To exact a promise of an unfair economic advantage by 
exploiting the inexperience or need of another is ineffective, ' (as discussed above the UK 
has nothing so precise), and ss 138 par 1 BGB which provides that `A legal transaction is 
void if it is contrary to good morals'. The scope of this as a doctrine may be beyond 
definition in UK terms as questions of morality are habitually avoided by the judiciary. 
Examples include: RGZ 86,296 which discusses exploitation through disproportionate 
counter presentations, and BGHZ 22,347,355 which illustrates contracts which expressly 
restrict personal and economic freedom of movement, or BGHZ 55,34,35 (1970) contracts 
which benefit the creditor to the undue detriment of others. 
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What is important, is that this German legal philosophy and code will be operated in 
conjunction with ss 242 BGB `The debtor is obliged to perform in such a manner as good 
faith requires, regard being paid to general practice' - the Principle of Good Faith. 
According to Horn et al, in setting out ss 242, it was the purpose of the legislator to: 
... make people conscious of the true content of the contractual obligation, ... a 
principle of legal ethics , which dominates the entire legal system, 
454 
It must be supposed here, that the clarity and succinctness of codification is required before 
such principles can operate successfully. Such a principle is certainly lacking in English 
law. 
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Economics Theories and Approaches 
The work which has been done here has not strictly followed the discipline of `law and 
economics' per se. It is more true to say that writings and commentaries derived from 
that discipline, and discovered during reading and research, have influenced beliefs and 
conclusions. 
Reference is made to those more direct influences within the main body of the text, so it 
is the purpose of these notes is to embellish those references, and to inform the reader 
of the kind of materials and analysis leading to their inclusion. 
The concept of economics based approaches to academic analysis to various fields of 
law has had peaks and troughs of popularity during the last four decades. However, 
Herbert Hovenkamp460 traces the origin of the practice back 
... at 
least as far as Daniel A Raymond's "The Element of Constitutional Law 
and of political Econtonly ". first published in 1840 
As far as influences from American sources are concerned, there would be no need to 
look further than the Chicago University publications initiated by Ronald H. Coase's 
The Problem of Social Cost of 1960. 
Once intellectual attention has been drawn to law and economics of the Chicago school, 
then a regime of neo-classical and anti-neoclassical theories become apparent. That is 
to say, those economists who base their conclusions on a precursory assumption of zero 
transaction cost, compared with those whose precursor is that there will be costs which 
should be the fundamental core of the study. " From that respect it can be supposed 
that this thesis has adopted an anti-neoclassical approach in that it has been the long- 
term costs (personal, social, industry-wide as well as financial) of the conduct and 
occasional breakdown in long-term music industry contractual relationships which have 
been of concern. It must be said that if this has not been a deliberate attempt to follow 
any specific economic school. 
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The traditional difficulty attributed by some to utilising economics methodologies is 
that the assumptions of economists tend to allow only for perfect markets with perfect 
market information. Fragments and fractions may be ignored or falsely represented so 
that the economist's conclusion can never be realistic. Coase462 has led Hovenkamp to 
allow that: 
Transaction costs must be defined broadly to cover externalities, or third party 
effects and any impediments to bargaining that might result from the status of 
the participants as bilateral monopolists. [-] Failures resulting from imperfect 
information are also generally regarded as transaction costs. ' 
There can be no doubt of the relationship between the quotation given above and the 
material of this thesis. However, this is not considered the place to examine whether it 
is the framework of legal approaches (such as the rules and rights historically attributed 
to third parties who fall within the sphere of any contract, or inequality of bargaining 
power, or the rules about mis-representation which have grown through English 
common law practice) which has influenced the economists' development of thought, or 
vice-versa. It is doubted here that academic economic theorum have had such a 
persuasive effect on the structure of law. It is thought here that the economics based 
approaches have provided convenient classification and points of reference from which 
to view and compare business activities such as formation of contract. Long-term 
contract based relationships in the music industry span economics theories and legal 
rule-making as if the industry were a test-tube experiment. 
The introduction of economics based approaches to this research was Trebilcock's 
analysis of whether an aspiring artist is faced with a monopoly, (i. e. the few major 
record companies) when he seeks to gain a recording contract. 4" Trebilcock drew the 
conclusion, which is agreed with here, that there are sufficient subsidiary and 
independent companies within the industry, along with varied self-promotion options, to 
negate the monopoly or oligopoly argument against this industry. It is also thought here 
that the standardised industry contract, while generally produced by the corporate party, 
is sufficiently open to negotiation, influence and variation, so that it cannot be described 
as a take-it-or-leave-it policy of contracting, except inasmuch as the creative parties 
show a tendency to avoid taking time to influence its content. This is seen as a 
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behavioural trait specific to both the creative and the corporate parties which will be 
influenced by psychology and governance rather than economics considerations. Thus 
the effects of music industry contracting practices may have economics repercussions, 
but the cause and fix are beyond the ambit of economics considerations. The economist 
must assume a starting point, and it invariably appears to be focussed at the moment of 
agreeing royalty percentages and exchanging signatures. A point of transaction. This 
ignores the initiation of motivation, drive and desire to become bound into the music 
industry via contract. See, for example, the opinions and relationship between Shaun 
Ryder and his managers. 465 Costs and damages were potential before any such point of 
transaction was reached. 
Having recognised economics methodology as a suitable source for analytical treatment 
here, it was decided to explore Eichner's Anthropogenic model. Eichner Says: 466 
The Anthropogenic model does not deny the importance of exchange, especially 
with respect to supplying the material needs of the population under the 
economic systems that have evolved in all but centrally planned socialist 
countries. However, it sees exchange as only one of four processes that may 
characterise any particular social activity. Exchange is, to be sure, the process 
quintessential to the economic dimension of society, but the economic dimension 
itself is but one of four such dimensions each with its own characteristic process 
or dynamic. The other three dimensions beside the economic that need to be 
taken into account in any comprehensive analysis are 1) the normative; 2) the 
political; and 3) the human developmental, or anthropogenic. The normative 
dimension encompasses all the values or beliefs upon which individual activity 
is predicated ... The political system, meanwhile encompasses all the 
mechanisms that exist for making conscious social choices amongst altennative 
courses of action. ... what is novel about the conceptual framework upon which 
the human resources approach is based is the delineation of the human 
developmental or anthropogenic dimension of society. This specification derives 
from the conviction that human competencies, defined as the ability to utilise 
various skills in a social setting, are no less important than norms, societal 
decision (including laws), and material goods in the functioning of soCleties. [J 
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The anthropogenic process involves successive, or complementary, affiliation 
with developmental institutions, beginning with the family, continuing through 
the various levels of schooling, and then consolidating around the experience 
gained through employment. 
He continues to explain that it is the economic and political systems which structure the 
normatives and dictate the career path of the anthropogenic dimension, but that the 
anthropogenic development in turn is dynamic, so that it evolves the development of 
politics, economics and norms according to upbringing, schooling, career experience 
and so-on. 
The detail given in Appendix 9 shows a clear group of music industry executives who, 
while each is distinctive in himself, fall into a certain anthropogenic trail from Brooklyn 
to music row via law school. Artists, however, are diverse and an anthropogenic 
overview will not group them except broadly and with too many generalisations. This 
supports what is believed here, that music industry executives are a labour force, or 
group, of human resource in Eichner's terms. It is interesting to note that Eichner uses 
anthropogenics to expand the traditional view of employment. He regards it not as an 
instant contract with both parties perfectly informed, but rather as a prolonged process 
which begins with an extended period of recruitment activities on the part of the 
employer (which part could be supplemented by the corporate party in the music 
industry) and a search on the part of the employee (which part could be supplemented 
by the creative party). This moves on the meeting and the selection process, each of the 
other, a period of orientation and indoctrination, assignment to a specific task and 
finally education or learning and training leading to evaluation and perhaps promotion. 
This model approach to viewing relationships is of much value and influence to the 
work done here, as it is felt that this is sufficiently similar to the process undergone 
during a long-term contractual relationship of the kind demonstrated by the music 
industry. The period of learning for a creative party may tend to be self-teaching and 
development. Evaluation and promotion or improvement of the terms for an artist may 
be a frequent event as demonstrated by the re-negotiations by George Michael during 
his relationship with CBS/Sony following periods of success. 
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The remainder of Eichner's discussion is given to American labour groups and human 
resources, but his methodological approach has proved constructive within what has 
been built up here. 
What remains to be said here, is that of the connection between economics studies and 
contract law it has been John Wigley and Carol Lipman's The Enterprise Econamy467 
which encouraged the decision to recognise both parties to music industry contracts as 
entrepreneurs. There is further discussion on this point at Appendix 5. 
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Scientific and Socio-psychology; Support Used to Develop the Views and 
Arguments Given: 
Throughout this discourse artists, lyricists and composers have been commonly 
described as "creative parties". Inherent in this description are a number of assumptions 
based on an acquired understanding of creativity and those who are creative. It is felt 
that it is of value here to examine the sources of those assumptions. In addition to 
discussing source, material justification for what has been assumed will be given. 
It must also be noted that the given assumptions will, inevitably, have affected 
interpretation and analysis of the nature and characteristics of those who constitute the 
music industry. (See chapter 13 et. Seq. ) 
1: Rothenberg, Albert; M. D. Creativity and Madness - New findings and old 
stereotypes46s 
Prior to writing the book which has been selected for self-education here, Rothenberg 
compiled and published a two volume bibliography listing 9,968 titles of books and 
articles which are scientific writings about creativity469 (in the context in which it is 
used here). He had spent some 25 years studying the creative process and the selected 
book, Creativity and Madness, is explicit of his findings. At that time he had conducted 
more than 2000 hours of interviews470 with relevant and co-operative subjects. 
In his summary of general findings he gives a report which corroborates the conclusions 
of the Myers-Briggs type indicator castings which have been carried out here, 
particularly on the matters of idealism, attitudes to authoritarianism, attitudes to 
judgement and taste and the response of creative parties to areas of inconsistency. His 
report reads: 
From all of these researches, I can report a very clear conclusion that some 
factors underlie all types of creativity; there are common psychological factors 
operating in varying types of creative processes in art, science and other 
production fields. (Rothenberg includes music and poetry in his fields of study) 
These common factors consist particularly of special types of thinking patterns 
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used by creative persons during the process of creation itself [-] I shall first 
report some generalisations about creative people derived from my data. First, 
contrary to popular as well as professional belief, there is no specific 
personality type associated with outstanding creativity. Creative people are not 
necessarily childish and erratic in human relationships, as is often thought, nor 
are they necessarily extraordinarily egoistic or rebellious or eccentric. Second, 
I must emphasise that, surprising as it may seem, creative people are actually 
not all exceptionally intelligent, speaking of intelligence in the commonly 
accepted meaning of performance on verbal I. Q. tests. Mary outstanding 
artists, writers, architects and other types of creators are only slightly above 
average intelligence. There is, moreover, no uniform personality style, if we 
speak of it in a technical psychological sense. (Hence the natural variations in 
the responses to the MBTI casting done here. The subjects have been type cast 
according to majority response. ) Creators are neither generally compulsive nor 
impulsive, although many - even highly outstanding ones, interestingly - are 
somewhat rigid, meticulous, and perfectionist rather than free and spontaneous. 
(Although 67% of those who responded to the MBTI casting here, claimed to be 
more spontaneous than deliberate, there was a 50% split about whether the 
structured and scheduled is more appealing than the unstructured and 
unscheduled. Also 53.33% said that they prized a strong sense of reality more 
than a vivid imagination. ) Some degree of introversion - inwardness and set( 
preoccupation does predominate among creative people in many fields, but 
some are surprisingly extrovert. (31.25% of the MBTI (Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicators) casting here, showed a predominance of introversion preferences. ) 
There is generally a good deal of idealism and striving for an ideal in their 
work, but there is neither a characteristic ideological position nor political 
affiliation. (This is felt here to be reflected in the tendency in music industry 
creative parties to vehemently desire a change in direction as their confidence 
grows, they adopt a particular style in their work which often leads to disputes 
with those who are trying to advise on management and control of their career. 
The most explicit example of this is George Michael and his swing toward adult 
rock and jazz. ) Authoritarianism lends to be despised, but there is inconsistency 
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because some creative parties are rather authoritarian about matters of 
judgement and taste. (See last comment) Few of its - creative or not - tend 
really to like authoritarianism and are sometimes inconsistent, so there is no 
particular difference in this group. Only one characteristic of personality and 
orientation to life and work is absolutely, across the board, present in all 
creative people: motivation. 471 
It is felt critical to note at this juncture that these last few comments of Rothenberg's 
reflect the suggestions of the Myers-Briggs ENFP type, as per the majority of the group 
studied for this research. In addition MBTI demonstrates preferences and comfort 
zones rather than absolutes, so it can be said that all people can go through an ENFP, or 
any other, type phase, in accordance with their instant conditions and circumstances. 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to draw out preferences and to show that a group 
or group majority share these preferences and are, therefore, of a type. Through out the 
cases discussed for this research it has been the motivation of the artists which has 
driven them, with blind faith and determination, to a position where they could enter 
into the long-term contractual relationships. This motivation is largely what has driven 
them to litigate in order to be able to support their ideals elsewhere and further their 
desired career path. 
Rothenberg makes it clear that he believes that creativity, as a behavioural setting, is 
learned and influenced by upbringing and environment rather than being a genetic trait. 
The core of his project is the analysis of the link, or relationship, between creativity and 
psychosis. Many, though by no means all, creative people suffer psychosis of one form 
or another. On the matter of whether certain behavioural traits are genetic or learned is 
of little relevance to this study of the music industry on the proviso that it is accepted 
that when proposing an improved relationship of understanding between creative party, 
corporate party and judicial party all or any will have to be capable of broadening, 
reducing or otherwise adjusting some behavioural responses in order that the improved 
relationship may be carried on. Even if the original traits are in the blood', so to speak, 
it is assumed that the power of human reasoning and decision making are enough to 
effect suitable, learned alterations towards contractual relationship management. If all 
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the traits under question are learned and/or affected from the personal environment, then 
the quicker better governance's are in place the better. 
In analysing the creative thought process, which personal experience here supports will 
be as applicable to a performing musician who has not composed the work he is 
reproducing, Rothenberg touches on the matter which non-creative people describe as 
the `magic' or the distinction between the artistic and themselves. That is the unusual 
types of conceptualisation to which the artist is subject. He says: 
... I think it is precise to say that the processes transcend the usual modes of 
ordinary logical thought. Therefore, I refer to them as translogical types of 
thinking. 472 
He continues to give numerous instances from his research, showing what he calls the 
Janussian process, by which the artist will receive as one several concepts which are at 
juxtaposition or are diametrically opposed, or the single conceptualisation of 
simultaneous antithesis. While the Janussian cognitive process is very much an idea 
generating form, Rothenberg then offers up evidence for what he calls homospatial 
thought process: 
... conceiving two or more 
discrete entities occupying the same space, a 
conception leading to the articulation of new identities. (Similar to 
metaphorisation) 
on the matter of "inspiration" Rothenberg is quite clear and his views are concurred 
with here. A flash of inspiration is a rare event, his studies show that meaning and 
purpose unfold during the creative process rather than initiating it. Although mood and 
cognitive reasoning do initiate the work these do not equate with "Aha! - Eureka! " type 
inspiration. The event is more likely to be one of coming to understand or re-interpret 
what is being created, the actual creation process being rather more deliberate and 
controlled, 
His studies also reveal that creative parties themselves are responsible for publicly 
perpetuating the myth of their being special in that they are gifted to receive 
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`inspiration' and act on it regularly enough for it to be the underpinning of their career. 
After all, an artist must be more valued and valuable if he has the gift of inspirations 
which the rest of us lack. Rothenberg also questions the possibility of mind altering 
drugs or alcohol being able to make an artist more receptive to inspiration. He thinks 
not. In terms of the research here, it is observed that drugs or alcohol make the parties 
more receptive to peaks and troughs of emotion and a heightened awareness of such is 
often the basis of a well written song or of a strong, interpretative performance. The 
same can, however, distort the creative party's perception and lead to the creation and 
production of nonsense or poor quality material which will damage the career. 
The question of altered mind state leads to Rothenberg's next point which is the belief 
in the unconscious creative `wellspring'. In short, Rothenberg confirms what was 
already believed here, that the unconscious (sub-conscious) cognitive workings 
compliment the conscious workings, neither can function at almost any task, without the 
operation of the other. 
In discussing homosexuality or bisexuality and creativity, Rothenberg interestingly 
remarks: 
... homosexual persons often 
find themselves discriminated against or excluded 
and on the outside fringe of their society, a condition social scientists call being 
"marginal". This marginality (also a factor for Jews, ex pairiates, disabled 
people and, perhaps, younger siblings) seems to have something to do with a 
persons learning to tolerate ambiguity, project varying points of view and strike 
out in new directions -factors that seen to play all important role in creative 
orientation and ability.... there are to date no known statistical bases for 
assuming that homosexuals are more successfully creative than heterosexuals. 
Specifically, on the performing arts, he adds: 
..., as male homosexuals are still subject to social disapproval, they often fluid 
acceptance in and are more attracted to publicly visible artistic fields ... Also, 
psychological tendencies to exhibitionism which frequently found in homosexual 
males seem to play a role. 473 
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Toward his conclusion Rothenberg asserts that: 
Deviant behaviour, whether in the form of eccentricity or worse, is not only 
associated with persons of [-] high level creativity, but is frequently expected of 
them. Creative persons themselves have said or done little to disavow this 
conception and expectation, and several outstanding ones have even formulated 
precepts about it. f74 
2: Other sources of influence: 
In addition to Rothenberg there are, of course, other sources which give insight to 
methodology for studying human behavioural patterns. Among them; Laurie J. 
Mullins47S who provides a descriptive narrative of study techniques. Of particular 
interest here is the method of nomothetics. 476 This is a generalisation which can be seen 
to cover the technique primarily used in research here, as nomothetic approaches are 
based on the practice of the collection of group data. Theorists are recognised as having 
captured group data which displays evidence of particular personality traits in order to 
draw comparisons between individuals. The purpose of the approach is to be able to 
predict behaviour. Environmental and social influences are viewed as minimal 
influences, while personality traits are viewed as constant. Mullins says: 
Researchers closely align themselves to studies which are 'scientific' in a 
positivistic sense. (The term positivism refers to a branch of science which is 
exclusively based on the objective collection of observable behaviour - data 
which are beyond question) Such approach transfers methods used in natural 
sciences to the social world, 
What has come to be believed here is that personality traits are, as suggested, consistent. 
However, the chosen preference for anthropogenics to give an overview of the results of 
what has been observed denies the nomothetics suggestion that environment and social 
influences are of minimal importance. The fact that high level industry executives fall 
in to such a clear group can be directly linked to their upbringing, heritage and 
education. In his book, Rock Gold, Tremlet017 explains: 
The publishing and agency side of the business had its roots in music hall. Most 
of the key figures were Jews, mainly of immigrant or East Dui working class 
origins, who began their careers treading the boards. 478 
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Lew Grade for an example had started off as a music hall dancer. The family name was 
Wynogradsky, they were refugees from Poland. Tremlett continues: 
Coming from the music hall background, with so many agents having been 
either dancers, musicians or performers, there was another Ill-built discipline: a 
respect for timing, routine and the needs of other artists. 
Interestingly, Beatles manager Brian Epstein trained at RADA, so he too knew the 
disciplines of theatre work. 
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Study of Personality Traits: 
The comments here are intended to demonstrate the philosophical concepts of the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® applicable to this research. 
Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers converted Jung's theory that personality is 
the relatively stable set of traits that produce stability in behavioural patterns. They 
created a test and scale which enables groups of people to be classified for comparative 
research purposes. 
Dr David W Keirsey extended this work and developed a set of test questions. A copy 
of the questionnaire based on that development and used to test a sample of music 
industry aspirants for this research is also included. 
The term Extraversion is used to refer to those groups of people who tend to spend the 
majority of their time interacting with others and drawing energy from that interaction. 
Conversely, Introversion will indicate those who prefer to stand-alone and will spend 
much time in deep thought. It is important to be aware that introversion is not 
synonymous with shyness or dislike of company. All people spend some time in one or 
other of these states of mind and all people have a preferred state. 
Sensing and Intuition. Jung suggested that there are two ways or dealing with 
information which surrounds and impacts on people all day every day. Sensing refers to 
the absorption of data through the five senses, while intuition refers to the abstraction 
and analysis of possibilities from sources and factor of information and data. Again all 
people will utilise both sensing and intuition at different times and each has a natural, 
preferred state. 
Thinking and Feeling. Jung felt that people make decisions on the basis of one of two 
criteria: rational, logical, impartially and with reasoning will be categorised as thinking, 
while decisions based on personal values or private beliefs are generally classed as 
feeling. As with each of these categories people spend some time in one or other of 
these states of mind and all people have a preferred state. 
Finally, Judging and Perceiving. Those whose preference is judging will have a 
tendency to be neat, extremely organised, orderly, perhaps fond of lists and schedules. 
Those whose preference is perceiving have a tendency to be flexible and spontaneous, 
make decisions as they go along and respond to instant situations. 
MBTI® and Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® are registered trademarks and Myers- 
BriggsTM is a trademark of the Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc., the publishers of 
the MBTI instrument. 
There are many texts, catalogues and sources, including those on the internet, which 
give good discussion and information on this subject. 
The Questionnaire: 
Candidates - please tick your selected response, A or B next to the question ... . 
e. g. 1. At a party do you - (you mark A or B here: -) 
 A) interact with ...... B) interact with a ....... 
This indicates that you are rejecting option Band are saying `yes' to, or accepting option A 
Please do not take up a lot of time answering these questions - respond instinctively. 
Thanks. 
1. At a party do you - 
A) interact with many people including strangers 
A) interact with a few who are already known to you 
2. Are you more - 
A) realistic than speculative 
V ., B) speculative than realistic 
3. Is it worse - 
A) to have your "head In the clouds" 
" B) to be "in a rut" 
4. Are you more impressed by - 
A) principles 
A) emotions 
5. Are you more drawn towards - JA) the convincing 
B) the touching 
6. Do you prefer to work - 
A) to deadlines 
/B) just "whenever" 
I 
7. Do you tend to choose - 
A) rather carefully 
/B) somewhat impulsively 
8. At parties do you - 
/A) 
stay late and gather increasing energy 
B) leave early feeling yourself running, out of energy 
9. Are you more attracted to - 
A) sensible people 
, 
/B) imaginative people 
10. Are you more interested in - 
A) what is actual 
/8) what is possible 
11. In judging others are you more swayed by - 
A) laws than circumstances 
vB) circumstances than laws 
12. In approaching others is your inclination to be somewhat - 
A) objective 
'7 B) personal 
13. Areyou- 
f A) punctual 
B) leisurely 
14. Does it bother you more to have things - 
A) incomplete 
B) completed 
15. In your social groups do you - 
A) keep abreast of other's happenings 
/B) get behind on the news 
16. In doing ordinary things are you more likely to - 
A) do it the usual way 
vi) do it your own way 
17. Writers should - 
, /'A) "say what they mean and mean what they say' 
B) express things more by use of analogy 
18. Which appeals to you more - 
A) consistency of thought 
B) harmonious relationships 
19. Are you more comfortable in making - 
A) logical judgements 
B) value judgements 
20, Do you want things - 
A) settled and decided 
/B) open to change and undecided 
21. Would you say you are more - 
A) serious and determined 
, 
JB) easy-going 
22. In phoning do you - 
A) 
rarely question that it will all be said 
B) rehearse what you'll say 
23. Facts - 
,,, 
/A) `speak for themselves" 
B) illustrate principles 
24, Are visionaries - 
A) somewhat annoying 
, /, B) rather fascinating 
25. Are you more often - 
A) a cool-headed person 
B) a warm hearted person 
26. Is it worse to be - 
V/A) unjust 
B) merciless 
27. Should one usually let events occur - 
A) by careful selection and choice 
B) randomly and by chance 
28. Do you feel better about - 
fA) having purchased 
B) having the option to buy 
29, In company do you - 
A) initiate conversation 
B) wait to be approached 
30. Common sense is - 
A) rarely questionable 
t/B) often questionable 
31. Children often do not- 
VA) make themselves useful enough 
B) exercise their fantasies enough 
32, In making decisions do you feel more comfortable with - 
A) standards 
, ý, 
/B) feelings 
33. Are you more - 
, 
/A) firm than gentle 
B) gentle than firm 
34. Which is more admirable - 
A) the ability to organise and be methodical 
r8) the ability to adapt and make do 
35. Do you put more value on - 
A) the definite 
, /' B) the open-ended 
36. Do new and unexpected meetings with strangers - 
v-'A) stimulate and energise you 
8) tax your reserves 
37. Are you more frequently - 
A) a practical sort of person 
, r/-'B) a fanciful sort of person 
38. Are you more likely to - 
A) see how others are useful 
, /"'g) see 
how others see 
39. Which is more satisfying - 
., 
/'A) to discuss an issue thoroughly 
B) to arrive at an agreement on an issue 
40, Which rules you more - 
A) your head 
V/B) your heart 
41. Are you more comfortable with work that is - 
A) contracted 
., /'B) done on a casual basis 
42, Do you tend to look for - 
A) the orderly 
%, 
%B) 
whatever turns up 
43. Do you prefer - 
A) many friends with brief contact 
, 
/B) a few friends with more lengthy contact 
44. Do you go more by - 
A) facts 
f B) principles 
45. Are you more interested In - 
vj production and distribution 
B) design and research 
46, Which is more of a compliment- 
A) "there is a very logical person" 
B) "there is a very sentimental person" 
47. Do you value in yourself more that you are - 
A) unwavering 
A//'B') devoted 
48, Do you more often prefer the - 
A) final and unalterable statement 
, 
%B) tentative and preliminary statement 
49. Are you more comfortable - 
/A) after a decision 
B) before a decision 
50. Do you - 
A) speak easily and at length with strangers 
, 
/B) find little to say to strangers 
51. Are you more likely to trust your - 
A) experience 
JB) hunch 
52, Do you feel - 
/A) more practical than ingenious 
B) more ingenious than practical 
53. Which person is more to be complimented - 
A) some one of clear reasoning 
V-1) some one of strong feeling 
54. Are you more inclined to be - 
t%A) fair minded 
B) sympathetic 
55. Is it preferable mosUy to 
A) make sure things are arranged 
-VAB) just let things happen 
56, In relationships should most things be - 
A) renegotiable 
B) 
random and circumstantial 
57. When the phone rings do you - 
VA) rush to get to it first 
B) hope someone else Will answer 
58. Do you prize more in yourself - 
A) a strong sense of reality 
V", B) a vivid Imagination 
59. Are you drawn more to - 
A) fundamentals 
A 
overtones 
60. Which seems the greater error - 
A) to be too passionate 
V'B) to be too objective 
61. Do you see yourself as basically - 
A) hard headed 
B) soft hearted 
62. Which situation appeals to you more - 
A) the structured and scheduled 
VB) the unstructured and unscheduled 
63. Are you a person that is more - 
A) routinised than whimsical 
-, -. 
/B) 
whimsical than routinised 
64. Are you more inclined to be - 
V""A) easy to approach 
8) somewhat reserved 
65. In writings do you prefer - 
A) the more literal 
the more figurative 
66. Is it harder for you to - 
/A) identify with others 
B) u6fise others 
67, Which do you wish more for yourself - 
A) clarity of reasoning 
, /B) strength of compassion 
68. Which is the greater fault - 
A) being indiscriminate 
B) being critical 
69. Do you prefer the - 
%/A) planned event 
B) unplanned event 
70. Do you tend to be more - 
JA) deliberate than spontaneous 
B) spontaneous than deliberate 
`My thanks for your time aDd 7ttentton! - llatrlsh' 
YOU and YOUR ROLE In The MUSIC INDUSTRY 
1: Please state your age: - __! _ _ 
1a: Is your involvement in the music industry 
Full-time Yes F 
Supplementary Yes Q 
(to a job outside the music Industry) 
Studentlirainee Yes 
lb: 
1c: 
1d 
if full-time, was it your first occupation Yes 
ly 
If No, what was your first occupation - 
Q 
No 
Q 
No 
Q 
No 
Q 
No 
If your music career is supplementary, what is your main occupation 
Please indicate which of the following best describes you 
IF YOU ARE A PERFORMING ARTIST - 
Lead Vocalist Q 
Other Vocalist Q 
Featured Instrumentalist 
(eg: lead guitar, band-leader, section leader, eta) 
Other Instrumentalist Q 
Independent "named" Session Player Q 
OTHER MUSIC INDUSTRY ROLES - 
Writer Q 
Produce Q 
Artist Manager Q 
Publisher Q 
A&R Manager Q 
Artist Agent Q 
Other * 
* (Please state positionfjob fitte) 
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The Term Entrepreneur: 
The concept of entrepreneurism was developed in 18'''/19'" century France: In 1755 
Richard Cantillon's Essai sur la nature du commerce en general was probably the first 
published work to define the essence of the function of one described as an entrepreneur 
as being to bear uncertainty. To Cantillon the entrepreneur was someone who bought 
and sold at uncertain prices. During this era those economists with an interest in 
government saw the entrepreneur as a contractor, the specialist in agricultural economy 
saw him as a farmer'479 and those interested in manufacture48° saw him as a risk-taking 
capitalist. Drawing all these together a classical definition, still accepted, is that given by 
Jean Baptiste Say in Traite d'Economie Politique (1803). Jean Baptiste Say identified all 
entrepreneurs as risk takers with the capability to administer and superintend. By 
bringing together raw material, labour and capital, it is suggested, the entrepreneur acts 
with instinct and foresight. This is the description which. in economic terms, best fits 
music industry personnel (both Businessmen and artists). They undertake to incur initial 
costs and risks in the hope that the costs of production of goods (i. e. songs or recorded 
material) or services (performances) will be exceeded by the profit or future revenue. 
Risk-taking is inevitable since costs are initially unavoidable and it is always uncertain 
that revenue will exceed cost, or even if there will be any revenue at all. 4 ' 
In England the term entrepreneur did not come in to common usage until much later and 
this fact of development has an interesting and relevant influence on the development of 
both the economic and contractual classical models as discussed. In the 16th century 
English economic theorists describe Merchant Adventurers, but this class of description 
did not come into general use. In the 17`x' century the English term was Undertaker (of 
risks), and in the 18th century in An Essay Upon Projects Daniel Defoe makes use of the 
term Projector equivocal with inventor. But this Projector was also perceived as a fraud 
and a swindler by nature. Furthermore, and most relevant here, English theory was all 
based on a presumption that normality represented equilibrium. Individual variants in 
behaviour were supposed to be either cancelled out by aggregation or suppressed by 
competition, unmeasurable social or cultural factors such as entreprenuership could not 
be modeled into the diagram. Rewards for risk taking and uncertainty could not be 
explained. Furthermore, conventional economic theory makes it difficult to draw a true 
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picture of an industry such as the music industry, where not just individuals but 
companies and conglomerates act solely as entrepreneurs. Conventional theory, both 
legal and economic, will assume timely, reactive adjustments to perfect market 
information in order to create or regain economic stability. In reality, however, it is not 
possible to gather perfect market information about either fashion trends on the high 
street or amongst eclectic populations when it comes to musical tastes, or, indeed, to 
predict the degree of volatility of the major component of the product, the artist. 
Although Jean Baptiste Say distinguished between capital which earns dividend and 
enterprise which earns profit it would seem that neo-classical economists paid little or no 
attention to entreprenuership during the 19a' century and this has affected both political 
and legal philosophical development in this area. It is not necessary here to follow this 
debate any further. It is, however, necessary to have made note of the selected meaning 
of the term entrepreneur and of the difficulties the concept has carried in conventional 
paradigm drawing. In short there is no accurate design for monitoring the risk/cost 
behaviour pattern of a purely entrepreneurial business structure. 
END NOTES 
479 Baudeau N.; Premier introduction ä la philosophie econontique; circa 1770: cited entrcpreneurs as 
risk takers and innovators in the sphere of agricultural development. 
4"0 Turgot A. R. J.; Reflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses, circa 1774: defined the 
entrepreneur in manufacture as one who risked capital. 
481 The insurable risk factors such as at open air events are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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The Nature of Record Companies: 
Under the heading `Sony President Looks Ahead', the 1997 Annual Report for Sony 
Corporation addressed the question "What kind of company do you want Sony to be? " 
Nobuyuki Idei responded: 
Basically I want Sony to be a company that makes dreams cone true for all the 
people we come in contact with, We want to continue to supply products that 
fiulfil the dreams of our customers world-wide, for example. We also want to 
attract people with creative talent, such as musical artists, movie directors and 
game creators, and help them realise their own dreams. And this process leads 
to the creation of new dreams. 
Sony is entering fields of business that bring together an unprecedented variety 
of activities. This is why we have to develop our own distinctive management 
methods. We are one of the few companies in the world that has leading 
strengths in both electronics and entertainment. These strengths citable ums to 
develop businesses in a comprehensive manner. Spanning barriers between 
nations and languages as well as the divisions between electronics and 
entertainment, our activities are all driven by a common objective: to make 
dreams come true. While I am president I intend to expand further on this 
image I have for the Sony of tomorrow, and to create a system to promote the 
truly global management of this company. 482 
Music group sales for Sony that year had increased 14% to ¥585 billion, achieved 
through the activities of Sony owned Columbia Records, Epic Records Group, Red 
Distribution, Relatively Entertainment, Sony/ATV, music publishing, Sony Classical. 
Sony Music Independent labels (SSO Music, Crave, The Work Group) Sony Music 
International, Sony Music Nashville Ltd. and associated labels. 483 
By comparison, in 1998 the EMI Group reported that costs of sales as a percentage of 
turnover and total costs was consistent year-on-year. Music publishing royalty costs 
had fallen slightly but this had been of set by increased marketing and promotion spend 
in recorded music. 484 This report also confirmed performance related commitments to 
pay advances to artistes and repertoire owners amounting to some 061A million by 31 
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March 1998. But this well established and longstanding group made no preliminary 
promise of dream-granting or wish-making in association with this compulsory business 
report. It could be speculated that in an industry about which the media is traditionally 
ready to pass gossip and derogatory comment, the older group of companies habitually 
refrain from such enthusiastic soul baring. 
As the industry progresses into a new generation, dominated not by `majors' but by 
`mega-companies' the media continues to sting. For example during late 1999 - early 
2000 the media driven anticipation over the effects of the Time-Warner take-over of 
EMI Group might have lead to the innocent bystander to expect most unsatisfactory 
results. Nigel Cope, Associate City Editor for The Independent wrote: 
Agents and managers say EMI's most powerful stars, which inchlde the Rolling 
Stones, the Spice Girls and Radiohead, are likely to have change-of-control 
clauses in their recording contracts that could be renegotiated. Although the 
merger has been carefully constructed as a 50: 50 joint venture, artists' tan yers 
are likely to argue that Warner's greater boardroom representation in the 
enlarged company gives the US company effective control. If large numbers (if 
artists seek new contracts, it could dramatically increase F I's costs or lead to 
widespread defection&485 
Perhaps there are echoes of George Michael's feelings toward the Sony take-over of 
CBS inherent in Nigel Cope's sensationalising comments. The fact that the suggestion 
of impending defection was misplaced is evidenced in a later edition of The 
Independent where journalist David Usborne exposed the nature of Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of Warner Music Group, Roger Ames. Under the Heading Quiet 
Rocker, High Roller Usborne writes: 48' 
Three Saturdays ago, Roger Ames, a few months into his reign as head of 
Warner Music, jelled into London from New York ... with a huge secret in his 
brief case ... and waited for one of the 
few other people also in the know to 
show up... This was Ken Berry; the chairman (? f IsM! Music and oiw (Y Afr. 
Ames' oldest friends. 
Mr. Berry revealed they had a problem. The secret was not so secret any more, 
while they were planning to go before the London press and leading music 
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industry analysts first thing on Monday morning to reveal all, it seemed that the 
Los Angeles Times and at least one British newspaper had advance word... . 
The two men were about to shake hands on the V2 billion merger of their 
companies to create the number one music giant in the world. And Mr. Ames 
was to be the chief executive of the new company. 
This could have been the moment for serious tantrums. Instead Mr Ames did 
something friends say illustrates why he is so popular in business. Ne spent the 
next two hours ringing as many of the artists and producers as he could find 
the people who actually supply Warner with the goods that sell the records - to 
tell them what was happening. He didn't want then finding out second-hand 
through the press in stories likely to contain important inaccuracies. 
Subsequent to the merger, the Time-Warner internet site has been a mass of enthusiastic 
press releases, executive speeches and positive statements about technology and future 
opportunities. Later in his piece Usborne also reports that Roger Ames, earlier in his 
career, while in charge of Polygram music world-wide, spoke up at a meeting attended 
by Polygram's senior executives and consultants from a Boston company, apparently 
he: 
asked a consultant who he thought Polygram's customers were. The consultant 
said they were the buyers of music CDs and the company's shareholders. 
"Wrong, it's the (f *J artists, " Mr. Ames exploded. "Mey're our customers. 
And if we do what you're proposing we won't have any [j*J records to put out in 
the first place. " 
A general reading of Mr. Ames personality suggest that the 'old school' personality 
traits of music industry executives, those like Walter Yetnikoff, are still strongly in 
place in at least one of the mega-companies going forward into the 21' century. The 
industry is inevitably changing it's product distribution and marketing but with the new 
generation of Japanese dream makers and US stalwarts in such influential posts, it is 
speculated here that long-term relationship habits, founded in the post music hall days 
of payola developed throughout the last four decades, will continue to lead to volatile 
love/hate fall-outs such as those studied here. 
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END NOTES 
482 Sony Corporation Annual Report 1997, p5 
483 ibid. p 11 
484 EMI Group Annual Report 1998, p13 
485 www. independent. co. uk/ncws/Business; 26 January 2000; pl 
486 The Independent; Business Review; 16 February 2000, p1-2 
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Third Party Rights: 
There is no intention here to enter in to a full discussion about the effects of agency 
where a third party is, to all intents and purposes deliberately, empowered to act on 
behalf of a principle. It is recognised that many of the relationships between advisors and 
artists in the music industry are prima facie, in ordinary parlance, agency relationships. 
However for the time being, it is felt here that the independent status of the advisor, 
whether he be solicitor, manager or otherwise, would, at present be maintained in an 
argument at law. In other words he remains an independent third party. 
To date, the general common law rule has been that only a party to a contract can 
enforce rights or duties conferred by that contract. This is known as the doctrine of 
privity. A party to a contract can be identified as one giving good consideration (price, 
duty or detriment in exchange for the other's price, duty or detriment). A bare promise 
(in exchange for nothing) a duty, price or detriment already owed or a duty, price or 
detriment past, (past consideration) cannot, in common law theory become good 
consideration, and therefore cannot make up an offer or constitute an act of acceptance 
and therefore cannot be part of the formation of a legally binding contract. 
However, despite the doctrines of privity and consideration, the enforcement of third 
party rights for benefit is by no means an entirely new concept. For example in Shadwell 
v Shadwell 4s' an uncle promised to pay £150 to his nephew on the marriage of the 
nephew to Ellen Nicholl to whom the nephew was already engaged. This case can be 
interpreted to suggest that performance of the contractual duty to marry, already owed 
by the nephew to Ellen Nicholl, was good consideration for the uncle's promise and was, 
somehow, a benefit to the uncle. Therefore the uncle's promise to pay was enforceable. 
(There was some doubt in that case as to the uncle's intention to become contractually 
bound). More recently in The Eurymedotn4s8 a firm of stevedores unloaded goods from a 
ship as they were already contractually bound to do for the ship owners. Some of the 
goods belonged to a third party who, prior to the unloading, stated that he would not 
sue the firm for such damages as might be caused to his goods during the unloading. It 
was found that the unloading of the goods was consideration for the promise not to sue, 
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despite the fact that they had to be unloaded anyway as per the contract with the ships 
owner. Both of these cases illustrate performance of a duly already ois ed and 
enforcement of third party intervention to that performance. 
Where there is a mere promise rather than completion of performance the situation has 
vacillated: Initially the mere promise was thought not be sufficient Jones v Waite 
(1839). This case concerned a promise by A to C pay a debt already owed, by A, to B. 
The common law view seemed to be that the promisor, A, suffered no detriment via the 
promise and the promisee C stood to make no direct gain. C was seen as a third party 
intervening in the contractual obligations owed by A to B. However, the promisee, C, 
may in fact have a vested interest in B (to whom the original contractual debt or work is 
owed), for example the promisee may benefit from the promisor carrying out his 
(original) contractual obligation with the other party in order that the other party be 
placed in a position, gaining goods or finance, to trade with the promisor - therefore the 
promisee becomes a third party beneficiary to the contractual obligation already owed by 
the promisor to the other. Indeed, in Pao On v Lao Yin Longo' it was recognised that 
C's promise to guarantee against potential losses if A carried out his contractual 
obligations with B was enforceable. The contract A+B pre-existed, and A subsequently 
threatened not to perform without that promise of guarantee from C, but C was a party 
of shareholders in B who stood to benefit from the A +B contract. 
There may be other types of vested interest in the performance of a contract for the 
benefit of a third party. As non-commercial interests these may, under common law, fall 
victim of the doctrine of privity and remain unenforceable: For example in Besil'ick v 
Beswick490 a Nephew purchased his Uncle's coal merchant business, as part of the 
purchase agreement he promised to pay an annuity to his Aunt after the Uncle's death. 
He failed to make the payments and the Aunt could not enforce them in her own right as 
she was not a party to the contract - however she did enforce the payments under her 
capacity as administrator to the Uncle's estate as she was thus empowered to act `on his 
behalf. Effectively this amounts to the party to the contract obtaining an order for 
specific performance which effectively ensures the third party benefit is received as a 
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matter of course. A difficulty arises where specific performance is not the remedy as in 
Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd. 491 where a husband sued for damages for a family 
holiday which was less than satisfactory. The defendant holiday company did not dispute 
that they were liable to the husband - with whom they had contracted to provide the 
holiday - but did dispute that they owed any liability to the other three members of his 
family. Lord Denning said: 
In this case it was the husband making a contract for the benefit of himself, his 
wife and his children.. In short a contract for the benefits of third persons, 
He was prepared to enforce damages against the loss of benefits to the third parties. 
However, James U., while he upheld the award of extra damages, did so on the basis 
that the husband had contracted for a `family holiday', thus avoiding conflict with the 
doctrine of privily. Later in Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey 
Construction UK Lid 492 the House of Lords criticised Lord Denning - although they did 
not overrule him. 
In St. Martin's Property Corp. Ltd. v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Lid 493 the House of 
Lords were faced with a case where a builder had done negligent work on a property 
which did not come to light until after the property had been sold, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson said that it was foreseeable in the contract, given the nature of the property, 
that it would be sold into third party hands and that any damage caused by a breach on 
the part of the builders would cause substantial loss to the third party at a later date. 
Clearly the cases above show that the judiciary have shown great respect for common 
law and the doctrines of privity and consideration while appreciating where the true 
losses lie. However, no discussion is apparent in this early stage of the development of 
this area of law as to the reciprocal liability of these third parties. It is believed here that 
the enjoinder and empowerment which may be brought about by the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999 must eventually become a two way attraction. 
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END NOTES 
487 (1860) 9 C. B. (N. S. ) 159 
488 [1975] AC. 154: followed in The New York Star [1981] 1 W. L. R. 138. 
489 [1980] A. C. 614 
490 [196712 All ER 1197 
491 [197513 All ER 92 
492 [1980] 1 All ER 571 
493 [1993] 3 All ER 417 
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